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SENATOR ALFRED ALQUIST: This is the second joint public hearing pursuant to 
Section 3523.1 of the Elections Code on the so-called Taxpayer Protection Act of 
'92 (Proposition 165), which is before the voters on the November 3rd ballot. 
Joining the Senate Budget and Fiscal Review Committee is the Senate Health 
and Human Services Committee, chaired by Senator Diane Watson, and members of 
the Assembly Ways and Means Committee, chaired by Assemblyman John Vasconcellos, 
who was unable to be with us today. 
I have a few comments of my own to make before I ask others to do so. 
In seven of the last ten years the Legislature has failed to send a budget 
to the Governor by the constitutionally required June 15th deadline. 
One major reason, of course, is the lack of revenues to fund the increasing 
demand for public services to meet California's diverse and expanding population 
growth. 
The second reason is the two-thirds vote requirement that allows a small 
minority of legislators to block passage of a budget. California is one of only 
three states out of the 50 that has such a requirement. 
The third reason involves initiatives, not like the one before us today, 
that allows special interest groups to establish major constraints that limit 
the Governor and the Legislature in enacting a balanced budget. The Governor 
and the Legislature are currently faced with federal requirements, state 
mandates, court-ordered mandates, statutory requirements, and constitutional 
provisions that mandate 92 percent of the spending in our state budget. 
While Proposition 13 resolved the skyrocketing property tax increases in the 
late '70s, it also contributed to a $250 billion loss in revenue and a shift in 
education funding from the local level to the state. 
Proposition 98 established in the State Constitution mandates that require 
K through 14 education to be funded at the minimum guarantee of approximately 40 
percent of the state's budget, regardless of any other fiscal priorities. 
And Proposition 99 requires the cigarette tax revenue to be spent on 
specific health related programs, and many changes must be made with a 
four-fifths vote of the Legislature. 
Proposition 165 will be appealing to those voters who want to cut the 
Governor's and the Legislature's pay when a budget isn't enacted by June 15th. 
And this measure will also be appealing to voters who want to reduce AFDC 
benefits by 25 percent. 
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Yet a closer review of this initiative reveals that public testimony and 
participation in the budget process is reduced by the Prop. 165 provisions that 
shorten the Legislature's review of the Governor's budget. 
A closer review will demonstrate that this Governor and future governors in 
California will have powers that no other state affords their chief executive. 
A still closer review will indicate that the provisions of this initiative 
will eliminate the Legislature's ability to override a Governor's veto action if 
a fiscal emergency is declared. 
This point cannot be emphasized enough: If by unanimous vote the 
Legislature sent to the Governor a budget and the Governor refused to sign the 
bill, the Governor can then declare a fiscal emergency, enact his or her own 
budget without regard to legislative or public budget priorities. And this is 
not the vision needed to ensure the success of california's future. 
In today's hearing we will examine the fine-print provisions of Proposition 
165. This morning's testimony will be focused on the constitutional role of the 
Legislature and the executive branch that's contained in the Governor's 
initiative. 
Testimony will also be heard on the potential impact this initiative would 
have to the state support of our children's education. And after lunch we will 
hear from health services and children's advocates on the potential loss of 
funding under the passage of Proposition 165. 
The Governor's own campaign on behalf of Proposition 165 raises several 
questions: 
Is the Governor really asking California voters to approve a constitutional 
amendment that his own staff admits is constitutionally flawed? After all, if 
the Legislature passed a bill and asked the Governor to sign it, acknowledging 
it was unconstitutional, the Governor would never do so. 
Who drafted Proposition 165, and if this is a technical error, how come it 
took nearly a year for the Administration to discover the error of these five 
repeated questions on this very same subject? And I don't think that that is 
something we want to have decided by the court. 
With me so far this morning, although we are expecting any number of other 
Members, is the Vice Chairman of Budget and Fiscal Review Committee, Senator 
Frank Hill. Senator Hill, any comments? 
SENATOR FRANK HILL: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate being 
here. I think the concern that I have this morning is focusing on, really, the 
balance of power issues. While we would disagree on the two-thirds vote 
requirement of passing a budget, I would think that we would share as 
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legislators what this is going to impact, the balance of power in our three 
branches of government. I'm especially concerned about this new issue that was 
raised at the hearing that we had up in Sacramento last Monday about whether or 
not the Legislature is going to maintain its authority for legislative override. 
And so, I would ask any of those witnesses that are coming forward, at least 
for my benefit, if they could focus on that issue, because that, to me, is the 
Republicans' very disturbing concern whether or not there is indeed going to be 
the possibility of a legislative override; and the reality is there is no 
guarantee that any one party is going to control the Governor's office in the 
foreseeable future and I think we need to look at it in that context. And I 
look forward to participating in the hearing. 
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
SENATOR ALQUIST: We'll call first this morning as our first witness, Ms. 
Elizabeth Hill, who is our Legislative Analyst. 
Good morning, Ms. Hill. You may speak from there or from here. I think you 
might be more comfortable here. 
MS. ELIZABETH HILL: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Members. It's a 
pleasure to be here today. The hat that I'm wearing today is a little bit 
different than our traditional legislative hat. We do have in the Legislative 
Analyst's office a statutory mandate to produce impartial analyses of state 
ballot measures, and it's in that role that I appear before you today. 
Proposition 165 makes significant changes to the state's budget process and 
calendar as well as public assistance programs. With me today is Mr. David 
Illig, who you also heard from on Monday in Sacramento. And if it meets with 
the committee's pleasure, I would suggest that I cover the state budget process 
issues this morning and then Mr. Illig could set the agenda overview for you 
before you get into the public assistance issues this afternoon because I see 
that you have a fairly full agenda. 
So if that meets with your pleasure, I'd like to focus on the six major 
budget process provisions in Proposition 165, and I'd be happy to answer any 
questions that you may have. 
The first issue is the budget submittal date. Proposition 165 delays the 
date for submittal of the Governor's budget to the Legislature from January lOth 
to March 1st of each year. The effect of this change would be to reduce the 
amount of time by about seven weeks that the Legislature has both to analyze and 
review the Governor's budget estimates and proposals, to compress the time 
available to the Legislature to seek public input, to conduct your budget 
hearings, and the budget conference committee processes. 
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The second budget change is that a late budget forfeits legislative salaries 
and expenses. Under Proposition 165, if the Legislature fails to pass a budget 
bill by the existing constitutional deadline of June 15th, which remains 
unchanged in the Proposition, then the Governor and the Members of the 
Legislature would forfeit their salaries and expenses, travel, and per diem from 
that day forward until the budget is passed and signed by the Governor. 
The third budget provision is the late budget which allows the Governor to 
continue the prior year budget of the State of California. If a budget bill is 
not signed by the Governor by July 1st, Proposition 165 allows the Governor to 
declare a fiscal emergency. If the Governor does so, then the prior year's 
state budget becomes the state's operating budget for the new fiscal year with 
the following adjustments for four constitutionally protected spending programs. 
First, funding for K-12 schools and community colleges, which would be 
increased to the level required by Proposition 98. And then finally the three 
other elements protected by the Constitution: state debt service costs, the 
homeowners' exemption reimbursement to counties, and state mandated local 
program reimbursement which are required by the Constitution. 
The Governor would be allowed to reduce funding for all other categories of 
expenditures, including entitlement programs, as needed to balance state 
revenues and expenditures. These spending cuts would become effective 30 days 
after the Legislature is notified unless the Legislature passes and the Governor 
signs a budget bill prior to the time the cuts would become effective. 
It should be noted that this declaration of a fiscal emergency and the 
resulting operating budget are not sufficient to end the forfeiture of salaries 
and expenses that we mentioned a moment ago. The Legislature must pass and the 
Governor must sign a budget bill in order for the forfeit period to end. 
These provisions could result in either costs or savings to the state. The 
impact in any year could be very large, depending on the circumstances. Savings 
would result to the extent that the cuts proposed by the Governor to the working 
budget take effect. Increased costs, however, could result to the extent that 
state agencies continue to spend at the prior year level and that that level 
would be higher than the Legislature would have approved in a new budget. 
The fourth budget provision is the post-budget spending cuts which are 
allowed. Proposition 165 grants the Governor increased authority to reduce 
expenditures after a budget bill becomes law, again by declaring a state of 
fiscal emergency. At present, as you know, Mr. Chairman and Senator Hill, the 
Governor may issue an Executive Order requiring agencies to curtail spending for 
state operations, but spending for entitlements and local assistance programs 
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basically are not affected. 
This measure provides that the Governor may reduce any category of 
expenditure, except for the constitutionally protected categories that I 
mentioned a moment ago. 
I note on your agenda that you're hearing from several education witnesses 
later in today's hearing, and clearly there is some open -- the education 
portion is open to some interpretation, because particularly in this post-budget 
fiscal emergency, the way the wording of the measure is constructed, it says, 
" ••• except for expenditures protected by Article 16, Section 8", which is the 
Prop. 98 section of the Constitution. But as you know, there is also an 
inclusion on test(?) 3(?) in that if revenues of the state have declined, then 
you have a situation where the guarantee would then be lower. And what would 
actually happen under that circumstance, in our view, is open to interpretation. 
Now, when could a fiscal emergency be declared? First, if cumulative state 
revenues are below budget projections by 3 percent or more; if cumulative state 
expenditures are exceeding projections by 3 percent or more; or finally, if 
cumulative state revenues and expenditures are each more than 1.5 percent, then 
you would be in that circumstance. 
As with the case of a delayed budget, spending cuts proposed by the Governor 
would take effect 30 days after notification of the Legislature, unless the 
Legislature passes and the Governor signs alternative budget balancing 
legislation. These provisions could result in substantial savings in any year 
in which the Governor makes cuts to enact a budget. 
The fifth provision is that cuts can be made without changes in existing 
law. Proposition 165 allows the Governor, whenever a state fiscal emergency has 
been declared, to make spending cuts that would currently require a statutory 
change in order to be effective. These cuts could include reductions in public 
assistance grants and health benefits. In addition, the governor could reduce 
state employee salaries or work time by up to 5 percent unless collective 
bargaining agreements allow such reductions -- excuse me, if collective 
bargaining agreements allow such reductions. 
And finally, the Governor's approval is required, in our view, for budget 
related legislation. The plain language of the measure appears to revise the 
Constitution's existing provisions governing how a bill becomes a law. 
Currently, a bill may become a law without the Governor's signature in two ways: 
the Legislature may override a Governor's veto, or the Governor may allow a 
measure to become law by taking no action on the bill. proposition 165 
specifically requires certain budget related legislation to be signed by the 
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Governor in order to become law. 
As noted earlier, if a fiscal emergency has been declared by the Governor, a 
budget bill passed by the Legislature after July 1 would require the Governor's 
signature in order to become law. Also, if a fiscal emergency has been declared 
after the enactment of a budget measure, measures passed by the Legislature as 
alternatives to the budget cuts proposed by the Governor would need the 
Governor's signature in order to take effect. Thus, in both of these cases it 
would appear that the Governor's authority to determine the state's response to 
a fiscal emergency would be greatly enhanced. 
This issue of the signature required, I know has been a point of dispute in 
Monday's hearing and will probably be subject to testimony today. I can tell 
you that by statute a readability committee is an advisory body to me as we 
decide how to write our analyses of the propositions. This was one issue that 
we had the readability committee focus on in particular, and their advice to me 
at that time was that the plain language of the measure needs to be brought to 
the voters' attention as we had both when the initiative was circulating for 
signature when we did our initial analysis and then in the final analysis we 
prepared for the voter's pamphlet. 
I'd be happy to answer any questions that you may have, Mr. Chairman. 
SENATOR ALQUIST: Senator Watson. 
CHAIRPERSON DIANE WATSON: I just want to say welcome to all of you, and 
sorry that I'm late, and I have one question for Ms. Hill. 
I hear the success of the hearing on Monday was very successful, Senator 
Alquist, and I thank you for that, and I thank you for bringing this issue right 
out into the public. There's an article in the Sacramento Bee that talks about 
the Governor's office stating that the proposition is constitutionally flawed. 
As I understand it, there's a provision in there that prohibits the Legislature 
from overriding the veto. 
Is there any way, prior to the vote, to get an injunction against that 
particular proposition on the ballot? Is there any way to stop it before it 
goes to the people? 
MS. HILL: Senator Watson, I'm not an attorney. I know that a suit was 
brought under the single subject provisions related to Proposition 165 and the 
measure was upheld on those grounds. To the best of my knowledge, there wou19 
be no way at this point to do what you have suggested. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Is there any attorney here with us that can address 
that issue? Can we invalidate a provision before it goes to the vote of the 
people? 
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SENATOR ALQUIST: I would think, Senator Watson, that the "No on 165 
Committee" would almost certainly explore that option. 
And Senator Watson, I started the meeting in order -- because we do have a 
long schedule, but you are scheduled to handle the gavel today and perhaps you 
have a statement of your own. 
Ms. Hill, apparently that's all of the questions. 
SENATOR HILL: Mr. Chairman, I have some questions. 
CHAIRMAN ALQUIS~: Senator Hill. 
SENATOR HILL: Senator Watson, do you want to do your ••. ? 
SENATOR WATSON: Well, let me just very quickly again welcome everyone here. 
And of course, I'm highly concerned about the impact of the initiative on the 
people of California, particularly the people of Los Angeles County since this 
is the largest county and the most diversified county, and the provisions will 
hurt the effort of the County Board of Supervisors as well as the people in the 
city to deliver their services. I am concerned about the health care, 
particularly clinics, mental health, social services, that will be severely 
affected under the provisions of this bill. 
I am hoping that we, through these hearings and also through the kind of 
press that we hope to have between now and November 3rd, highlight the flaws in 
this proposal. What we need to do is educate the public so they will know. I 
am hearing in my office now from welfare recipients that didn't know that the 
budget last year cut them and that the budget this year also cut their grants 
and the impact of 165 will be devastating. People just have not tuned in and I 
guess we haven't done the job of getting the message out. 
So with the press here I'm hoping that this will be a major step in trying 
to educate the public as to how flawed this proposition is. It's called "The 
Taxpayers' Protection and Fiscal Responsibility Act." That name in itself 
deludes people into thinking it's going to protect them in some way when it 
really will hurt people that we need to help and we're committed to help. 
With that, I appreciate those who are coming to make presentations, and I 
hope that the press will follow 165 all the way into the polls so that we can 
get it defeated and then we can start on really a reform. 
I want to thank Ms. Hill for, again, her very articulate and cogent remarks 
relative to 165, and I hope the remainder of the day that we can continue to 
have such relevant information that will help people make the right decision. 
Senator Hill. 




Liz, it's your opinion that the provision requiring a signature indeed does 
not allow for a legislative override of a veto after that June 15 deadline is 
past? 
MS. HILL: Senator Hill, what we indicated is that it appears to change 
that, and clearly this is an issue of judicial interpretation, but just looking 
at the plain language of the measure, the word "sign" is repeated numerous times 
in both Sections 4 and 5, which are the budget sections of the measure. 
SENATOR HILL: Okay. A couple more technical issues. You talked about 
whether or not Proposition 98 was guaranteed, and if you're in the circumstance 
the Governor declares a fiscal emergency, we have revenue drop by at least 3 
percent, is the issue that we adopted a budget based on some projection, 
revenues are off by 3 percent, is the issue that you're talking about then 
whether or not the Governor would have the authority to reduce the 98 guarantee 
because we have fallen below those 3 percent projections? 
MS. HILL: You have several competing issues at once. You have the 
situation that you've just outlined which, depending on also what was happening 
with local property taxes and average daily attendance, which are also factors 
in the Proposition 98 guarantee calculation along with state general fund 
revenues, if that were to affect the then Proposition 98 guarantee amount with 
the wording of the measure, which says "except expenditures protected by the 
article that applies to Proposition 98", there would be some interpretation 
because the guarantee may have at that point in time changed. 
However, as you know, the Legislature also, usually in a control section of 
the budget act, specifies what the Proposition 98 guarantee will be for the 
upcoming fiscal year. So you could also have a situation where the budget act 
expresses a guarantee level which now would be higher than the new one. Well 
then, does the wording of this measure apply, for example, to the budget act 
guarantee amount in the control section, or what the new Proposition 98 
guarantee would be, given changes in the factors with the proposition? 
The other factor you have, of course, is now you have a situation with both 
some retroactive recapture and loan payments that now are in the Proposition 98 
equation. How would those be interpreted by the courts? 
SENATOR HILL: And so your conclusion is it's just not clear. You don't 
know whether or not the Governor would unilaterally have the authority to say we 
no longer the 98 guarantee has fallen and so I unilaterally have the 
authority to reduce those expenditures. 
MS. HILL: We're saying it's open to interpretation. 
SENATOR HILL: Last question, Madam Chair, if I could, deals with the 3 
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percent trigger, that fiscal emergency. How much is 3 percent? How many times 
in the last 4 or 5 years have we been off in terms of the finance projections by 
3 percent? How many times would you attribute that fiscal emergency? 
MS. HILL: Well, certainly in the last 3 years, Senator Hill, our revenues 
have declined relative to the initial budget estimate by that amount. Generally 
on the expenditure side, it has not swung as much as our recent experience with 
revenues, particularly because of the recession. But in the last 3 years you 
would have that situation. 
SENATOR HILL: So the last Deukmejian budget and the last two budgets the 
revenues have been off by that 3 percent amount. And so if this had been in 
effect the Governor would have the authority to declare a fiscal emergency and 
all the additional powers. 
MS. HILL: To the best of my knowledge. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: A couple of questions before you leave. Number one, if 
Proposition 165 is to pass, does it supersede any other provision in any other 
statute that has to do with these budgetary provisions relative to the 98 and 
maybe Proposition 99 that raises revenues? What would be the impact of 
provisions in -- particularly, the fiscal provisions in 165 have? 
MS. HILL: To the best of my knowledge, Senator Watson, I mean this would be 
the latest expression of the people's intent and be placed in the Constitution. 
I think one of the issues you may be getting at is also, say, the interaction 
with the education issues and in that case the measure does not amend that 
provision, it references it. So it would not change the Proposition 98 
guarantee but I think what you would have, in effect, is some uncertainty as to 
how the two measures interact together under different scenarios. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: So, to the extent that there are provisions under 
certain code sections, it would amend those code sections, the ones that are 
named here. 
MS. HILL: Those only. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Okay. 
My next question is, we get fiscal information from the Finance Department 
(the Governor's department), from your department, Leg Counsel, from the 
Controller, from Ways and Means, and our Budget and Fiscal Committee five 
different sources. Often, those numbers don't jive, and I think that's been the 
problem over the years. I remember a letter from Ways and Means six years ago 
saying that we're in a deficit posture(?). It wasn't IOU to A-OK-- we were not 
A-OK -- and I think Pete Wilson realized that after taking over from the 
Deukmejian Administration. Is there any way in 165 that we can be able to know 
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what the real and actual figures are? How do we collaborate across all those 
different sources of information to know the real figures? 
MS. HILL: Senator Watson, my reading of the proposition rests that 
determination in the Department of Finance. It's the Department of Finance's 
estimate of the cumulative 3 percent revenues, expenditures, or some combination 
of the two, that would dictate the fiscal emergency provisions in Proposition 
165. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, that's what I think is feeding a lot of the 
problem, because as I said, the figures are different from each one of those 
sources usually, and some way we've got to know what -- and, you know, the May 
revise always hits us upside the head with reality and it seems to me we ought 
to do a better job of becoming projected and accounting. 
I listen to the Controller a lot because he knows what's in the bank 
accounts, and that has a lot of meaning to me. You know, what money we really 
have on hand and what money we owe out and who we have to pay. So some way 
we're going to have to have more accurate reporting of what our fiscal picture 
is, and I don't know if the Finance Department has that level of accuracy. It 
hasn't in the last few years. 
That's a comment more than a question. 
We want to thank you so very much for coming here to Los Angeles and for 
bringing us this information relative to 165. 
MS. HILL: Thank you very much. As I mentioned, I covered only the 
budgetary portion. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Senator, do you have another question? 
SENATOR HILL: I do, Liz, before you go. Senator Watson just raised an 
interesting thought in my mind. Would it be possible for a governor to use 
over-optimistic revenue projections from the Department of Finance, or maybe use 
the most optimistic --we've got 5 different projections about what's going to 
happen to the economy -- we will choose the UCLA School of forecasts if that 
happens to be the most optimistic one -- get a budget passed, and then to 
obviate or to eliminate the contentiousness of making some of the budget cuts 
while we're trying to get a budget adopted? At what point then could you say 
we're off our 3 percent, we used over-optimistic revenue forecasts and now I can 
make these cuts unilaterally because I've declared a fiscal emergency? Is that 
scenario plausible or possible? 
MS. HILL: In my judgment it is possible. Of course, it would depend what 
the Legislature and the Governor did in terms of appropriating those revenues, 
then what sort of effect it may have on the spending reductions that the 
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Governor would be authorized to make. 
SENATOR HILL: It just seems to me the legislative reality is that we 
would -- nobody wants to make the tough decisions about the tough cuts and if 
somebody's willing to go along, and the Department of Finance is willing to go 
along with an optimistic revenue projection that gives us more money to spend, 
more than likely most of the Legislature is going to jump at that. At what 
point then does the 3 percent analysis come in that allows the Governor to 
trigger a fiscal emergency? 
MS. HILL: That determination has to be made on a quarterly basis. So at 
the end of each of the quarters of the fiscal year-- September ••• 
SENATOR HILL: So at the end of that first quarter, theoretically he could 
come back and say we're off by 3 percent, doesn't look as good as we thought, 
and I'm going to declare a fiscal emergency. 
MS. HILL: It's theoretically possible. 
Thank you very much, Madam Chair and Members, and Mr. Illig will be 
available later on the health and welfare provisions. Thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We appreciate it. 
Steve Gold, Director, Center for the Study of States, Rockefeller Institute. 
MR. STEVE GOLD: Thank you very much. 
I would like to say first of all that my Center studies state budget 
problems and solutions all over the country. We probably spend more time 
looking at California than any other state because it's the biggest and the 
problems here are some ways worse than other places. 
I've been asked to provide some perspective about how the California budget 
problems compare to those in other states and also how the policies in 
California, and particularly those in this proposition, compare to those in 
other states. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Mr. Gold, too, would you direct some of your comments 
toward the initiative process, which is unique to very few states, and which 
appears to be the way we are making policy in California through initiatives. 
So you might want to give us the national perspective on the initiative process 
as you go through. 
MR. GOLD: Sure. 
And, also, I've prepared some written comments. I'm going to go beyond it 
in some ways and just summarize it in others. 
Basically, first I'll talk about the causes of the fiscal problems, then how 
taxes and services in California compare to other states, and finally talk about 
policies in other states, both adopted so far and the ones that I think need to 
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be looked at in the future. 
Now as is well known, all states are having fiscal difficulties, and the 
most important reasons are the recession and burgeoning Medicaid costs. Also, 
the enrollment increases in the schools and corrections increases and inadequate 
tax systems are also major reasons why states are having budget problems. There 
are any list of reasons why states are having budget problems -- increases in 
AFDC are not as important as the factors I've just mentioned. Although most 
states who've had big increases in AFDC in the past two years, it is such a 
small percentage of the budget that it's not as important as the recession and 
Medicaid and school increases. 
It's interesting to note that although California has had big increases in 
AFDC caseloads, they're not particularly large by national standards. Clearly, 
the most recent information available from the American Public Welfare 
Association Journal in February of 1989 and January of 1992, the increase in 
AFDC caseloads in California was only the 21st highest in the country. So it 
was not far above average. 
And it's interesting to note that Arizona, which has much lower benefits 
than California, had the second biggest increase. 
So no other state has targeted AFDC as an area for cuts in the way that 
California has, and in fact, the cuts that were enacted last year and this year 
are bigger than the reductions that have been adopted in the last year, two 
years, than any other state. 
Now, even though most states are having budget problems, the problems in 
California are much worse than most other states, if not much worse than any 
other state. And there are three factors I want to mention in regard to why 
these problems are so big in California. 
(NOTE: Mr. Gold's testimony was inaudible due to technical difficulties. 
Refer to Mr. Gold's written testimony for content.) 
MR. RICHARD SYBERT: ... (beginning of his testimony is inaudible) ... I'm here 
at your request to testify regarding the proposed budget cutting mechanisms 
under Proposition 165, the Taxpayer Protection Act on this November's ballot. 
I understand that a representative of the Office of Child Development and 
Education may testify on other aspects of the act later today, so I'll confine 
my own comments to a comparison of the budget cutting mechanisms in the 
initiative with those of other states. 
As you know, the Act would provide California's Governor with the ability to 
reduce spending to meet revenues when there's a deficit and the Legislature 
cannot or has not acted to close it. In certain defined circumstances, the 
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Governor would then be empowered to close the deficit through cuts in 
approximately 50 percent of budget categories. 
Several months ago my office, the Office of Planning and Research, conducted 
a comprehensive survey of the 50 states -- I have a copy here with me and I'd be 
happy to provide the Members with a copy afterwards 
available to other state governors to reduce a budget. 
to compare the mechanisms 
What we found, in a nutshell, was that California was almost alone in 
ham-stringing its chief executive in the budget arena. At least 44 other states 
give their governors more authority than California currently does to bring 
spending into line with revenues. There are only five other states -- Florida, 
Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, and New Hampshire -- which deny their governor such 
authority, and at least one of these -- Florida -- is currently working on 
legislation to correct this. 
Moreover, we found that the powers proposed under the Act fall about in the 
middle of the range of such authority granted other state governors. In other 
words, Prop. 165 is a fairly moderate version of what is fairly standard 
gubernatorial authority. One may argue whether or not on the merits a governor 
should have this authority, but it's simply inaccurate to claim that it is 
unusual or extreme. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: On that issue, the budgetary process is described in 
the Constitution of California. Are there similar provisions in these other 
states, or in other states, that compare to ours? Are we that far out of line 
in terms of our constitutional provisions relative to the budget process? 
MR. SYBERT: Senator, forgive me, can you try to rephrase it? I'm not sure 
I understand and I want to answer correctly. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Our Constitution gives the authority to the Legislature 
to work the budget. The Governor proposes and then we analyze and work and 
present a budget. In other states, is the constitutional authority similar, 
comparable? 
MR. SYBERT: Yes. That is the basic structure. In addition, what most 
other states have done is they have recognized a potential gridlock situation 
when the governor and the legislature can't agree on a budget. That's happened 
in other states as well. And the rationale is that all right, while the debate 
continues, meanwhile we have spending programs and we have revenue coming in, 
and since deficit spending is forbidden under most state constitutions, 
including California's, there's got to be a mechanism to make sure a state 
doesn't go into deficit spending while that debate is going on. And most other 
states have resolved this by giving the executive branch, the governor, limited 
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authority, under guidelines, under prescribed limitations, to cut spending while 
that debate is going on, to bring it into line with revenues, and that, it's my 
understanding, is also the intent of Prop. 165. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you. 
MR. SYBERT: Thank you. 
Naturally, the extent of independent gubernatorial budget authority varies 
among these 44 other states. I've blown up a chart here, and copies attached to 
my written comments that you have, to demonstrate the different categories. At 
the lower end -- I don't know if you can see this, this is at the bottom of the 
chart -- at the lower end a governor is permitted to achieve minor savings by 
reorganizing executive branch departments, by consolidating them and impounding 
some of their budgetary funds. There are five states -- Kentucky, Montana, 
Nebraska, Illinois, and Bill Clinton's Arkansas -- that grant this kind of 
limited authority. 
At the upper end -- this is at the top of the chart here -- there are 20 
states that permit their governors to reduce any expenditures necessary to bring 
them into line with revenues with few or no limits as to the budget categories 
that may be cut, and in addition, to reorganize the executive branch. These 20 
states include some of our neighbors -- Arizona, Nevada, and Oregon. 
Now, in between these two ends of the spectrum, the remaining 19 states give 
their governors a variety of limited mechanisms. There are relatively crude 
ones such as requiring that cuts be made pro rata across the board. Examples of 
that are Alabama and Georgia. Or that cuts be made under an agreed set of 
priorities, as in Arkansas. And then there are other states, such as 
Connecticut, where the governor has discretion to make cuts up to a certain 
percentage. Or, as another example, Missouri, where the governor can make cuts 
only in certain nonexempt categories of the budget. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Excuse me. I just would like to announce the presence 
of Assemblyman Bob Epple. Thank you for joining us. Continue, please. 
MR. SYBERT: Thank you, Senator. 
In this middle group of 19 states, the executive branch cannot be 
unilaterally reorganized. 
Again, Prop. 165 is in this middle ground of mechanisms. It does not, or 
would not provide the governor with unlimited discretion as to where to make 
cuts, but instead would allow him to make spending reductions in about 50 
percent of the budget categories. The other half of the budget, including debt 
service, education -- and I know Secretary DiMarco will speak to this later 
today -- local subventions, and 95 percent of state employees' salaries would be 
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exempt from any cuts. 
Now, this may be contrasted, for example. Let me show you a second chart 
here. 
What we've done on this second chart -- what the second chart shows, 
Members, it's a list of states, some of the states that provide their governors 
with independent budget cutting authority, and it shows the percentage of their 
budget expenditures that may not be cut. It shows the exempt percentages. And 
you can see that at the top Minnesota and North Carolina say everything's open 
to being cut; they exempt nothing. At the bottom, Massachusetts exempts over 80 
percent of its budget. California, under Prop. 165, again would be about 
two-thirds of the way down. Fifty percent of the budget would be protected and 
50 percent would be open to cuts. This may be contrasted, for example, with 
some of the larger industrial states perhaps more analogous to California: 
Pennsylvania, where none of the budget is exempted from cuts; New York, where 
only 6.8 percent may be exempted; or smaller states such as Arizona and Colorado 
where only education is exempted. 
As I said, we present data on this chart as to 21 states that exercised this 
kind of budget authority in 1991, and two-thirds of them were more generous to 
their governors and their ability than Prop. 165 would permit the California 
governor. 
I believe that it is inaccurate to claim, as some have, that Prop. 165 would 
give the governor unlimited budget power. Instead, Prop. 165 would give the 
governor the ability, if he or she and the Legislature cannot agree on a budget, 
and only if their is a projected deficit, to make cuts based on the then-current 
or most recent budget baseline in about half the budget categories and then only 
enough to close the projected deficit. Prop. 165 does not let a governor write 
a budget. It lets him close a deficit according to set criteria and an 
established budget baseline, either while the budget debate goes on or with the 
current budget still in place. Those are two very different things. 
I heard testimony earlier this morning about the fear, and I believe Senator 
Alquist referenced this in his opening remarks, that somehow Prop. 165 repeals 
the standard constitutional provision of a legislative override; that the 
Legislature on a two-thirds vote could override a governor's veto. 
The Attorney General, yesterday, came down with an opinion, which I 
understand is now public, that that is not the case; that there is no repeal of 
the legislative override in Prop. 165 and that simply is not an issue. You 
cannot repeal, according to the Attorney General, a constitutional provision by 




The Legislature would still be able, by a two-thirds vote, to pass a budget and 
have it be law. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Let me draw your attention to the Sacramento Bee 
article, September 29 "Error Makes Proposition 165 Constitutionally Flawed." 
Judge Gordon, Director of the Gove~nor's campaign for 165 ... that there is a 
small, minute technical error ... so that could be corrected by the courts, and 
that is the flaw that we are referring to. There is an admission to the fact 
that it is an error. 
MR. SYBERT: Madam Chair, I want to be careful. I am a lawyer. I'm not 
here to testify on behalf of the initiative or the initiative campaign. I'm 
here to testify as to what we found referencing other states. But I do know 
that the Attorney General has found and issued an opinion that that is not the 
case. He has issued an opinion that there is no such error. I have an extra 
copy of that and I'd be happy to give it to you if you'd like to take a look at 
it. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, Mr. Gordon, who was responsible for putting it on 
the ballot, said it was an error. So you have some conflict with the people who 
developed Proposition 165, is what you're saying. 
MR. SYBERT: My own personal opinion, not speaking on behalf of the Governor 
or anyone else, speaking on behalf of me, is that I don't believe there is an 
error, and apparently the Attorney General believes also that there is no error. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: All right. My next question to you would be this: 
Now, in current law the government must submit -- the governor must submit a 
balanced budget, and it gives a time certain. And in current l~w, the 
Legislature is required to pass a budget and there's a requirement of 
two-thirds. Do you feel that the new authority in 165, and I'm going to read 
directly from it, "would allow the Governor to declare a fiscal emergency and 
reinstate the prior budget adjusted for constitutionally required increases and 
any reductions needed to balance anticipated revenues and expenditures when a 
new budget has not been passed." Does that language not give the governor the 
authority to declare a budget or to write a budget? 
MR. SYBERT: I do not believe so. My reading of the Act is that if there is 
no budget, for whatever reason, if there is no budget, and if there is a 
projected deficit, because remember, if there is no projected deficit none of 
this kicks in in the first place, if there's no budget, number one, number two, 
if there's a projected deficit, then number three, the governor is required to 
take the prior year's budget as a baseline and he is permitted to make cuts in 




CHAIRPERSON WATSON: But this allows the governor to rewrite the budget. 
MR. SYBERT: Well, I think strictly speaking it allows the governor, under 
very strict circumstances, to rewrite a very small portion of the budget, but it 
certainly doesn't even come close to allowing him to ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Small, large, it really doesn't make any difference. 
The rewrite is the trigger word there. What I see, this very clearly gives the 
governor the authority to rewrite a budget in a fiscal emergency. 
The concern I have is that there is a two-thirds requirement, for obvious 
reasons, to pass a budget. That makes it more difficult or brings more people 
into the decision on a budget that impacts over 30 million people for the State 
of California. I feel that it flies in the face of representative policymaking. 
The 120 people write that budget and the governor can lower figures, can't 
increase them but can lower figures. It gives the 120 people and their 
constituents the representation on that budget. Now, Proposition 165 changes 
that and puts it into the hands of one person to then rewrite, and that flaw 
does not allow us to go back and correct it through an override. 
MR. SYBERT: Madam Chair, I have great respect for you and I'm going to have 
to •.• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: It doesn't have anything to do with respect. Just 
answer the question. 
MR. SYBERT: I'm going to respectfully disagree with almost everything you 
said. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: It's all right to disagree with me because I'm 
disagreeing with you, so it's okay. 
MR. SYBERT: Let me just very briefly go down the laundry list of 
disagreements. 
Number one, I think there is an enormous difference between being able to 
affect one, two, three percent of the budget and being able to affect 100 
percent of it. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We're not talking about size. We're talking about the 
authority, and the authority says the governor can ... One provision or 100, 
does the governor have that authority under 165 or not? 
MR. SYBERT: But I am talking about size and I don't think you ..• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: No. No, no. Answer my question. Does 165 give the 
authority to the governor to rewrite one provision? 
MR. SYBERT: One provision? 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: One provision, or more. 
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MR. SYBERT: Under certain specified circumstances. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Or more. Yes/no? 
MR. SYBERT: Under certain specified circumstances. Unfortunately, it's not 
a yes or no question. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: Madam Chair? Perhaps I can rephrase this. Does the Act 
give authority to the governor to spend money when an appropriation has been 
made by the Legislature? 
MR. SYBERT: Forgive me, sir. Could you -- I didn't catch a couple of words 
there. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: Does the initiative give the authority to the governor 
to spend money without an appropriation having been made by the Legislature? 
MR. SYBERT: Again, I'm speaking after my own personal reading of it. I 
don't represent the initiative and I'm not here to give formal legal advice. My 
reading of the initiative is it doesn't -- no, I don't think so, because the 
governor has to take the existing budget baseline. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: Okay, But, if there is no appropriation that's been made 
by the Legislature, no budget approved, and he acts to spend after that date 
under the authority granted in this, and he is doing it without an appropriation 
of the Legislature. 
MR. SYBERT: I think you would want to get an expert legal answer to that, 
but I suppose there is an implication that there's a continuing appropriation 
from the current or just prior year's budget baseline. 
Madam Chair, may I continue? 
I'm sorry, I got a little distracted and I was in the middle of disagreeing 
with you on everything and I forgot the last ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: You think I'm going to remind you what you were 
disagreeing with me on? (Laughter.) 
MR. SYBERT: The last four or five points. Oh, I know, you made reference 
again to the assertion that the Legislature would be unable to have any 
opportunity to redress the governor's action, and again, I don't believe that's 
the case. Apparently, the Attorney General doesn't believe that's the case. 
Under current law, without Prop. 165, you need two-thirds to pass a budget and 
you need two-thirds to override a governor's veto. As I understand the Attorney 
General's Opinion, with Prop. 165, if the governor vetoes a budget and the 
Legislature then overrides by two-thirds, that budget becomes law. That's the 
way I understand the Attorney General's Opinion, and again, I have an extra copy 
of it if the committee would like it. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: As I understand, there's a provision in 165 that 
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requires the governor's signature and what it does on that budget by a certain 
deadline. What that does is to eliminate the possibility of a veto override by 
the Legislature. 
MR. SYBERT: My understanding, Senator Watson, is that that is not the case 
and the Attorney General has apparently opined that that is not the case. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, Mr. Gordon says it was an error and should have 
not been in there. That's the person who put the proposition on the ballot. 
MR .. SYBERT: I read the same article in the Sacramento Bee and all I can 
tell you is since my arrival in Sacramento about 20 months ago I have been 
stunned at how often the newspapers get it wrong. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Oh, maybe that's the reason, you just got here 20 
months ago. Okay, all right. 
MR. SYBERT: Let me briefly finish up my prepared remarks and then if there 
are any additional questions I'd be happy to respond to them. 
Again, this OPR survey that looked at the other 49 states, we found that 
there is a correlation between greater gubernatorial authority and smaller 
deficits. The states whose governors have significant or full budget cutting 
authority this year faced average budget shortfalls of 2.5 percent of planned 
expenditures. That is less than half the average 5.7 percent shortfall of 
states like California whose governor has little or no authority. Putting that 
another way, states whose governors can reduce spending when the Legislature 
cannot tend to run substantially smaller deficits. 
We also looked at the court cases which have challenged some of these 
powers, and as you might imagine, there are a number of those. These kinds of 
budget cutting powers are sometimes challenges of violation of the separation of 
powers. According to the court cases, most of these budget cutting powers are 
upheld. The general rule is that such authority is constitutional and it 
doesn't violate the separation of powers if it is constrained within broad 
policy limits that are set in statute. It looks to me like the Taxpayer 
Protection Act appears to meet this test because it sets which budget categories 
may be cut and which not. 
In conclusion, Madam Chair, and Members, the breath of the governor's 
authority to cut the budget that is established in the Taxpayer Protection Act 
is common and it is normal in many other states and it generally passes legal 
muster. Prop. 165 is a fairly mild version of such authority ... it falls about 
in the middle. Again, the alternative is deficit spending which is 
constitutionally forbidden. 
I appreciate the opportunity to comment and I'd be happy to respond to any 
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further questions or comments that Members may have. 
SENATOR HILL: Madam Chair, if I could, I've got some questions. The first 
one, Mr. Sybert, deals with your original chart talking about California being 
in the group of four or five I guess six states that had no authority in 
terms of budget reductions. My question is, as you look at that authority 
this is under the proposed authority -- the Governor declares a fiscal 
emergency -- how many of those other states does the governor have the blue 
pencil authority? 
MR. SYBERT: You mean the line item veto? 
SENATOR HILL: Line item veto. 
MR. SYBERT: Senator, we did not look at that but I would be happy to try to 
get that information and get it back to you. 
SENATOR HILL: It just seems to me that if you make the argument that really 
California has a very weak governor, that there are only five other states that 
have the -- that don't have this kind of new budget authority that part of 
that part of the tremendous leverage that the Governor has in our budget 
process is his ability to blue pencil, and it seems to me somehow that has to be 
adjusted in there in terms of being a fair comparison of other states and other 
governors' authority. I know that not all other states does the governor have 
that blue pencil authority. 
MR. SYBERT: I think that is a fair comment and I will get that information 
to you, but I also suspect the answer is going to be that most of them have the 
line item veto. I know that they have it in Arkansas, because Bill Clinton has 
said that if he's President he wants it as the national President. So I suspect 
Democrat, Republican, across the board, most governors have that authority. 
SENATOR HILL: But again, that would be a-- it seems to me that's just an 
additional power that the governor has that somehow isn't reflected in terms 
of ... 
MR. SYBERT: Sure. That is a fair comment and I will get that information 
to you. 
SENATOR HILL: You know, this issue about whether we get or need to have a 
signature or not is a great concern to me. I'd like to see that Attorney 
General's Opinion. You could just send it to me. I'd like to get a copy of 
that. It seems to me that's a very critical piece of this whole budget 
authority is whether or not indeed after you get past that June 15 deadline 
whether or not there's an ability to override a veto of whatever governor, and I 
know there's a difference of opinions but I think that's a real critical part. 




MR. SYBERT: Senator, we had our budget cuts, so rather than spend 29 cents 
on a stamp, I'm just going to give it to you. 
SENATOR HILL: Okay. 
Two other questions that I'd like to get your response to. On the second 
chart, I think the issue was California if Prop. 165 passes, the governor 
would have the authority to reduce half of the state budget. Put him right in 
mid-range, or actually two-thirds or so of the way down. That implies that the 
governor would have no authority in terms of -- I assume -- maybe this is not a 
correct assumption -- my assumption is that includes the governor would have no 
authority to reduce K-14 appropriations. That that's part of the 40 percent 
that she had. I assume the other things add up to 10 percent. 
MR. SYBERT: I believe that's the case. I know there has been some dispute 
as to whether that exemption is limited to the Prop. 98 guarantee or whether it 
extends to an education appropriation greater than the Prop. 98 guarantee. It 
may be an academic question. I don't know how soon we're going to get an 
appropriation greater than the guarantee. I believe that Secretary DiMarco is 
prepared to address that a little later. 
SENATOR HILL: But my comment is not, you know, what happens if we end up 
with an expenditure over the 98 guarantee, but what about the real world exempt 
we've had the last couple of years. If we pass a budget, make an assumption on 
what the 98 guarantee is going to be, we found out the last couple of years our 
assumptions were overly optimistic. That triggers the governor declaring 
there's a fiscal emergency. This year we had a $2.3 billion recapture in 
overpayment. So my question is, if Prop. 165 is successful, does the governor 
have the authority to reduce the K-14, the Prop. 98 guarantee under this year's 
scenario by that $2.3 billion? 
MR. SYBERT: I'm really going to ask you to hold that question for Secretary 
DiMarco. She simply is more qualified than I am. 
SENATOR HILL: Okay. I guess -- the Analyst testified: we're not sure. 
It's an open-ended issue: I'm not sure. If indeed it turns out that the 
governor would have that authority to reduce the 98 guarantee by the 2.3 -- I 
assume just by the $2.3 billion, then the percentage of authority the cut that 
the governor would have in terms of your chart would not be 50 percent but 
indeed somewhere in the neighborhood of 10 percent, because if you take out the 
40 percent, the K-14 suffer. 
MR. SYBERT: Senator, again, please ask Secretary DiMarco, but my 
understanding is that nobody has suggested that the minimum guarantee itself, 
which is some 41 percent, would not be exempt. 
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SENATOR HILL: No, no. I understand that. But it seems that the way that 
you come up with the 50 percent figure, in terms of half the budget would be 
protected, is assuming that all 40 percent of the K-12 expenditures would also 
be protected. 
MR. SYBERT: Yeah. 
SENATOR HILL: If indeed it turns out, as the Analyst says it's an 
open-ended question, and we'll find out-- I see Secretary DiMarco here-- that 
the governor has the authority to reduce that $2.3 billion under this year's 
real world scenario, then the reality is the governor's authority here, in terms 
of his authority to cut spending, you would have to-- actually, what you'd have 
to do in terms of the chart that you would have would be to add that to the 50 
percent. You'd have to add additional 40 percent to the budget which would give 
him the authority to reduce, indeed, a total 90 percent of the state budget. 
MR. SYBERT: I don't read the numbers the same way. If -- and we would need 
to crunch the numbers ... 
SENATOR HILL: Let me put it this way. 
MR. SYBERT: No, I understand what you're asking and I would like to 
respond. If you assume that the governor would have the ability to cut what in 
retrospect is an overpayment to the schools above what turns out to be their 
actual Prop. 98 guarantee, then at most, I suspect, that would push the 50 
percent figure, exempt figure, down to 40/45 percent. The major -- a major 
portion of the budget would still be protected and would still put California 
right in the middle. 
SENATOR HILL: But when you calculate up that figure, you're totaling in --
you're assuming that K-14 expenditures are exempt from the governor's ability to 
reduce. That's what I'm trying to get at. 
MR. SYBERT: I believe that's correct. We did make that assumption. In 
most cases, even if there is a -- with 20/20 hindsight or 20/20 accounting, even 
if it turns out that there is a Prop. 98 overpayment, the vast bulk of education 
funding will still be within that Prop. 98 minimum guarantee and will be exempt. 
SENATOR HILL: But I assume that in terms -- when you put this chart 
together you're not talking --when you exempt programs, when you say, for 
instance, Mississippi Medicaid is exempt, you can't take credit for the portion 
of programs which could be cut, if only, like you say, if $2.3 billion and we're 
still spending $17 billion on K-14 education, you're putting the entire program 
into that exempted category. 
MR. SYBERT: Well, my understanding, and again, I don't want to punt too 
often but Secretary DiMarco will respond to this, my understanding is that K-14 
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education is exempt under the proposition. 
SENATOR HILL: Completely. 
MR. SYBERT: That's my understanding. 
SENATOR HILL: And even under the overpayment scenario there's no authority 
to go back and retroactively blue pencil that? 
MR. SYBERT: That is my understanding, but again, I want to be very careful 
not to overstate my brief. I'm here to testify what the budget cutting 
mechanisms are in other states. I can't represent either the Administration or 
even a thorough legal analysis in answering those kinds of questions. 
SENATOR HILL: I guess to get back to my scenario, the way it appears that 
this chart is put together since you're having entire programs not portions of 
programs, whether or not you're exempted, I assume to get to Massachusetts 80 
percent of all programs have been exempted, you're totaling all of them up, that 
if indeed the governor has the authority to reduce that Prop. 98 guarantee by 
the $2.3 billion, then your 50 percent figure would had to have that additional 
40 percent added to it? 
MR. SYBERT: Well, what percentage of total K-14 funding was the 
$2.3 billion? I mean, we can figure this out real quick. 
SENATOR HILL: But I don't believe -- I'm trying to get back to that 
point -- I don't believe that's how the rest of the chart was pieced together by 
only saying the $2.3 billion piece of K-14 was factored in there. I assume that 
you'd exempt the entire program. 
MR. SYBERT: Yes. Because my understanding, again, is that K-14 education 
is exempt, so we put the whole program in there. 
SENATOR HILL: The last question gets back to a concern that I've had, and 
Mr. Epple talked about that, given the the argument has been this only gives 
the governor authority, because again, I'm trying to analyze this from the 
perspective of not this Governor but who's the next governor and what if it's of 
a party that I don't like, just like some of my colleagues here are concerned to 
that on the opposite, what about giving -- the argument is, well, it only gives 
the governor authority to cut, and so as fiscal conservative, Senator Hill, you 
shouldn't be worried about that because even if it's the most liberal Democrat 
governor who gets elected, their only authority is going to be in terms of 
reducing programs, that shouldn't make you nervous. My question is, if indeed 
you have the fiscal deadlock, we don't have a budget in place, isn't it fair to 
argue that by giving the authority to the governor to continue expenditures, 
using last year's budget as a baseline indeed gives the governor authority to 
spend money because it's based on last year's programs? 
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MR. SYBERT: Again, I think that we need to separate out two issues here. 
One is the interim ability of the governor while the budget debate is going on, 
if it lasts past the constitutional deadline, is the interim ability of the 
governor to cut expenditures, authorized expenditures? The other issue is 
whether an expired budget, whether the appropriation legally carries on. And I 
suspect the person who has to answer that is the Controller. You may have a 
situation where there is no legal authority for the state to actually spend 
money and the state has to issue IOU's if there is no budget, just as occurred 
this year, and perhaps the IOU'S have to be a reduced rate according to what the 
governor cuts. But again, that is something that I haven't taken a look at, 
wasn't asked to, and I really think you would need to talk to the Controller 
about the legal authority, because, of course, he is the one who pays the bills. 
SENATOR HILL: I don't think it's a Controller issue at all. I mean, the 
real world is this: As we go through the budget process into the budget 
committee we know the governor does not have authority to spend money, that the 
Legislature doesn't put the funding in for the Office of Planning and Research 
or we reduce that by a certain amount, there is no way the governor can spend 
above that amount. And that really is the balance-of-power trade-off. We know 
at any time we can pass a budget and the governor has the ability to blue 
pencil. You know, I got a park blue pencil by the Governor two weeks ago in 
terms of the budget that he had -- that's his authority to do that. But the 
trade-off is while he has the ability to make those cuts he also does not have 
the ability to expend any money. And so my question is, under this scenario, 
and it isn't a Controller's issue, it's an issue that says if you're going to 
use last year's budget as a baseline, we've got a fiscal emergency, does the 
Legislature have the authority, under that declaration of a fiscal emergency, to 
eliminate the Office of Planning and Research? It doesn't appear that it does. 
It appears that you start with whatever last year's baseline is in terms of an 
assumption, and the reality is, hasn't that changed that balance of power 
because the governor now has authority to expend, albeit only to that level of 
last year's budget? 
MR. SYBERT: Well, there's no question-- I don't know if the scenario you 
outlined is correct or not. If it is, if there's no legal authority to spend 
without an appropriation and if there's deemed to be no appropriation, then I 
imagine you can't spend anything, and instead of having a 2 or 3 percent cut in 
the budget you have an effective 100 percent cut. I don't know if that's correct 
or not. 
SENATOR HILL: But isn't Prop. 165 giving him that authority? Isn't it 
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allowing that money for the first time to be spent ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Absolutely. 
SENATOR HILL: ..• when he declares that fiscal emergency? We're deadlocked. 
We have no budget, it's July 1, the governor has no authority, nobody has any 
authority to spend out those monies. We're not paying nursing homes or school 
kids or state employees. We don't have that authority to spend, we've got to 
send out IOU's. Isn't under the Prop. 165 authority now the governor has the 
ability to spend all that money from last year's budget? 
MR. SYBERT: Again, Senator, my response is that I see there to be two 
separate issues here. One is the governor's ability to reduce planned 
expenditures. The other is the ability to actually issue payment. And I think 
those are two separate issues. I was going to say there is no question that 
Prop. 165 does shift, to some degree, the balance of power between the branches 
of government. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: But doesn't he have the unilateral ability under this 
to then expend money? 
MR. SYBERT: My reading is, I'm not sure that's the case and I haven't 
looked at that question. 
SENATOR HILL: I don't think that there's any legal question about that at 
all. I don't think there's any disagreement about that issue at all. 
MR. SYBERT: Well, again, this is the first time that I've heard that point 
raised by anyone, which may be a tribute to your insight, but I don't know the 
answer to that one way or the other, yesjno, up or down. 
SENATOR HILL: Richard, I wonder if you could do me a favor, in addition to 
looking at the Governor's blue pencil authority and how does that compare to 
other states. How many other states would the governor have the authority to 
spend last year's budget if we were in a deadlock, in terms of comparing, you 
know, your analyses that this will put California in the middle of governors' 
budget authority. 
MR. SYBERT: To answer that really requires a legal conclusion that I'm not 
sure my office is authorized to make. So what I'm going to promise you is that 
I will look into whether we can respond to that or whether someone else should. 
SENATOR HILL: But let's make this assumption, and I don't believe that 
there's any disagreement by anybody anywhere that if we have a fiscal -- the 
governor declares a fiscal emergency, July 1 we have no budget -- just like this 
year -- that the governor has the authority to spend last year's budget. I 
don't think there's any dispute about that. I think everybody concludes that. 
My question is, in terms of your chart to show us where we rank at the bottom of 
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the six states right now, in addition to showing the blue pencil and factoring 
that in terms of how many other governors have that authority, how many other 
states would the governor unilaterally have the authority to spend money up to 
last year's budget once he declares a fiscal emergency? It seems to me that 
ought to be part of that adjustment in terms of whether or not this is more 
power or the middle of the road power that other governors can utilize. 
MR. SYBERT: Senator, I have to respectfully disagree with your assumption 
that everybody assumes, everybody knows that this gives the governor the power 
to spend. As I said, that's a separate issue, and that goes to what we had this 
year, whether certain programs have to go on being paid, whether through IOU's 
or through something else. As I read the initiative, Prop. 165 gives the 
governor the ability to cut planned expenditures. I have not looked at all at 
the issue that you've raised, and frankly, I haven't heard it raised before 
today. 
SENATOR HILL: But I'm talking-- you're talking, and I hate to beat this 
point, let me just close with this, you're talking about after the first 
quarter, as I learned today, the Governor has the authority to reduce by up to 
3 -- if expenditures fall off by 3 percent he can blue pencil, come down to that 
amount. I'm talking about a different scenario. This year's scenario, the July 
1 budget, we don't have a budget. My understanding of the initiative was -- you 
know, in fact, we have a handout here it says that if we do not have the 
budget that a governor declares a fiscal emergency, has the authority to use 
last year's budget as a spending plan. And so that's my ... 
MR. SYBERT: Yeah. I understand your observation very well, and again, my 
response is, I'm not sure whether it's a spending plan or a planned expenditure 
plan. 
SENATOR HILL: Let me just read here on the second point from governor's 
authority under Prop. 165, "would allow the governor to declare a fiscal 
emergency and reinstate the prior year budget, adjusted for any constitutionally 
required increases." Okay, "reinstate the prior year budget". I mean, I think 
that -- it seems to me very clear. 
So my question is, in terms of looking at the blue pencil authority and how 
does that factor in in terms of your chart, how many other states, if you have 
no budget, does the governor have the authority to reinstitute the prior year 
budget? Because it seems to me that's also what you're -- a tremendous amount 
of leverage. I'm looking at it and saying, hey, Kathleen Brown's the next 
governor and by god, I want some program cut and I'm going to hold out in the 
two-thirds vote, we're going to hold up that budget because we want something 
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cut, and that new governor says, hey, too bad, we don't have a budget on time, 
July 1, fiscal emergency is going to be declared, we're going to spend last 
year's budget, tough luck, you guys. 
MR. SYBERT: Senator, I will look into that. But again, we're not a legal 
office. I can't promise you that we can give you a comprehensive answer to 
that. 
SENATOR HILL: But you ought to be able to very easily tell me how many 
other states would the governor unilaterally on his own declare a fiscal 
emergency, have the ability to spend last year's budget. 
MR. SYBERT: I will look into that, but again, I'm not sure that everybody 
would agree with that distinction. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Senator Hill, it is my understanding that the authority 
in 165, for the governor to impose a budget unilaterally, is unprecedented. 
Do you have any information to the contrary, Mr. Sybert? I understand it's 
unprecedented. 
MR. SYBERT: I disagree with that statement. I do not believe ••• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Is there another state where the governor unilaterally 
can impose a budget? 
MR. SYBERT: There are 44 other states where the governor can unilaterally 
make changes in the budget. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: No, no. I'm going to get real specific in my language. 
Are there any other states that allow the governor the authority to impose --
now, these are the key words -- to impose a budget unilaterally? 
MR. SYBERT: Just like 44 other states, Prop. 165 would give California's 
governor the authority to unilaterally make certain changes in the budget. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: That was not my direct question and I'm going to can 
you latch on to impose a budget? Can you speak to? Do you feel that 165 allows 
this Governor to impose a budget? You know, it kind of gets to the question 
Senator Hill was raising, because, you see, we're talking about last year's 
budget. 
MR. SYBERT: This is my personal opinion. My personal opinion is no, it 
does not. My personal opinion is that 165 gives the governor the power to make 
certain changes at the margin on an existing budget. It does not give him the 
power to write or ..• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Is there any other state -- now, maybe you can answer 
this -- is there any other state that allows the governor unilateral authority 
to impose a budget? 
MR. SYBERT: There is no state, including California under Prop. 165, that 
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gives the governor the power to impose an entire budget, nor would Prop. 165. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: But the Governor can impose the same kind of 
expenditures that were in the budget the prior fiscal year. 
MR. SYBERT: The governor can impose roughly the same kind of cuts that 44 
other governors can. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: That's not the point. And I think you get the point, 
Mr. Sybert. The point is that Prop. 165 allows the governor unilaterally to 
implement a prior year's budget figures. Is that a true statement, Ms. Hill? 
Okay. 
Thank you very much, Mr. Sybert. We appreciate your testimony. 
MR. SYBERT: Madam Chair, I sincerely appreciate your courtesy. It is not 
always thus. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Moving right on along, and we're going to try to make 
up for the time that we're behind. I've got to make one adjustment. Dr. Caiden 
has to run real quick. She's Chair of the Department of Public Administration, 
Cal State University, San Bernardino. And I would like her to come up now and 
then we'll call up Janice Nielsen of the California League of Voters. 
Before you get started I'd like to also announce the presence of 
Assemblywoman Barbara Friedman, just joined us. Thank you for coming, Barbara. 
DR. NAOMI CAIDEN: Madam Chair and the committee, I'd like to thank you very 
much for -- I very much appreciate the opportunity of testifying today. I do 
have to get out to San Bernardino this afternoon to the students, so I'd like to 
talk a little earlier. 
I'd like to start off by saying that I am not an expert on California 
politics or on California budgeting. One may ask who is, but I have researched, 
written, and taught public budgeting in a number of contexts, including the 
historical, also relating to poor countries and to the federal government for a 
number of years. 
I'd also like to mention that I am editor of Public Budgeting of Finance, a 
quarterly journal. I already gave Senator Alquist a copy and this one is for 
the committee. It's all I could rustle up on short notice. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you very much, Doctor. 
DR. CAIDEN: In which there is an article on "California's Structural Budget 
Crisis" by Jane Savage, which may be of some interest. 
I have also circulated a statement for the committee and I could get more 
statements to anybody later on if they wanted. 
You're familiar with the proposition as it stands. It seeks to amend the 
Constitution to augment the power of the governor in the budget process and to 
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allow the declaration of fiscal emergencies. 
I'm not going to go over the provisions, we've done that for long enough 
this morning. I would like to say that I believe that as it stands, on the face 
of it, this would contravene the separation of powers and would substitute, in 
my opinion, dictatorial power without contributing to the democratic resolution 
of conflict, to informed and realistic budget debate, and to the resolution of 
the current crisis, which there presently is in California. 
First, the Governor has discretion when to call an emergency. Even when a 
budget has been duly passed he can refuse to sign it. Secondly, whenever his 
office shows more than a certain divergence from forecasts, and this, of course, 
is something that is easily manipulable, forecasts are estimates. The 
forecasting record in California has not been very accurate, and this is 
something that can very easily happen. 
During the emergency, unless the opinion that we heard in the last testimony 
stands, it's my reading that the Legislature cannot override the governor even 
by two-thirds majority and therefore the governor has the discretion and 
opportunity to substitute his or her own priorities. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Dr. Caiden, on that issue. Is there any other state in 
the Union that allows the governor that kind of unilateral authority? 
DR. CAIDEN: I do not know. I am not an expert on state government. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Okay. 
My other comment is that if politics is entering into this, when Jerry Brown 
was Governor, we overrode him seven times, and most of those times were on 
fiscal issues where we disagreed with the large cut. The governor can never 
increase a line item but the governor can cut or eliminate a line item. And 
when he did that, our own majority in the Legislature, by two-thirds, overrode 
his veto and it protected many programs that would have caused great impacts on 
the life and safety of people. But my question really went to do other states 
give this authority. 
DR. CAIDEN: As far as I can see, the cards are stacked and the governor 
simply cannot lose. He will win the budget debate. 
What I have looked at is in other countries with different systems of 
government. Where similar unlimited powers over the budget are granted to the 
executive in other democratic countries, they are usually checked through the 
cabinet system of government. The executive depends on retaining a legislative 
majority, and if it loses a vote on the budget it has to resign. There's no 
similar provision in a separation of power system where the executive and the 
legislature share power and are expected to check each other. 
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In my opinion, Proposition 165 would embody the worst of both the systems. 
It would allow, on the one hand, the executive unlimited power without a 
reciprocal power by the Legislature to vote him or her out of office, and this 
to me is the critical point, that it tries to get the best of both worlds. The 
executive is not responsible to the Legislature and is not checked by the 
Legislature. 
Other aspects of the proposition have been touched on. I believe they're 
clumsy and possibly counterproductive. The suspension of salaries provision is 
a kind of collective punishment. It's more redolent of a colonial type 
relationship than a democratic institution, and it allows more leverage for an 
irresponsible minority, a one-third minority or something more than a one-third 
minority in the Legislature to hold things up with the threat of that punishment 
on their side. 
The furlough and salary cuts provision, they single out non-contract 
employees, they may affect program performance and morale considerably in the 
state public service. In any cases, they are not a reasoned kind of approach to 
budget cutting. 
What are the problems that Proposition 165 ostensibly seeks to remedy? They 
may briefly be inferred as four: budgetry irresponsibility, automatic spending, 
failure to reach agreement, and budget imbalance. And I'd like briefly to go 
through those four. 
The first one is budget irresponsibility. I would maintain that this 
proposition would increase, not decrease, budget irresponsibility. The governor 
would have a unilateral power. This is not a responsible position. The 
Legislature may be ignored and therefore also has no incentive to behave in a 
responsible way. Neither side has an incentive to behave responsibly. 
Second, automatic spending, or what the proposition calls "auto pilot 
spending". The proposition excludes earmarked areas under the Constitution. 
There are four areas that are apparently excluded; therefore, those are major 
areas of automatic spending. There is one, of course, that is not and that is 
the welfare area which is part of a different part of the proposition. The way 
this works necessarily, as Steve Gold earlier on pointed out, would be to 
provide an incentive to get more areas exempted. We would simply have a greater 
incentive to the kind of government by initiative that we have now. Everybody 
would simply try to get their areas exempted. 
The problem of failure to reach agreement, which is a very big problem in 
California, as Elizabeth Hill pointed out, the debate period would be shortened, 
which would make it more difficult to expose the budget to public comment, more 
-30-
difficult for compromises and agreements to be reached, and the governor himself 
or herself would have no incentive to gain agreement at all. There's simply no 
reason if you can always win. Why should you bother to try to gain agreement? 
Finally, budget imbalance cannot be resolved by gimmicks. The budget 
imbalance is related to substantive economical and political issues which, 
again, the committee has heard about from Mr. Gold's testimony. The failure, 
and I believe it is a failure, of Graham-Rudman at the federal level should be 
warning enough. This was a gimmick. It simply complicated processes and it did 
not contribute, it did not do what it said it would do, which would be to reduce 
the federal deficit to zero in a given number of years. It couldn't do it. 
What is needed is reasoned analysis, and a debate with understanding and 
resolution of problems. 
My testimony is very brief because I think this is what I can contribute. 
In conclusion, I do not think that Proposition 165 would achieve its 
ostensible aims, those four points. It would result, in my opinion, in a 
dangerous transfer of power to the governor who already may veto a budget and 
has line item veto, and in addition, there is a trigger mechanism available 
which was not apparently used this year. It would allow the substitution of 
executive priorities, and more than this, it would contribute to a worsening of 
the budgetary climate which appears to be poisonous already, making agreement, 
compromise, cooperation, and responsibility, which is what budgeting is about, 
more difficult not less. 
In my opinion, it would be better, if this were possible, to remove the 
two-thirds majority requirement, which I have not checked how many budgets would 
have been passed by the Legislature without that two-thirds requirement, but it 
does seem to me that this is something exceptional in the United States and that 
it does make agreement more difficult. The important point is, as again Dr. 
Gold mentioned, to craft packages, to come to compromises that would make 
budgets possible. It would be better to remove that requirement than to submit 
to these vagaries of arbitrary power and the uncertainties that this proposition 
would bring. 
In concluding, I'd like to quote something that A. Allen Post, the previous 
legislative analyst, once said to me when I interviewed him. And he said that 
he saw his role as "trying to make politics work at their best and not at their 
worst". I would submit that this proposition would tend to make politics work 
at their worst and not at their best. 
Thank you, Madam Chair. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you so much, Dr. Caiden. Are there any questions 
-31-
0 r:) t::".. \__ uiJ 
from committee members? We appreciate those very cogent remarks, and we hope we 
can get you back to your students on time. 
I'd like to go back now and ask for Janice Nielsen with the California 
League of Women Voters. Come forward, please. 
MS. JANICE NIELSEN: Good morning. My name is Janice Nielsen and I'm here 
today representing the League of Women Voters of California. 
The League has made the defeat of Proposition 165 its highest priority this 
fall. The League and its members throughout California are working as hard as 
we can to educate the citizens of California about the dangerous changes in our 
system that the enactment of Proposition 165 would bring. 
The League is adamantly non-partisan: we never support candidates but we do 
take strong stands on issues. We have taken the strongest possible stand in 
opposition to Proposition 165. 
Based on the latest Field poll data, it appears that California voters are 
inclined to agree. After hearing of the proposition, 50 percent indicate 
opposition while only 37 percent support the measure. The ballot label on 
Proposition 165 merely says it all: "Grants governor constitutional power to 
reduce certain expenditures to balance the budget during fiscal emergencies." 
Proposition 165 upsets the balance of power between the executive and the 
legislative branch. It destroys our system of checks and balances and puts 
unprecedented, unilateral control of the state budget in the hands of one 
person. How does this happen? 
Currently, the Governor submits his proposed budget to the Legislature by 
January lOth. Proposition 165 would delay that submission until March 1st, 
allowing seven fewer weeks for legislative and public scrutiny. If the budget 
is not passed and signed by July 1st, the governor can declare a fiscal 
emergency and make cuts in any area not constitutionally protected: health 
care, law enforcement, transportation, family planning, environmental 
protection, and yes, education, a point to which I will return in a few moments. 
To understand the real magnitude of this constitutional shift of power you 
have to read Section 12.2 (b) in the initiative. That section clearly indicates 
that no one can stop the governor's cuts because the legislative override 
provision is effectively eliminated. 12.2 (b) reads, "Any reductions proposed 
under subdivision (a) shall become effective 30 days after the proposal is 
transmitted to the Legislature unless prior to the end of the 30-day calendar 
period the Legislature passes the budget bill and the bill is signed by the 
governor." 
The League of Women Voters believes that any override of a governor's 
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actions requiring the governor's approval is no override at all. Indeed, Steve 
Olson, of the Department of Finance, testified Monday at the legislative 
oversight hearings in Sacramento, and I quote, "The plain language is in 
conflict with existing constitutional provisions." Two weeks ago the League of 
Women Voters and the PTA unveiled the coalition's radio campaign opposing 
Proposition 165. The radio spots point out the unprecedented and unchecked 
powers that 165 would give this and all future governors. In response, th~ 
proponents of 165 issued a press release saying our spots "blatantly lie to the 
voters of California." Furthermore, the release stated that "The Legislature 
can override the governor at any time." This past week, on Monday, after 
several hours of questioning by both Republicans and Democrats, the proponents 
of 165 were forced to admit the initiative is flawed. Proponents claim that the 
wording that would enable the governor to virtually control the entire budget 
process was the result of a "technical error". 
Campaign manager George Gordon said, "It was an error. It should haven't 
been there." They further stated that, and I quote, "The court can disregard 
the literal meaning of the language of a law." The operative word here is 
"can". Maybe the court can disregard the language. Can we be sure they will? 
Can we take that risk? 
Initiatives often have a great deal of fine print and this initiative is 
certainly no exception. The League encourages people to read the fine print. 
The proponents of this initiative ask us to take a giant step backwards. They 
ask the voters to ignore the fine print and trust that the issue will be settled 
after the election. 
I can imagine how most legislators must feel about this. Throughout 
California's history you and the public have had one real weapon against the 
dictatorial powers of any executive: By two-thirds vote of both Houses, you can 
tell a governor "no". Proposition 165 changes that rule. When its provisions 
are triggered you could override the governor's spending decisions by a hundred 
percent of both Houses and the governor could still ignore your vote simply by 
refusing to sign the override. I would think the Legislature would be very 
hesitant to give up their veto override; certainly the League of Women Voters 
has grave concerns about it. 
We do not single out one governor on this matter. We do not believe that 
this or any future governor should have such immunity from checks and balances. 
Even after the budget is passed and enacted the danger continues. Section 
12.5 gives the governor the power to declare a fiscal emergency any time the 
budget is out of balance by 3 percent or more. Simple miscalculations by the 
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Department of Finance could trigger a so-called emergency. We all know how hard 
it is to make fiscal projections. In seven out of the last ten years the 
Department of Finance has made these miscalculations, and since the director of 
Finance is appointed by and works for the governor, the chances of simple 
miscalculations might increase as soon 165 becomes law. 
Once again, any override would have to be approved by the governor. Section 
12.5 (b) reads, "Any reduction proposed under subdivision (a) shall become 
effective 30 days after the proposal is transmitted to the Legislature unless 
prior to the end of the 30-day calendar period the Legislature enacts in each 
House, by roll call vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership 
concurring, alternate legislation to bring anticipated revenues and expenditures 
for the fiscal year end to balance and that legislation is signed by the 
governor." 
The proponents of Proposition 165 state that governors in 44 other states 
have similar authority to keep their budget balanced. This is simply not true. 
Despite any claims to the contrary, Proposition 165 would give the governor of 
California more power over the enactment of our state budget than any other 
governor in the country. In no other state has the public's ability to 
participate in the budget process been so limited and the legislative override 
provision been eliminated. 
Returning to education funding for a moment. Assertions that Proposition 
165 does not affect the level of school funding are misleading. Proposition 165 
does not expressly exempt school funding from spending reductions, as stated by 
the proponents. All of the discretionary money above the Proposition 98 
guarantee could be cut by one person alone. It allows the governor to 
unilaterally reduce funding while still complying with the provisions of 98. 
This past year the Governor proposed to cut education by 2.3 billion, an action 
he could have taken unilaterally had 165 been the law. And, of course, higher 
education is not protected at all. 
The Governor claims that this initiative would give him and all future 
governors a powerful incentive to improve legislative action. In truth, this 
initiative would give the Governor's own party an incentive to delay the process 
so that their own leader could ultimately define the budget, perhaps ignoring 
public priorities. Why compromise when you can have it all? 
Although he proposed the initiative, the issue here is not Governor Wilson. 
This constitutional amendment will give this and all future governors virtually 
unchecked power. The governor remains in control of the budget process from 
beginning to end. The League fears the chilling effect on regulatory agencies 
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and independent boards and commissions whose budgets depend on the whim of the 
governor alone. 
We are familiar with our current Governor and past governors, but what about 
governors in the future? What would happen if a particular governor disagreed 
with strict oversight of the nursing homes that care for our elderly? Or for 
tight enforcement of our environmental protection laws? Or for our worker 
safety laws? 
The proponents of 165 like to focus the discussion of the initiative on the 
welfare aspects. 165 does nothing to strengthen the already worn safety net for 
California's 1.5 million poor children and their families. It provides no 
additional job training, no child care services or health care for the working 
poor, and does not address the inadequate supply of jobs in California. But 
talking about welfare just gets us off the main subject of this initiative: 
consolidation of power in one person. 
The League of Women Voters fully recognizes the disenchantment and 
frustration Californians feel with the budget and legislative process. We share 
that frustration and constantly work to enact legislation that will make the 
process more efficient. We are confident that when the public learns the true 
content of this initiative that they will not be seduced by the welfare 
provisions and will vigorously reject the unprecedented and dangerous new powers 
165 would put in the hands of one person. 
In conclusion, I would like to state emphatically that this is a 
constitutional amendment. It gives the governor virtually unchecked power in 
the whole entire budget process. Californians will take a great risk of losing 
our checks and balances if they support this initiative and gamble on a court 
decision. If this initiative wins and goes to court, it will be the taxpayers 
who foot the bill for a change in wording that never should have been there in 
the first place. If it wins and doesn't go to court, we will have sacrificed 
public and legislative participation for unchecked gubernatorial power. The 
only way for Californians to win is to oppose 165. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: I want to thank you for a very fine presentation which 
I wish would find its way into the press. 
MS. NIELSEN: We're doing our best. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Just sign your name at the bottom, your organization, 
and send it into the L.A. Times and all the other papers because I think you 
said it all -- very logical, very rational, and it makes tremendous sense to me. 
Thank you for the research that the League of Women Voters always does. And 
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what we need to do is take your work and educate the public between now and 
November the 3rd. 
Any questions? All right. You said it all. 
MS. NIELSEN: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Members, what I'd like to do is to take up the next 
three presenters, and I don't know how your time is allotted. If you feel you 
can sit long enough we could go through and finish our program without 
for lunch, or we could take up the next three and break for lunch. Since this 
is a democratic process, would you like us to continue on or would you want to 
break? Senator, would you like us to continue on rather than breaking for 
lunch? And, you know, that doesn't preclude you getting up, going out if you 
need to. I think maybe the economy of time would, you know, if we'd just go on. 
It's running late. 
What I'd like to do is ask the educational presenters to come up now, and 
then if you want to break for lunch we'll do that. 
Diane Brahams is here, representing the State PTA. And if I can ask Denise 
Rockwell Woods, President of the National Education Association Chapter, United 
Teachers of Los Angeles, to come up at the same time. And then we'll have 
Maureen DiMarco. If you'll come up to the first row. Maureen, we'll have you 
up as soon as they finish. 
My name sake ..• and one of my fine volunteers and interns in my office who 
knows how to use the airwaves. 
MS. DIANE BRAHAMS: Thank you. That's nice. 
My name is Diane Brahams and I'm the Community Concerns Advocate for the 
California State PTA, and I appreciate the opportunity to testify here today. 
The California State PTA is strongly opposed to Proposition 165. No single 
issue on the ballot could be more devastating to education as well as other 
services to children and families than Prop. 165, and no single issue could be 
more devastating to our traditional American system of checks and balances in 
government. 
While the proponents of this measure want the public to believe education is 
protected from cuts, this is simply not true. As you've heard many times today, 
Prop. 98 provides only the minimum guarantee of funding for schools. Because of 
a strong commitment to public education, the state has provided, until this 
year, funding above the Prop. 98 minimum. 
If Prop. 165 becomes law during a governor-declared fiscal emergency, the 
governor would be able to cut education down to the Proposition 98 level. As we 
learned this year, Prop. 98 does not truly protect education. If Prop. 165 
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becomes part of our Constitution, the governor will have new unilateral power 
over the budget to further erode Prop. 98 funding by cutting the base on which 
it is predicated. 
What does all this mean? Well, earlier this summer Governor Wilson proposed 
a 2.3 billion in education cuts. Under Prop. 165 he could have single-handedly 
made those cuts. He also could have prevented 110,000 little children from 
starting kindergarten this year. All of that could have happened without any 
provision for legislative override and without violating or manipulating 
Prop. 98. 
As you've already heard many times again today, the way the PTA sees it, 
budget funding levels are always based on, as you've heard, General Fund 
revenues, personal income, school enrollment, and property taxes. As part of 
the fiscal emergency language in the initiative, the Department of Finance, 
appointed by the governor, and the determinates of the revenue calculations, 
could recalculate the Prop. 98 funding level at any quarter to lower than when 
the budget was adopted. Nothing in Prop. 165 prevents the Department of Finance 
from declaring, as part of the fiscal emergency, that their earlier estimate of 
the Prop. 98 guarantee was an error. Therefore, the Department over-estimated 
budget calculations will have caused an apparent over-funding of public schools. 
The governor would then be free to cut school funding to the Department's newly 
calculated Prop. 98 minimum level and still stay within the constitutional 
language of Prop. 98. 
This means that the initiative empowers the governor to act only on his 
priorities, not the will of the people. It can have the same effect as 
suspending Proposition 98 without a two-thirds vote of the Legislature, not the 
protection the people voted for in Prop. 98. 
Funding the budget will be dependent on the honesty, integrity, and good 
will of the governor, whoever he or she may be, and the Department of Finance, 
not necessarily in the best interest of our children's education. 
Another way that education funding could be hurt under Prop. 165, if, during 
the budget deliberations, the Legislature casts a two-thirds vote to suspend 
Prop. 98, there is then no limit to what the governor can cut from the education 
portion of the budget in a fiscal emergency because the education funding would 
no longer be protected, or at least for one year. 
Although budget cuts are always harsh, these cuts would be particularly 
devastating. They could probably and really would come in the middle of a year. 
Classes would be eliminated and teachers would be laid off, and children's lives 
would be painfully disrupted. 
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I'm a member of the PTA because children are my first concern, but as a 
citizen of California I am also concerned about good government, and simply put, 
Prop. 165 is bad government; it violates American constitutional principles. 
Although this year's budget battle was the worst ever, there was eventually 
a negotiated solution between the Legislature and the Governor, and the 
Legislature stood firm behind education. PTA was allowed to get out there and 
advocate for the Hill-Isenberg budget proposal. Under Prop. 165 why bother 
electing a Legislature? Their ability to override the governor is eliminated 
because the language of the initiative clearly states the governor must sign the 
budget. 
Earlier this week proponents of 165 asked the citizens of California to 
ignore this exact language in the initiative, assuring us the courts would 
straighten this, and I quote, "technical error". This is not just a technical 
error; it is a major revision in the Constitution. 
We are asking the Governor to withdraw his support of Proposition 165. The 
citizens of California should not have to rely on the courts to pay for an 
expensive legal proceeding to restore our system of constitutional separation of 
balance of powers. And Prop. 165 gives one person too much power over the state 
budget. No one governor, Democrat or Republican, should have that much power to 
hurt education or place his or her priorities above the will of the people. Our 
public schools are too important, our children are too important. That's why 
the California State PTA strongly opposes Prop. 165. 
I represent the rank and file PTA parent, and I can't imagine them walking 
in with the language that's in the ballot books and trying to understand exactly 
what this is doing to their rights. PTA will be out there educating people, 
though, on the facts of this initiative. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Are there any questions of the presenter? I want to 
thank you also for bringing to us the point of view of PTA. You always do a 
good job. And we're going to depend a lot on you and the League of Women Voters 
to do that education that is not necessarily available to our citizens. And I 
think that once the word gets out we can defeat 165 but we certainly are 
depending on your help. 
Thank you. 
All right, Denise Rockwell Woods. 
MS. DENISE ROCKWELL WOODS: Good morning. I'm Denise Rockwell Woods. I'm 
the Vice President of United Teachers, Los Angeles representing 34,000 teachers 
and certificated support personnel in Los Angeles, as well as the President of 
the NEA local of 20,000 members. 
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In America, every eight seconds of every school day a child drops out of 
school. In America, every twenty-six seconds of every day a child runs away 
from home. In America, every sixty-seven seconds a teenager has a baby. Every 
seven minutes a child is arrested for drug abuse. And in America, every day 
100,000 children are homeless, every year 300,000 are in foster care, and 
500,000 are in over-crowded juvenile detention centers. 
Our children are the casualties of a government that sadly has forgotten 
that it is the trustee for all of the children of the nation, not just the rich 
and the well-to-do. Our children are the casualties of a Governor who has 
forgotten the sage words that remind us that those of us who are strong must 
help those who are weak. 
Children should not be punished because their parents are poor or on welfare 
or live in a state where unemployment is on the rise and where corporations 
would rather leave this state and country to gain higher profits than pay decent 
wages. Children should not have to dig through school trash cans after the 
breakfast and lunch programs to find good food to take home to supplement or 
simply be the evening meal. Children should not have to stay away from school 
because they are ashamed because they have no clothing or no permanent shelter. 
Children should not have to drop out of school to earn substandard or minimum 
wages to help support or be the sole support of their families. 
Welfare recipients and their children must not be used by the Governor as 
Willie Horton was used by President Bush to ensure a political victory. In this 
case, a victory that would give the Governor complete budgetary control, render 
the Legislature, you who are our local representatives, unnecessary and thereby 
destroy the system of checks and balances. This system of checks and balances 
was the only thing that kept this school district from being in greater debt 
this fiscal year. 
We are concerned that the citizens of California not be fooled by this power 
grab proposition. We must not allow the Governor, who has no term limitation, 
to use the welfare issue to further a personal agenda of dictatorial control 
over the budget. The teachers and certificated support personnel that I 
represent have a vision of California which sees government as the initiators of 
policies that ensure that every family has the right to live in a decent home, 
in a decent neighborhood, offers programs to educate every child to the fullest 
extent of his or her potential, creates through its economic policies a job for 
every individual who wants to work, a job which pays at least a living wage. We 
envision a society where the hungry are fed, the homeless are housed, and the 
sick are treated. 
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There's a bold and simmering resentment of poor people in this state and 
this sinister proposition feeds on it. We feel we must challenge this 
mean-spiritedness. I don't know about you, but I agree with Congressman Clay 
that I am ashamed every time I see a person sleeping on a public sidewalk or 
eating out of a garbage can. Most of our street people aren't really disturbed 
or ex-drug addicts. More than 50 percent of the homeless are members of 
families where at last one person works 40 hours a week. 
Hungry, homeless, poor people are not responsible for their plight. 
Government policy, legislative indifference, and gubernatorial callousness cause 
homeless families and hungry people. Something is seriously wrong in our state 
when it's easier to get crack cocaine than it is to get a good job or access to 
higher education. 
We came here today to express our distress and concern about how this 
proposition will impact the children that we teach. We think that this 
proposition is negative for the poor children of California and we are going to 
do everything in our power and use all our resources to defeat it. 
Thank you for listening. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you. I appreciate your point of view. Are there 
any questions? Thank you so much for coming. 
Ms. DiMarco, Secretary of Child Development and Education. 
SECRETARY MAUREEN DiMARCO: Good morning, Senator. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Morning. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Thank you for the invitation to address the joint 
committees. 
You've asked me to testify on "what impact increasing the governor's current 
budgetary authority would have on public education." I will give you brief 
testimony because it can be stated rather briefly. 
The impact on public education can be found in the exclusions of the 
initiative. The initiative categorically excludes four programs from the fiscal 
emergency powers of the governor under both scenarios contained in Proposition 
165, in our opinion, and that one section that is most appropriate, to which 
you've asked me to testify about, is that funding for public education as 
provided in Article 16, Section 8 is explicitly excluded. 
In my view, the governor would have no power to propose reductions in 
support of public schools, period. This would be the case even if the 
Legislature had appropriated more than the minimum funding guarantee provided in 
Proposition 98, or if it could be reasonably estimated that the guarantee would 
drop below the level of appropriations in the budget act. This is because the 
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exemption for the public schools is categorical. It is not explicitly limited 
to the minimum amount of the guarantee but, instead, funding for education is 
provided in the Constitution which sets out a general principle of funding 
priority for the public school system. 
The assertions that have been made that schools could be cut under this 
initiative, in my opinion and from my analysis, are absolutely incorrect. 
Schools cannot be touched under this initiative. 
Secondly, there is a significant positive impact, in my opinion, for schools 
from the provisions of this initiative related to the governor's budgetary 
authority. 
As you painfully know, Senator, and have experienced, I know with enormous 
grief over the economic state of the state itself and the consequences that that 
has wrought for all of us, most particularly the issues that you and I share, 
concern for the great economic hit on the State of California has caused us all 
to have to pass budgets, or participate in their process, that do not fund as 
fully as we would very much like all of the issues related to children, most 
particularly public schools. That certainly was the case with the budget most 
recently passed. 
Part of the problem with the budgets that we have had to confront, 
particularly in the last two years, has been that as the economy declined and 
the revenues fell off, even far lower than the dismal projections that we 
started out each January with, there was no way to stem, staunch, or slow the 
size of that deficit. And so, all of us had to helplessly watch as those holes 
grew bigger, knowing that the remedies were going to be more draconian; the 
larger those measure became, the larger the deficit became. 
The budgetary authority granted to the governor under Proposition 165, in my 
opinion, would help slow that, would help limit the size of the deficits 
ultimately confronted with a final budget, and would keep from -- keep those 
deficits from accruing at an even higher rate than necessary due to severely 
declining revenues, and thus, by doing that, would eliminate the threat to 
public education that might occur and has occurred in past budget processes. 
In essence, it is my opinion, in a very short form, the budgetary authority 
that would be granted to the governor under Proposition 165, as it relates to 
public schools, the short answer is, on the face there is absolutely no impact 
at all, public schools cannot be touched; and in the indirect, on the broader 
budgetary authority, it would help protect schools from being threatened by 
ever-gaping deficits that run uncontrolled before the Legislature has the 
ability to deliberate and find a solution. 
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Let me ask a question on this point, Ms. DiMarco. In 
Section 12.2, subsection (a) of 165 it says, "When a fiscal emergency has been 
declared the prior year budget adjusted for," and it gives some articles. In 
those articles, is there language that protects the amount of funding that 98 
would have required in that fiscal year we're in, in the current fiscal year, as 
opposed to the prior year? My question is this. Suppose the prior year's 
funding was less than what would be required under Prop. 98 in the current year 
that we're dealing with the budget. The language here says that a prior year's 
budget could be used. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: It is our opinion, Senator, that whatever the prior year 
budget is that you are now in the position of having to continue, as 
appropriations continue in the absence of a budget, that you cannot touch the 
level of school funding even if it should be determined that it is an 
over-appropriation either intentionally, by the Legislature choosing to invest 
above the minimum guarantee, or by operation of revenue decline causing 
recalculation of Proposition 98 to be lower than the actual spending level. 
For instance, in this past year, which we are both so painfully aware of, it 
was determined that there was an over-appropriation in existence on the K-14 
budget, the Prop. 98 guarantee, due solely not to an intentional 
over-appropriation but to a decline in revenues from the original estimates. It 
is our opinion under that exact scenario that the governor's budgetary authority 
under Prop. 165 would not, I repeat, not enable the governor to reduce in any 
way, shape, or form that appropriation absent legislative action. It is our 
opinion, to be even more clear, that the only reductions that may be made to the 
K-14 appropriation, regardless of its relationship to the final calculation of 
the guarantee, must be made by legislative action. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Let's say that we don't have an over-funding situation. 
Let me give you a scenario. 
The Governor asked for a $2.3 billion cut this year. Under 65, would he 
have been able to make that cut? 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: No. If 165 had been in place and there had been --
let's take the two parts of it, Senator, if I may. During the spring, as we 
knew that revenues had declined far further than the projections and the 
over-appropriation became apparent -- the dispute of the amount I won't go into 
now, I think we did enough of that this summer -- the Governor would not have 
been able to touch that money. He would not have been able to reduce K-14 
spending even though the guarantee calculations had changed. 
Then let's move to the second part of 165's budgetary authority which is, it 
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is now July 1, a budget is not in place, and we know that the school budget is 
(quote/unquote) "over-appropriated". Again, I will tell you, it is my opinion 
the Governor still may not reduce that appropriation even as he moves into the 
next year on emergency powers, that that would require an action by the 
Legislature. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Let me put it this way. Right now it's $4,185 is the 
amount of money per child that drives the appropriation. Now, in my scenario 
there's no over-appropriations in the prior year, and like L.A. Unified it grows 
by thousands per year, as you know. A given year, year 1998, L.A. Unified and 
some other districts in Southern California have grown by, let's see, 20,000. 
If we run over the budgetary deadline and 165 kicks in, the governor calls a 
fiscal emergency and can institute the prior year's budget -- let's say it's 
$4,185 -- but the demand and the situation has changed where we now go to $5,000 
or $5,185, do you not see this as a reduction if the governor adopts the prior 
year's budget? 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Senator, what you're asking me is could the governor 
increase spending in reflection for enrollment growth in the summer months prior 
to school beginning, assuming that no budget is passed prior to the traditional 
beginning of the school dates. Certainly for L.A. Unified, some schools begin 
and did this year under the prior year budget. That is actually what currently 
occurs. It is not possible under Proposition 165, in my opinion, for the 
governor to increase the level total dollar amount of spending for any category. 
He may not spend, under this initiative, in my opinion, and I believe that that 
is upheld by enough analysis to be clear. 
If you are asking, in addition, can the amount be increased by the amount of 
enrollment growth, the only way that would be able to occur is if the 
Constitution was written differently and it actually caused an increased factor 
on the basis of enrollment. As it is, the budget act, as you well know, has a 
total dollar amount. The calculation factors include enrollment growth. It 
would be my opinion that more than likely the governor could not make that 
adjustment for enrollment growth. It could not ensure that there was more money 
to accommodate enrollment growth because, again, that would be increased 
spending and the governor .•. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: But, Maureen, in essence, would that not be a violation 
of 98? 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: No, Senator, I don't believe it's a violation of 98, 
because in the absence of the budget you would be suggesting that the governor 
should usurp legislative authority to make those appropriations. And again, 
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some of those factors might include whether or not you are above or below the 
minimum guarantee. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: But you see, in 165 it always leaves it up to questions 
because 98 sets out a specific mechanism -- you know it better than I do -- in 
government, and it says, when we collect the revenues and after we pay all of 
our indebtedness, then a certain percentage of the revenues goes to education; 
that's 98. 
Now, if the governor takes over and has the authority to use a prior year's 
budget and there's been growth but we haven't had a decision on how we 
appropriate the monies, the governor can use the prior year which is thousands 
of dollars below collectively where it should be. Is that not a violation of 
98, in essence, fundamentally? 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Senator, there are too many factors that I can't factor 
into the scenario. No, I don't believe so because, again, Proposition 98 is a 
final -- the actual 98 guarantee is a final dollar calculation. Under the 
assumption that we are in a fiscal emergency because we have reduced revenues, 
the Proposition 98 guarantee, as you know, goes down. Now it also interacts 
with a variety of other factors and I certainly don't want to torture any of you 
by going through all of the possible permutations of test one, test two and test 
three and its impact on that final calculation. But there are scenarios 
certainly where you could by remaining at the prior year level because of the 
reduced revenues that are impliedly assumed in your scenario, I think, and by 
the fact that we may have a fiscal crisis that's even deeper than that, you 
could actually be exceeding the Proposition 98 guarantee for that year even 
including enrollment growth. Again, there's a variety of factors that go into 
it and enrollment growth is one of them. But again, it depends, as you well 
know, on the economic status of the state, the collection of revenues, what 
prior year spending was as well as enrollment growth. It's an extremely complex 
initiative in and of itself. 
This was crafted, I am told, to be very clear not to adjust those factors 
and tinker with Proposition 98, but the intent of the drafters of this measure 
and the explicit language, I believe, of the measure states very clearly that 
education funding is to be exempt, not to be touched, not to be tinkered with. 
Proposition 98 is absolutely not to be in any way eroded by this measure. Quite 
the contrary, the intent is to get state spending under control under those dire 
circumstances that would trigger the provisions of the budgetary authority for 
the governor in order to protect education. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Speaking conceptually, we know how 98 got to the ballot 
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and we know what the intent of 98 was; it was to give education its proper 
constitutional guaranteed, its proper share. We fought for 64 days; you were 
intimately involved in it because the Governor wanted $2.3 billion cut from the 
budget. That was the sole issue that really held up a budget decision; that was 
the sole issue. 
I look at the language of 65 and there are just gray areas. And, you know, 
it sounds real good to say 98 is not going to be touched. But the governor, and 
as I understand this proposition, he or she would have the authority then to 
call a case of emergency based on the information that comes from the Department 
of Finance -- and I listed five different divisions that give us figures and 
they never jibe -- based on the sole information from the Department of Finance, 
the governor then unilaterally can call a fiscal emergency. And if we're over 
the deadline date, can then use the prior year's budget which might or might not 
be adequate for funding the schools. 
Now, conceptually, we wanted to guarantee above all other programs that 
education was funded properly. I am still concerned because we're using the 
prior year as one tool and one factor and so regardless of 98, by applying the 
funding level for prior year could indeed, in my interpretation, violate 98. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: I respectfully have to disagree with you, Senator. And 
I need to ••• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Put a pen right there. Ms. Hill, am I way off? And 
then I'm going to let you respond, Ms. DiMarco, but I want to hear from the Leg. 
Analyst. 
MS. HILL: Senator watson, our reading of the measure under the scenario 
that you're discussing where a prior year budget goes into effect because the 
budget for the new fiscal year has not been passed by the Legislature and signed 
by the governor, for the constitutional required programs, in our view there 
would be -- if the minimum funding guarantee then in that new fiscal year that 
had been created was higher than the higher year, there would have to be an 
increase in the budget. So our view of that is different than what Ms. DiMarco 
has testified to you on that point. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you. Go ahead. I interrupted you, I'm sorry. 
There's been so much disagreement this morning before you came into the room and 
these were questions that we wanted to raise and we decided to wait until you 
came. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: I agree. And clearly, the Legislative Analyst's 
scenario, which is even more generous than the one that I gave, would then 
ensure that Proposition 165's provisions are even more of a protection than I 
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have even categorically stated here. Under either of those statements, either 
the Analyst's, which would require the automatic adjustment of the guarantee 
upwards, or under mine, which is a level that remains from the prior year, 
clearly public education is not able to be cut by the governor under Proposition 
165 Budgetary Authority Rules. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: My colleagues, if you need to jump in, please do. Ms. 
Friedman? 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN BARBARA FRIEDMAN: I just see a puzzled look, I think, on Ms. 
Hill's face. Do you agree with Ms. DiMarco's summary of the contrasts between 
your positions? 
MS. HILL: Ms. Friedman, I was the lead-off witness this morning, I think 
before Ms. DiMarco was here and also before you arrived. We think the wording 
of the measure is unclear on the reverse scenario. What I just testified to was 
if the minimum g~arantee goes up between fiscal years and the fiscal emergency 
has been declared. But then in taking the other scenario, let's say that more 
like this situation the revenues have gone down, the prior year amount is over 
appropriated; we think it's unclear because of the wording of the measure that 
references Article 16, Section 8, which just says, "expenditures required by". 
Now, to us, there are a couple things that could be read there. 
"Expenditures required by" under test three could potentially go down under that 
type of a scenario. However, you also have a situation where the Budget Act in 
a control section outlines the Proposition 98 guarantee. So there would also be 
an articulation of legislative intent in the control section. How then legal 
folks would look at that, and I'm not a legal expert, we think at this time is 
uncertain. I think there's the issue of what the intent of the measure is 
versus the actual wording of the measure. And in looking at the wording of the 
measure, which is the only thing in our capacity as an elections office, in this 
particular case analyzing the measure, our reading is that it's unclear in that 
scenario. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: So are you saying that there may be a possibility 
that if this passes and what occurred in this recent year occurs again where 
there was an over-appropriation based on the revenues that were generated, that 
if the governor declared a fiscal emergency, then he could then basically cut 
the money that was over-appropriated from the schools? 
MS. HILL: I think part of what is confusing to the committee is that fiscal 
emergency is under two scenarios and the one you're talking about here is not 
under the 3 percent scenario but rather, as you mentioned, the budget having not 
been enacted by the Legislature and signed. As you outlined it, we think that 
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there is some question about that if you are in an over-appropriation situation 
from the prior year. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: And the result of that would be then, I guess, 
there would be a further cut in schools and conceivably the ADA amount could be 
reduced from the previous year. 
MS. HILL: Well, I think you've also hit on another complication, as Ms. 
DiMarco also indicated. You have a number of factors that determine the 
Proposition 98 guarantee: average daily attendance, local property tax 
revenues, and State General Fund revenues; and the interaction of those three 
would also have to be taken into account in arriving at your decision. You also 
have a complicating factor from the 1992 Budget Act with the loan repayment 
provisions now that were enacted as part of this year's budget solution and how 
that would be interpreted in view of the constitutional issue of "expenditures 
required by", and that's a quote out of the Section 12.2 of the measure, Article 
16, Section 8, and that would be the relevant section that would have to be 
interpreted. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: On this point, who does the calculation of all these 
different factors, Ms. Hill, under 165? 
MS. HILL: In terms of these four constitutional exemptions, it would be my 
reading that it's the Department of Finance that makes those determinations. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We, under a fiscal emergency, are out of the 
calculating business. Right? If there is a fiscal emergency and the governor 
can assume the authority and the powers given to that person in 165, the 
calculations can be done without the legislative committees: Ways and Means, 
fiscal committees, on the Senate side Budget and Fiscal Review. We then would 
not be able to put our factors into the equation for consideration. Is that 
correct? 
MS. HILL: Again, there's two fiscal emergencies: one fiscal emergency 
where the Department of Finance would make the determination is at the end of 
the first, second, or third quarter, if there had been the three percent. Now, 
the measure also uses the term "fiscal emergency" which can be declared if, on 
July 1st of the year, the budget bill has not been passed by the Legislature and 
signed by the governor. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: It's July 7th now. Take your scenario from July 7th. 
MS. HILL: Okay. So the budget has not been passed or signed by the 
governor. Then the prior year budget would be in effect from the prior year 
with adjustments for the constitutional issues that are mentioned. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Made by whom? 
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MS. HILL: It's my understanding, and I believe Deputy Director Olson 
testified to the committee on monday, that in part it would depend if the 
Legislature, if 165 passed, clarified through legislation as to how that portion 
would be implemented. Absent a clarification by the Legislature for that 
period, then the Department of Finance would make that determination. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Would be the only body to make that determination. If 
we made a clarification in the Legislature that the Ways and Means and the 
Budget and Fiscal Review committees along with the figures coming from other 
sources would have to be calculated in, the governor could veto that bill, 
right? 
MS. HILL: That's correct. It could be vetoed. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: so, then in conclusion, it could be the Finance 
Department alone making these determinations. 
MS. HILL: It could be, Senator Watson. Whether it will be would depend ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: But it could under 165. I'm just trying to understand 
165 from the funding mechanism and, Ms. DiMarco, I'm just trying to get some 
clarification in my own mind as to whether we place education at risk under 165. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Senator, I appreciate that because you and I share the 
greatest concern that public education be placed in any risk at any time. The 
Department of Finance's calculations, as Mr. Olson testified on Monday, I quote 
from his testimony if I may, which should help reinforce to you that they share 
the same opinion I've testified to. Mr. Olson said, and I quote directly from 
his written testimony submitted at the same time as his oral, "In the Department 
of Finance's view the governor would have no power to propose reductions in 
support of public schools. This would be the case even if the Legislature had 
appropriated more than the minimum funding guarantee provided in Proposition 98 
or if it could be reasonably estimated that the guarantee would drop below the 
level of appropriations in the Budget Act. This is because the exemption for 
the public schools is categorical." Again, I'm quoting from Finance. "It is 
not explicitly limited to the minimum amount of the guarantee, but instead to 
funding for education as provided in the Constitution which sets out the general 
principle of funding priority for the public school system." Finance does share 
the same view and Mr. Olson did testify to that. 
In the case of gubernatorial veto, all the override authority of the 
Legislature is in place under this initiative and it's been confirmed. I think 
you had testimony this morning as to the Attorney General's Opinion confirming 
that again. At any time should the governor veto anything ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Prior to your arrival there was a great bit of doubt 
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about whether or whether or not the Legislature could move to override a 
governor's veto. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Correct. And because of that doubt, as you know, an 
Attorney General Opinion was sought and has been released in it's full text and 
I ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Yeah. But the Attorney General has just one opinion 
and I would like ••• 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Well, the Attorney General's Opinion is, for a lawyer in 
particular, the short answer is "no", period. I've never seen an attorney write 
a sentence that said "no", period or "yes", period. And then goes on to 
explain, and I'll quote from this, "Under well-established rules of statutory 
and constitutional construction, Section 5 of Proposition 165 should not be 
interpreted to impliedly repeal the Legislature's power to override a 
gubernatorial veto. Failure of the governor to sign a budget bill cannot 
prevent the bill from becoming law under other constitutional provisions 
including by Legislative override. The budget bill becoming law is not 
contingent upon the provisions of Proposition 165; rather, the emergency powers 
in Proposition 165 are contingent upon the budget bill. Thus, once a budget 
bill becomes law, including by means of a Legislative override, the fiscal 
emergency provisions under Proposition 165 are of no effect." 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: The Attorney General is the attorney for the governor, 
for the executive branch. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: I would submit for the State of California, Senator, I 
think that's what he thinks he got elected to do. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: And one of the proponents of the bill, very clear. So 
I would expect his opinion to be written that way. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: I would ALSO suggest, Senator, that if this is passed 
that it would be litigated and I don't know who wants to go and suggest that the 
Legislature's override authority has been impaired by this measure. It 
certainly will not be us. But the Attorney General Opinion and the testimony 
that you've sought in these two hearings certainly should give you a very thick 
legislative intent and proponents .•• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, there was some admission on the part of one of 
the sponsors of the bill, as reported in the Bee ••. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Mr. Gordon wasn't correct. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Yeah, Director of the Governor's campaign for 165. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: I believe if you call Mr. Gordon, he will tell you that 
he misunderstood the question, that he was referring to something else. I can 
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tell you that I checked after having read that because it certainly was not my 
interpretation based on my understanding of the provisions, and knowing full 
well that I was coming here today. That in fact, I believe, also is why the 
Attorney General Opinion is quite important. The press release released by the 
campaign which was handed to me this morning is also very declarative of the 
same point; it makes it very clear. I think whether Mr. Gordon's answer was 
correctly reported by the press or he misunderstood the question, that article 
certainly is incorrect and it is very clear to me, and I assume the Attorney 
General's Opinion will show that to you as well, that the override authority of 
the Legislature in no way, shape, or form has been impeded, eroded, or changed 
by the provisions of Proposition 165. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Mr. Gordon-- I'll just finish up here-- said it was 
an error, so I guess Mr. Gordon is in error saying it was an error. But what it 
spells out to me is that there are some flaws in this 165 and I think 165 
we've been talking all morning and afternoon on just the fiscal aspect of the 
budget and not even just barely touching on the welfare aspects of it and it 
seems like there's two distinctly different issues in 165 which to me would fall 
on its face and should be thrown out because it deals with two major 
constitutional policies. And so, so much for flaws. 
Mr. Epple. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: I wanted to add one additional thing dealing with the 
flaws, since you're referring to the Attorney General's Opinion. The Attorney 
General's Opinion seems to hold that there is an implied repealing of a section 
of the Constitution, when, in fact, 165 doesn't attempt to do it; it adds a new 
section that sets a separate category of budget and that's those passed after 
July 1st. I don't believe it, in fact a court's going to find that this 
attempts to repeal any portion of the budget or the power to appeal -- or to 
veto. My problem is is how can we depend upon an Attorney General's Opinion 
that doesn't deal with the question of whether or not this deals with a special 
case requirement in the Constitution of a budget arising after a specific date 
as opposed to repealing the right of the Legislature to act. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Again, my reading of the Attorney General's Opinion, I 
think it's fairly clear, and perhaps I misunderstood your opening statement, is 
that you may not impliedly repeal and you do not. 
I 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: That's correct. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: And this does not. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: And 165 does not do that. It, in fact, establishes a 
separate case where a budget has not been passed by a certain date and specific 
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new actions that will be taken under that consideration. That doesn't repeal 
another section of the Constitution. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Again, I can only say to you, Mr. Epple, that the 
Attorney General has opined that it does not, the proponents have made it very 
clear that they do not believe it does, the legal advisors for the 
Administration have examined that question and Mr. Olson testified again on this 
Monday at the Sacramento hearing, and again I'll say categorically it does not 
override. As the Attorney General said, Proposition 165 does not drive the 
budget bill; the budget bill authority and powers of the Legislature are intact 
and still would hold. I don't know how to be any more clear than that. Case 
law certainly supports that; I could cite you the cases, but I don't think we 
want to do a legal brief. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: I think the Supreme Court of the State of California has 
to look at that initiative as in the most liberal construction to uphold it. 
And in order to uphold it, I think they'd have to find that it was clear, that 
it established a separate and different criteria for a new circumstance and that 
it was no longer after that date in the old circumstance of the budget bill. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: If I may, Mr. Epple, let me quote from Kennedy 
Wholesale, Inc. vs. State Board of Equalization. It's a 1991 case; it is the 
holding Supreme Court case on this issue and I quote from the opinion, "In order 
for the second law to repeal or supersede the first, the former must constitute 
a revision of the entire subject so that the court may say that it was intended 
to be a substitute for the first". Board of Supervisors vs. Lonnigan(?) from 
the same year and Hensner vs. West American Finance Company also support that 
opinion of the court, and clearly, nowhere is there any intent as to that issue 
evident at all. In fact, the proponents have formally declared that the intent 
is to allow to affirm legislative overrides. I could go on and give you a lot 
more legal cites, Mr. Epple, but I believe it's very clear that that issue is 
absolutely not present here. 
ASSEMBLYMAN EPPLE: Well, okay. I want to point out that I believe that 
when it goes before a Supreme Court that, in fact, all of those nice opinions 
probably will never be gotten to because the court's going to find that it's 
clear on the face and they'll never get to the opinions that all these people 
are giving, because in order for there to be any opinion evidence given, whether 
the legislative opinion or the opinion of the makers of the initiative, you have 
to have an ambiguity. And unfortunately, I don't believe that this is ambiguous 
at all. It says clearly that after July 1st, this is the process. And that is 
a new process that does not repeal any other process; it sets aside and sets 
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apart a new process. That's where we're going to find the danger in this and 
we're going to end up with a process that cannot be overridden. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Well clearly, Mr. Epple, we disagree, but I can assure 
you, if we get to court on the issue of whether or not legislative overrides 
have been repealed by this measure, you and I will weigh in on the same side. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Ms. Friedman. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: If it's appropriate, I'd like to change the subject 
from Prop. 165's effect on public education to Prop. 165's effect on school-age 
children, directly. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: I'm going to have to say that my specific charge, and I 
checked with the committee staff, was on public education. As far as outside of 
the school setting, Secretary Gould and Director Anderson testified in 
Sacramento to that and I believe you have their written testimony as well as 
their others. Within the purview of the education request I am prepared to 
respond to your questions, but beyond that, for programs that I'm not 
responsible for, I'll have to defer to Secretary Gould. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: Well, I'd like to ask the question. If you don't 
feel prepared to answer it, I would certainly respect that. 
As I understand it, the Governor had articulated his approach to many issues 
but especially dealing with children as prevention. And I wanted to direct 
myself to the portion of Prop. 165 that cuts Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children by 10 percent. And I believe the Legislature just cut Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children by, I believe, 5.4 percent. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: 5.8. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: 5.8 percent. And as I understand it, about 70 
percent of AFDC recipients are children under 10. I've spent a lot of time 
visiting the schools in the district that I currently represent, which includes 
MacArthur Park, Pico Union, Silver Lake, Koreatown and other areas, and one of 
the things that teachers have talked with me about is children coming to school 
hungry, children coming to school not ready to learn, children coming to school 
even in kindergarten, below grade level, even in kindergarten. 
So my question is my concern is that this is the exact opposite of 
prevention and that this is going to increase the number of children that come 
to school hungry. I believe that right now, or before the 5.8 percent cut, that 
the average grant to a single parent with two children was somewhere around 
$630/$640, around that area. So if we were to add 5.8 -- I'm hoping someone is 
going to help me with the arithmetic on this -- but a 10 percent cut on $630 is 
about $63. 
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON: $663 is the maximum grant for three. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: $663. A 10 percent cut of that -- and is that 
right now with the ..• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: And then with the budget cut, 1992 grant level would be 
$425, and then the Governor's 165 budget cut will take it down to $597. And 
just to give you a comparison, the average rent is $811/$818 in the state, in 
the high-rent areas -- San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: My concern is the fact that this is going to have 
on children. As I mentioned, I spent a lot of time in schools in my district. 
During the interim I spent some time at the California Youth Authority at 
Ventura. So we see the results of when kids do not get what they need 
educationally, emotionally, nutritionally. How can this possibly fit into any 
notion of prevention? 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Again, I am not the expert on the provisions of welfare 
nor do I feel comfortable testifying on them, but I can respond to your question 
in a broader sense. 
Anyone who has gone through the pain of these last two budgets is clearly 
aware that the State of California has far greater needs than we are able to 
meet, and, clearly, that when that occurs that we are ending up with enormous 
needs without the revenue there in place. 
I am greatly concerned that when you look at the trends that have been 
projected even by the most conservative, or the most optimistic perhaps is the 
better word -- which doesn't usually go together people in the state and in 
the economic community, I have to tell you, that we are on an absolute collision 
course; that we already saw that this year and the collision course has already 
met -- the front part of the engines have been damaged on both education and 
children's health issues as well as all kinds of other issues that I think all 
of us believe are human investment issues. The reality is is that you're going 
to have to take that question in a broader context. 
If the State of California continues to have the kinds of deficits that 
we've experienced in the last two years or, frankly, any kind, given the 
tightness of the state's fiscal picture, I'm concerned that we are going to have 
a state's economy that cannot support our children anywhere, anytime, in any 
issue area. 
On that broader context I have to say to you that the State of California 
must be able to have a solid economic base. That first priority, I could tell 
you, means that you must be able to live within the amount of money that you 
have in place. I am not going to certainly pretend to open up a discussion on 
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the relative merits of tax increases versus cuts versus something else, but I 
will tell you that the reality for every Californian is that when your income 
goes down, you have to make choices, you have to make priority choices and you 
have to live within your income. And I will give you a very painful personal 
example. 
My husband is a senior research engineer in the aerospace industry. I 
should say "was". My husband has been laid off from his job at Douglas Aircraft 
because of this recession, and as a result, functionally our household account 
was just cut in half a month ago, diminishing our family budget. Now, that 
doesn't mean that I'm going to do all the things I'd like to do, including 
setting aside monies, a responsible person for retirement, or setting aside 
money in a savings account for an emergency, and I could go on and on with the 
analogy. The reality is, I cannot, we cannot continue to spend at a level for 
which we have no resources. Neither can I, at this point, certainly see that I 
should run up my credit cards and hope for better days around the corner. I 
don't see them coming nor is that responsible fiscal management. I don't like 
the outcomes; clearly, there are choices that are going to be made in our 
household account that are not going to be the best prevention. They're going 
to be holding on while we re-establish a new economic base, and that new 
economic base, obviously I'm hoping means my husband's re-employed and that I 
remain employed, and that way we can continue on with the plans that we've made 
for our economic well-being and our future. 
The State of California is in a much more acute version of that personal 
scenario I've just shared with you. In order for our children's needs to be 
met, the debate is not over. The provisions of the initiative as it relates to 
welfare, they are over the economic principles that are governing or not 
governing California's fiscal structure and the actions of all of us 
collectively in making sure that we have not only a solid balanced budget but 
also ... 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Maureen, that sounds goods, but the bottom line ... 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: ... but also, Senator, but also we do establish a revenue 
base that will support those growing needs of our children. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Okay. But the bottom line should not drive the policy 
where it comes to child growth and development. 
The thing that really hurts me, Ms. Friedman, is that the vision of this 
department that Ms. DiMarco's heading up was there with a lot of us way long 
before a lot of people in this room were in the Legislature or associated with 
it. And what we wanted to do was to have an advocacy department for children 
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and for families, and when I hear you spout that line, Ms. DiMarco, I am very 
disheartened because it's the same thing the Governor was saying to us when we 
spent 64 days saying no to him. Under any conditions, any conditions, I would 
never approve of a $2.3 billion cut to education. If that's all we had, better 
we put it into education and close the prisons, close CYA, and I argued with my 
caucus. I said if we close a universityl we close CYA -- one for one. 
I am very disheartened to hear you go through all of that rhetoric. We know 
budgeting; we have the responsibility for doing it. But where's the advocacy 
for education for children? You ought to be fighting to get every single dollar 
out of the revenues for children, and I think your question was a very cogent 
one. Let's look at the school-age children across education lines, the social 
service lines. What is our commitment to them? Should we not fight for them? 
I could give a care less about the figures that come out of the Department of 
Finance. What I care about is our children and how we find in this budget a way 
to support children, and I just don't hear that coming from you and I'm so 
disappointed. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Senator, I'm sorry that you don't hear it in my comments 
because my advocacy is no less intense than it has ever been, and 
I can assure you that my advocacy is for children not just for this week but it 
is for the long haul. Our children have, no question at all, diminished in 
their economic and social well-being over more than a decade. In fact, I would 
submit it's been two decades. Someone declared victory in the war on poverty in 
the '60s and went home, and it was as premature declaration, in my opinion. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Agreed. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Children's agenda will never be served without the 
resources they are to serve it, and that requires, in my opinion, it requires 
some solid responsible action by all of us as adults to ensure that it will be. 
Yes, I wish with you, Senator -- I think you and I could probably construct 
a budget, given unlimited resources, that would address every issue and you and 
I would be in total unanimity. The reality, however, is that we have lost 
$25 billion, as you well know, over the last two years. In order for us to 
accommodate that and make sure that our children are taken care of as best we 
possibly can through this time and build a base for the future, we do have to 
face those hard realities. 
The $2.3 billion cut to schools I have to object to. I've been very quiet 
about it. I wish not to replay the budget battle but I beg your indulgence 
while I explain. 
The $2 billion budget cut that's been alleged was a cut from a budget that 
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Governor Wilson submitted in January that had a $2 billion increase in it for 
schools. We fought hard to try and hold on to that increase. Ultimately, year 
over year, we were able to carve a budget, working together with the 
Legislature, yourself included, that increases school funding for this school 
year over the prior one by $1 billion. If you ask me next was it enough, I will 
tell you categorically, Senator, it was not. It is not. Am I telling you it 
was the best we could do? Absolutely. The projections that we have for next 
year based on the commitments that we have made in this budget for this year and 
next year for schools show that we will have the grand total of new revenues, 
after we pay for our commitments to schools, for every other service in this 
state, of $155 million, which is not enough for health and welfare, not enough 
for public safety, not enough for higher education. But we did, painfully, with 
great agony, make decisions together this summer, none of which did we feel were 
fully adequate at all, to try to do the best we could within the realities that 
we have gained. 
Together, I would hope, Senator, I know your commitment to this, I know your 
long history to this. We must not only debate as advocates for our children 
over how best to spend the money in the budget, but we must join together to 
build the economy back in this state so that we do not dig ourselves into these 
economic holes; again, otherwise we will never meet our children's needs. And I 
submit to you that the time for that disaster is not very far away, measured in 
months, in my opinion, not years. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Ms. Friedman, I'm sorry to have just cut you off. I 
just couldn't resist the opportunity to say those things. That's all right, Ms. 
DiMarco and I go round about like this a lot but we're coming from the same 
place about children. 
I just wanted to point up that I just am disappointed to hear that line of 
argument and to hear you spread over into other areas when you just got through 
saying, "I'm only here to speak to education." Now you're talking about 
economic development and raising revenues and so on. I'm just really 
disappointed but we'll talk about that one on one. 
Sorry. 
ASSEMBLYWOMAN FRIEDMAN: You real represented how I would have responded 
to that. 
There is one thing I do want to say. I appreciate, and while I have 
sympathy for your personal situation -- you talked about the fact that you and 
your family will now have to make choices on things you want to cut. The people 
that we are talking about do not have choices. They have no choices. It's to 
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buy food or not to buy food. 
SECRETARY DiMARCO: Again, Ms. Friedman, I am not at all -- and I think if 
you look at my history you'll know that I am probably even more sympathetic to 
that than some people that you work with. My concern is is I just don't know 
where to get it. I know what I would like to do in my personal situation. I 
don't have the resources and I have to make adjustments so that I can. I don't 
like the outcomes but the reality for California is we are running out of 
taxpayers that will be able to support at any level the people who are needy and 
people who are in need of the services that you and I do agree that we want to 
provide. 
I think that the issue for us is not to attack each other's solutions as 
wrong and then go on and say we won or we lost, but the issue is is that we need 
to join more people in the discussion, that you and I probably agree on at least 
95 percent. You may not like the approach that I've taken, you may not like the 
approach that the Governor has taken, but I think that our goals may be the 
same. The sooner we'll be able to pursue that the better our children will be 
served in the future. 
Secretary Gould has certainly given you a long testimony, including the 
offsets that there are to the reductions as far as the specifics in welfare, and 
again, I'm not the person who should testify to that. But I can tell you this, 
that my advocacy, as Senator Watson wishes to see continue -- I thank you, 
Senator; my portfolio is strengthened -- I can assure you that in those 
discussions both within the budget context and within our analysis of this 
measure have included my pushing very hard and Secretary Gould's support for 
ensuring that everything that we can possibly do to offset the cash grant in 
services to ensure children's health and welfare and well-being has been done 
and will continue to be done. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Let me just say -- and thank you so much, Ms. DiMarco, 
for coming here and getting on the hot seat 165 is not a solution, and I want 
everyone in this room to know my position. It is not a solution, it does not 
gain us anything. we lose so much and we put our children at risk. 
There are two issues, and I have to keep harping on that. There's a 
reduction in the welfare grant and the possibility of a reduction in educational 
financing. It also sets the governor up to be a dictator and to be able to run 
government single-handedly because there's a process that is in the Constitution 
that is a reserve for the Legislature, and that is to appropriate funding. And 
the way I read 165, with its warts and all, is that it throws all of that into 
court, it throws it all into a great amount of disagreement. You know, you read 
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an Attorney General's Opinion, and we've had any number of opinions here. But 
what it does it sets up a situation where we must question everything that we 
thought we had the authority to do under 165. It's a terrible proposition. 
It's a grab of authority. It disregards the lives of a lot of people under the 
color of budget concerns. And the information is even narrower now than it was. 
So I think this is a threat to the balance and the economy and the welfare of 
the people of California. 
And with that, we're going to move on. I thank you, Ms. DiMarco, for your 
presentation here. I would like to ask the committee members now, we have The 
Most Reverend Phillip Straling who is the Bishop of San Bernardino/Riverside 
Catholic Diocese and I'd like to pay him the courtesy and let him go on now, and 
then after that we can take a quick break to get a bite to eat or whatever. 
Would that be agreeable? If so, let me ask The Most Reverend Straling to come 
forth now. 
Father, thank you for being here. 
BISHOP PHILLIP F. STRALING: Good afternoon. My name is Phillip F. Straling 
and I am the Catholic Bishop with jurisdiction over the counties of San 
Bernardino and Riverside. This makes up the Catholic diocese of San Bernardino. 
I also serve as the Vice President of the California Catholic Conference, and I 
might just make a note on that. The California Catholic Conference is a 
combination of all twelve Catholic dioceses of California, the Metropolitan 
Archdiocese of Los Angeles and San Francisco. So it represents all twelve of us 
and I am the Vice President of that Conference. 
I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and to discuss 
the concerns of the California Catholic Conference with Proposition 165, the 
Welfare and Budget Reform Act. 
As I begin my testimony, I'd like to context my remarks against the 
realities of our current economic and social scene in California. I feel it is 
essential to do so for too frequently in today•s world we rush off to solve 
major problems, lacking both knowledge and understanding. The result of our 
ill-conceived action then compounds our problems and further jeopardizes our 
well-being. 
The major problem that we see with Proposition 165 is that it presents a 
series of ill-conceived solutions to the major social and economic problems of 
our day. It appears that those who developed the Proposition 165 did so based 
on myths and stereotypes that ill-serve the seriousness of the issues to be 
addressed. 
Further, lacking both knowledge and understanding of the real issues, 
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Proposition 165 would, if passed, produce immeasurable suffering in the lives of 
the most vulnerable members of our society: poor children. At the same time, 
it would deliver a mortal blow to effective government in our state. 
Permit me to share with you my concerns in the first area mentioned. The 
premise of Proposition 165 is that California's budget problems are being 
created, in part, by an uncontrolled growth in welfare triggered by a benefit 
that is making California the u.s. Mecca for people who don't want to work. I 
wonder if those who developed Proposition 165 have been following the news 
recently or have any memory of recent history. News headlines daily give us 
information of the worst economic recession to hit Southern California since the 
Great Depression. Perhaps they've been quick to forget the devastation of the 
industrial base of the early '80s that turned cities and towns in Ohio and 
Pennsylvania into ghost towns and produced one of the largest in-country 
migrations from the northeast to the west and southwest. Or perhaps they don't 
remember the unprecedented foreclosures and land sales that dislocated thousands 
of farm families in the mid-'80s. Obviously, they remember nothing of the 
savings and loan collapse coupled with one of the worst banking crises in our 
history, a collapse that is continuing to have a particularly adverse effect on 
the building industry throughout California. Perhaps they choose to forget the 
great tax giveaways of the '80s that have created the worst income gap between 
the rich and the poor in our country since records began to be kept in this 
area. And finally, perhaps they fail to realize that the Cold War ended and 
approximately 20+ percent of California's thriving economy of the '80s is fast 
disappearing. 
I wonder if they ever read the newspapers: The story of September 3, 1992 
of the San Bernardino Sun that the Commerce Department reporting that income 
growth adjusted for inflation declined by 1.9 percent in 1991, the worst decline 
on record going back to 1970. 
The story of August 12, 1992, Los Angeles Times that reported that in cities 
with populations over 100,000+, more than one-fourth of the children are living 
in poverty, that approximately 10,000 American children die of poverty each 
year. In the county in which I live, San Bernardino, the figure is 34.4 percent 
of the children are living in poverty. The story concluded that "Children are 
the poorest citizens in California and are suffering the consequences." 
Or the headlines of September 26, San Bernardino Sun that read, "Job Picture 
The Worst In 10 Years." 
Yes, California has some serious economic problems contributing to some very 
serious social problems, and yes, these problems are placing severe strains on 
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the fiscal well-being of the state. But I think based on the evidence available 
to us that it's safe to say that the major causes of the state's fiscal problems 
are a changed world economy coupled with a changed world political reality. 
These factors, coupled with the short-sighted, greed-oriented and failed 
economic policies of the '80s need to be addressed if we are to rebuild our 
national and state economy. I fail to see how any responsible person could 
blame the economic tragedy of the '90s on helpless children. Seventy percent of 
the recipients of AFDC in California are children -- 1.6 million children. Of 
this number, 200,000 are infants. Or blame it on unemployed workers, trying to 
hold their family together, or the aged, the blind, or the disabled. 
Yet, that in fact is what Proposition 165 would do -- to punish these groups 
as though they were the cause of our problems. Proposition 165 would, if 
passed, immediately reduce welfare benefits by 10 percent and in six months, if 
the adult member of the family did not find work, benefits would be reduced by 
an additional 15 percent. This would be in addition to the benefit cuts that 
will be experienced by most beneficiaries within the next month as a result of 
this year's budget resolution. A family of three would have a combined 
benefit -- AFDC and food stamps -- reduced to $751 a month, or $9,012 a year. 
Using today•s poverty line of $11,570 for a family of three, that family would 
be made to live at 79 percent of that which is established by federal government 
barely sufficient for a family's survival. Further, the benefit would be frozen 
at that level for seven years. If the present economic crisis continues for 
another two or three years, that family, in 1995, would be living with an income 
level equivalent to 65 percent of the established poverty line. 
In a state where many AFDC families are already spending in excess of 50 
percent, some as high as 70 or 80 percent, of their income for shelter, 
reductions of this nature would serve only to increase the already unacceptable 
number of homeless families as well as ensure the destruction of many more 
innocent young lives. Further, these cuts would make the quality of our lives 
unbearable and surely hamper any real possibility of any economic revival in our 
state. 
I could go on in this area for much longer, but I honestly feel that we all, 
at least those of us in touch with human faces of poverty in our streets, are 
sufficiently pained by the present circumstances without imagining the horrors 
to come if the short-sighted and mean-spirited Proposition 165 is adopted. 
Proposition 165 is not satisfied with wreaking havoc in the lives of poor 
children, families, aged, and disabled. Proposition 165 would reconstruct our 
state government by effectively destroying the balance of powers between the 
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legislative and executive branches of government. It would, if passed, vest the 
equivalent of absolute fiscal power in whoever sits in the governor's chair. 
This would essentially destroy the systems of checks and balances designed by 
our forefathers and mothers as a safeguard for our democracy. Short-sighted and 
myopic thinking on the part of the proponents of 165 would jeopardize the 
established process of good government designed to ensure that the common 
welfare of all people is served by a balanced representative government. 
Recently, we Catholic bishops of the United States published a statement, 
titled, "Putting Children and Families First - A Challenge For Our Church, 
Nation, and World." Our motivation in issuing this statement is captured in the 
opening paragraph: 
"Our nation is failing many of our children. Our world is a hostile and 
dangerous place for millions of children. As pastors in a community deeply 
committed to serving children and their families, and as teachers of a faith 
that celebrates the gift of children, we seek to call attention to this crisis 
and fashion a response that builds on the values of our faith, the experience of 
our community, and the love and the compassion of our people." 
Further, in the statement, we advance a criteria for a national policy. I 
think this criteria could serve us well here in California. And I will conclude 
my remarks this afternoon by applying this criteria to our state. 
Our great State of California must move beyond partisan and ideological 
rhetoric to help shape a new consensus that supports families in their essential 
roles and insist that public policy support families, especially the poor and 
vulnerable children. In pursuing this goal, we, as a state, should advocate for 
policies and programs that 
- Put children and families first 
- Help but don't hurt families and children 
- Ensure that those with the greatest need get the most help 
- Support policies and programs that empower families to meet their 
responsibilities to their children 
- Fight economic and social forces that threaten children and family life 
- Build on the strengths of families, reward responsibility, and sacrifice 
that people make for children. 
While I find myself unable to see any real value in 165 by way of fashioning 
a response that will enhance the well-being of the poor children and their 
families, or, for that matter, any segment of our society, let me state 
categorically, the defeat of Proposition 165 is not our exclusive goal. It's 
not our goal to embarrass any political personage or party. Our goal, looking 
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beyond the defeat of 165, is to impel all to build with one another a society, a 
state, and a nation, a world with a clear priority for all families and children 
in need. 
And I sincerely thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you, Bishop. Are there questions or comments? 
We thank you for this compassionate view of 165. I just wish we had proponents 
in the room that could hear you, but we are recording this session and we will 
see that your printed words are distributed. Thank you so very much. 
BISHOP STRALING: Thank you very much. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Members, let's take a break until 2:00. There are 
cafeterias in the building, and for those of you who have not been able to 
present -- Michael Wald, Wendy Lazarus, Genevieve Heron, Claire Deffense, and 
Dr. Lewis King -- we will be back in the room for your testimony at 2:00. 
Thank you so very much. 
(BREAK) 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We're going to try to finish up by 3:30. We will 
follow the order on the file, and we'll start with Michael Wald, Jackson Eli 
Reynolds Professor of Law at Stanford Center for the Study of Families, Children 
and Youth, who's done extensive research in this area. Is Dr. Wald here? 
DR. MICHAEL WALD: I'm Michael Wald. I am a Professor at Stanford Law 
School, where I have taught since 1967. I teach courses dealing with public 
policy toward children, courses on child abuse and neglect, general development 
of public policy, child custody, and a number of other courses. I'm also 
formerly the director of the Stanford Center for the Study of Families, Children 
and Youth, which is an inter-disciplinary research center at Stanford which has 
been funded by private grants to do research on public policy issues as they 
affect children. 
In addition to my research work over the years, I've been actively involved 
in the child welfare system. I was, last year, appointed by Chief Justice 
Malcolm Lucas to a committee, 40-person task force, looking at the future of the 
state courts and, particularly, I'm on the task force looking at the future of 
courts dealing with children. I've been the primary draftsman of most of the 
child abuse and neglect laws in California, and I'm a former chairman of the 
State Advisory Committee on Child Abuse and Neglect and various other government 
groups. 
I guess I was invited to testify because I did this report which all of you 
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have here and which you've also, I think, received in your offices and in the 
mail because I mailed it out to all current legislators and candidates. 
I want to start off by just saying something about why I did this report, 
when I decided to do it, and how I proceeded in terms of it. 
I decided to do the report last February, late January/early February, when 
there was a large article in the New York Times. It was talking about welfare 
reform all around the country, and that the most extensive proposal with regard 
to welfare reform was the one being proposed in California, at that point as an 
initiative to qualify for the ballot, and that California might set a trend for 
the rest of the country. I then looked at a lot of the literature about welfare 
reform and saw that virtually all of the research that had been done focused on 
welfare reform purely as a question around work incentive and whether different 
proposals create more or less work incentive. And none of the studies that had 
been done looked at what was the impact of different kinds of proposals and 
systems on the well-being of the children. Since the AFDC (Aid for Families 
with Dependent Children) program is a children's program -- and as you all know, 
of the slightly over 2 million recipients, a million and a half are children --
it seemed appropriate to look at what would be the effect of various kinds of 
welfare proposals on the children. 
This was done, it was funded by the Stanford Center for the Study of 
Children and Youth, by no outside sources. Actually, the only funding that was 
involved was the publication costs. And as normally with academic work, in 
draft form it was widely distributed to a very large range of people of 
different perspectives including people in the current Governor's Administration 
for comments and went through revisions by comments all the way through. But it 
was something that I did on my own without being involved with any other groups. 
To summarize briefly the main conclusions, in looking at each of the 
provisions of 165, there is no question that anybody looking objectively at the 
data would have to conclude that if 165 became law, it would be extremely 
harmful to a large number of children. Moreover, it would be extremely harmful 
to that group of children who are already the most at risk in our society: of 
having health, academic, emotional and other developmental problems; children 
living below the poverty line; children who already have multiple risk factors 
affecting their lives as a result not only of the low income on which their 
families have to live, but because many have experienced family disruption; many 
live in dangerous neighborhoods~ they have schools and other resources that are 
often inferior to what are generally available to children. Hitting on top of 
that, further reductions in their well-being cannot help but make them worse 
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off. 
Basically, to break it down, why will children be worse off; and not every 
child will, but I'm talking about the great majority; certainly 70 percent of 
the million and a half children. They will be worse off for one of two reasons: 
As a result of 165, either their parents will have substantially less income 
available and these are parents who already have inadequate income to be able to 
provide for the day-to-day needs of their children; or for those parents who are 
able to find jobs to replace the lost income. The great majority of them will 
not be able to find adequate child care for their children at the points when 
they are working. The proposal does not provide for any child care and these 
children will be put, many, many of the children will be put in inadequate child 
care. At particular risk, in terms of these factors, are the 200,000 infants; 
children one year or under who constitute the largest proportion of any age 
group that are receiving benefits at this point. So essentially one out of six 
or one out of seven children is under the age of one, a time when if there's 
going to be child care at all, it has to be extraordinarily high quality child 
care with a great deal of continuity, and this is not available and will not be 
available for the children. How will this play out in terms of these children's 
well-being? There'll be two different factors that will have an effect. One is 
for the group whose parents lose the income. Essentially right now, families in 
terms of cash income, as you all know, are receiving approximately $22 a day in 
cash income under the AFDC program. They will be reduced to $17 a day for all 
of their non-food needs; their rent and everything else. This is a family with 
a mother and two children. More than half of all recipient families at this 
point pay 50 percent or more of their income to housing. In Los Angeles County 
over 70 percent pay more than half of their income for housing. The only way 
that the families who lose the income will be able to make up for this income is 
by moving into more crowded housing conditions; some will become homeless, 
certainly; others will move into more crowded housing conditions, more housing 
that is older, that has lead-based paint, that is dangerous. 
Moreover, they will be less able to get children to medical care; there will 
be much greater stress. There is substantial evidence, I've documented all of 
this in this volume so I won't go into a great deal of detail, there will be 
much greater stress on the parents, and the biggest single predictor of whether 
a parent physically abuses a child, and particularly seriously physically abuses 
a child, is a low-income parent under a lot of stress. We are going to see more 
physical abuse. We are going to see more children doing poorly in school 
because in overcrowded housing conditions they are going to be sick more often; 
-64-
they are not going to be able to study as well. Despite which for many of these 
children are heroic efforts by their parents and other relatives to try and care 
for their well-being, they face very great problems. 
For those whose parents are able to work, and unlike some of what has been 
said by the proponents, in order to make up for the cuts for the great bulk of 
the parents, they would have to work 20 hours a week in order to make up for the 
cuts. This notion that you can do it in six to ten hours a week, assuming there 
are any six to ten hour a week jobs in the world of which there are very few, 
assumes no child care costs whatsoever. As soon as you take into account any 
child care costs for when the time that the parent works, the parent has to work 
20 hours a week just to break even. Half of all of the parents have children 
5 -- half of all of the children are 5 years or under. It's not that the 
parents can go to work while their children are in school for a period of time, 
they are going to have to find child care. For very young children the child 
care situation in our state and in our country, and California is better than 
most places in the country, is really very gruesome, it's very grim. Kids are 
exposed to multiple caretakers when what the basic thing kids need is stability. 
I will not go through the large body of research on the impact of unstable child 
care on children, particularly very young children, but it is highly associated 
with delinquency, with dropping out of school, with troubles in peer 
relationships and falling behind in school. This is an overwhelming body of 
research that relates inadequate caring in the first year or two years and 
inadequate child care to these kinds of developmental problems. 
Okay. Unfortunately, very few of the parents will even be able to respond 
to this in terms of finding work because they won't have the child care. Some 
will and they'll leave kids in dangerous situations. Next year it is certainly 
going to be the case if 165 passes that we're going to read in the L.A. Times a 
story that says, "Fire Kills Four Children" and it's going to turn out that a 
seven-year-old was left in charge of four-year-old, three-year-old in a house in 
which there was a wiring problem, a fire started, and then the paper's going to 
focus on why did mother leave children alone, why is a seven-year-old caring 
for-- and then there'll be blame of mother. Nobody's going to write the story 
that says, "As a result of Proposition 165 four children died in a fire", but 
that will be the result;it will be directly because the mother was trying to get 
employment at points when she had no child care available, that accidents occur, 
that injuries occur, illnesses and death. 
In essence, all of this is somewhat detailed in developmental things. I 
would like to end by pointing out a fundamental moral question that's involved 
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in this. This whole structure of 165, and I believe strongly that we need 
reform of the welfare system, that there are real problems with it recipients 
think there are problems, everybody thinks there are problems -- but this whole 
structure is being justified as saying we're going to create a bunch of 
penalties and hope parents respond to this, to these penalties and work more by 
these penalties. But if the parents are unable to respond to it, if the parents 
don't respond to it, it isn't the parents that are harmed by this, it's the 
children that are harmed by this. So what we're carrying out is a grand 
experiment trying to alter parental behavior in which the consequences of a 
failed experiment will be substantial harm to children. If such an experiment 
were proposed to a university human subjects committee, it would not pass, we 
would not be allowed to do it because it is unethical to conduct such an 
experiment where children might be harmed. 
That's what's happening with Proposition 165. Alternative ways of welfare 
reform could help parents and children. This is just not going to do it. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Any questions? 
Dr. Wald, I want to say probably your report is the only and probably the 
finest empirical study on the effects, the consequences of it. I think the 
points that you make that the punishment goes to children ought to be the one 
single factor to defeat this proposition. If you were in here when we heard 
those who were from the Governor's office speak, they seemed to be more 
concerned about the budget and how we arrive at the final budgetary line than 
the impact on the people that these budgetary categories serve. We're going to 
depend on you and some of the others too to get this word out. We've got to do 
a lot of educating between now and November. Right now, you know, when you say 
"welfare" it's the favorite whipping boy or girl for the taxpayers and I think 
that's why the Governor called it the "Taxpayers Protection Act". 
DR. WALD: And if I may say something in .•. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Please . 
DR. WALD: ... two things in response to that. One is that it also seems 
enormously troubling from an ethical perspective that to tie the two parts of 
this together, essentially to take a budget thing and make children's welfare 
the victim of a budget thing ..• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Right. 
DR. WALD: •.. you just don't hold them hostage; you do a budget thing and 
let that be faced by voters directly. There is something wrong with that. 
The other part is that it really plays on what are enormous misconceptions 
about the system, some of which I try, many of which I try and point out in the 
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report, which really came home to me clearly when I would talk to my friends in 
a law school or social acquaintances about what I was working on and I would say 
to them, "Tell me the percentage of welfare mothers who are teenagers" because 
lots of the publicity is this is going to deal with teenage issues. I say, 
"Tell me the percentage." Of my friends who keep up with the newspapers to some 
degree-- they're academics, they do other things, some of them look at this --
the lowest estimate I got was 20 percent, most estimates were around 40 percent 
and lots of them were 60 percent of the parents were mothers. When I would tell 
them that only 7 percent were teenagers they'd fall off of a chair and when I'd 
say only 1.8 percent of all of the parents were below 18, 9,000 out of 500,000 
mothers are below 18 and that's what this is saying we're going to deal with the 
teenage thing, it really makes it look differently. 
Moreover, you get the family unity argument: we're going to do family 
unity. The family unity which is in the -- it's actually in the ballot 
arguments and in the pro-165 literature, basically says that the provision that 
requires teenage mothers under 18 to live with their parents promotes family 
unity. Well, as I say, to begin with there are only 9,000 such mothers, the 
overwhelming bulk of whom already live with their families. We're talking about 
one or two thousand teenagers, many of whom were abused and neglected, and we're 
going to cut benefits for 500,000 mothers, a million and a half kids, to deal 
with 1,000 families. Anybody who would think about this in a serious way could 
not come to the conclusion that this is sensibly thought out. And the fact that 
the Administration never developed -- when I started this I wrote to people and 
said, "Send me your background papers that have done the analysis on children", 
I was never able to get a background paper looking at the impact on children. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: It's not surprising. If there are no questions, I want 
to thank you, Dr. Wald. If you can stay around for a few more minutes in case 
we need you as a resource person. 
DR. WALD: And I do have some extra copies if any people here would like 
one. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Great. If you will give them to the Sergeants there, 
then they can see that they get distributed to anyone who wants them. Thank you 
so very much. 
DR. WALD: Thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: David Illig is from the Legislative Analyst's office 
and if you can come up real quickly and just give us a quick overview, we'd 
appreciate it. 
MR. DAVID ILLIG: I've been asked to just provide brief comments on a few of 
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the provisions of Prop. 165 that haven't already been discussed, and among those 
are the fact that the proposition also allows for grant adjustments based on the 
actual budget act appropriation and caseload growth as projected by the 
Department of Finance. This, in effect, means that either the Legislature could 
choose any given appropriation and then the grants would be adjusted, or the 
governor could, through a line item veto, reduce the appropriation, and that 
could also affect AFDC grants. 
Further, the initiative would repeal the language that limits trigger 
reductions to the AFDC and SSI/SSP COLAs. Thus, the trigger provisions 
elsewhere in statute could affect the actual grant base through the combination 
of the trigger cuts themselves and the map adjustment procedure. 
In addition, the proposition would exclude from the grant any children 
conceived while the parents are on aid as long as the parents are in the 
caseload. In other words, if the parents are not on the caseload but the 
children are, then additional children would not be excluded. 
And finally, the proposition makes a number of changes to the General 
Assistance program, and among these, it limits the General Assistance grants. 
It does not allow them to be higher than AFDC grants regardless of what a county 
would choose to provide. It allows in-kind aid to be counted as part of the 
General Assistance grants and it provides the counties discretion to reduce 
grants below AFDC grants should they decide to do so for budgetary or caseload 
reasons. 
There are a number of other components 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: So are you saying let me be sure I understand you. 
The grants can be cut deeper than 25 percent? 
MR. ILLIG: In the General Assistance program? 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Oh, okay. In the GA. 
MR. ILLIG: In the GA program. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Now what about AFDC? 
MR. ILLIG: Well, in AFDC, yes. The 10 percent reduction applies to 
everyone, the additional 15 for anyone on aid more than six months. But if the 
budget act appropriation itself is too small to support an AFDC grant at that 
level, then yes, it would be further reduced. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Now, it says in those first six months you'll have a 10 
percent cut and the second. If the governor declared a fiscal emergency within 
the second six months, he could cut the grant to any level that he would choose? 
MR. ILLIG: That would certainly be possible, yes. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Wow! We've got to get that out. Okay. Excuse me. 
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MR. ILLIG: Those were the major provisions that haven't been discussed 
earlier. If there are further questions. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Mr. Epple? 
This is the kind of information that doesn't appear obvious in the 
beginning. Number one, I think it's unconstitutional because of the two 
separate issues in this one proposition and the prohibition against that. But 
when you go down and there's even more power in the hands of the governor, 
because the governor can reduce down to almost zero -- am I to understand that 
that • s the case? 
MR. ILLIG: Conceivably that could be the case. Whether that would actually 
occur is ••• 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, I mean, but the possibility is there. 
MR. ILLIG: The possibility would be there. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: All right. Well, thank you for that information. I'm 
sure we got that recorded because I want to be able to point out the loopholes 
in this. 
MR. ILLIG: And I might point out one possible limit to that and that is 
maintenance of effort requirement in Chapter 19 of the Social Security Act which 
would potentially put our Medi-Cal dollars at risk, but beyond that, then the 
possibility for waivers presumably the grants could be further reduced. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Yeah. Right. Senator Alquist, do you have any 
comments? All right, thank you very much. 
Okay, going back to the agenda we'll call Wendy Lazarus, Children Now. 
Wendy's not here. Oh, I'm sorry. 
MS. WENDY LAZARUS: Good afternoon. Thank you. I am the Vice President for 
Policy with Children Now, which is a statewide policy and advocacy organization. 
I've devoted the last 20 years of my life to being a policy analyst for children 
and families and being an advocate and I bring that experience to looking at 
this question of Prop. 165. 
I want to try to speak to you just very briefly on behalf of all of the 
children of California, the 7.8 million children who won't have a chance to vote 
on November 3rd, but whose futures are probably more affected by what is in the 
fine print of this initiative than any of us in the State of California. These 
kids, as you know, are 26 percent of our population and we've just got to be 
very, very careful about how it will affect each and every one of them. 
In doing our own analysis -- let me just say that Children Now is privately 
funded. To ensure that our analysis of things can be objective, we take no 
government money, we're funded by private foundations, corporations, and 
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interested individuals. And our board of directors includes a really wide 
spectrum of leaders from across the state representing every stripe on the 
political spectrum from business leaders like George Roberts and Richard Atlas 
to community leaders like Anita DeFrance from down here and the Honorable Cruz 
Reynoso. 
So we have taken an extensive look at what's in this and I've provided some 
materials -- you can see all of this in more detail. But looking at everything 
all together, we think that Prop. 165 represents the most harmful measure to 
California's children of any proposal in recent memory in California; and that's 
for three reasons which I'd like to go over with you just briefly. 
First is you've heard a lot about the budget authority from the standpoint 
of good government. There is also an angle affecting children which is terribly 
important. By upsetting the constitutional checks and balances in the state 
budgeting process, we are really touching the lives of every single child in the 
state. I don't think there's a single child who doesn't benefit from some state 
service, either public schools, immunization programs, abuse and neglect 
programs, drug education programs. For every one of these children the 
continuity of these programs is now going to be left in the hands of just one 
person and that is the governor. So that just for instance, and I want to 
stress that these comments are not directed at the Governor who is now governor, 
this could be anybody, and let's just say we have a governor who believes that a 
parent belongs at home taking care of their child and for that reason decides to 
cut funding for child care and for child care licensing. That is the kind of 
power that Prop. 165 would allow and that is the kind of inconsistent commitment 
to kids that we simply can't allow. 
For the kids who have no vote and no high-paid lobbyist to represent them, 
they simply can't get by with a shortened budgeting process of public input, and 
you know this does shorten that process instead of beginning in January, 
beginning in March. Kids need a public airing of the budget issues, they need 
the checks and balances, and I would say to you, most of all they need the kind 
of consistency in programs. What good is a drug education prevention program if 
it's here one year and gone the next based on the whim of whoever is governor. 
So that aspect has just got to be seen as a critical children's issue. 
Secondly, the second major reason we think this is so damaging to kids has 
really been laid out very well by Professor Wald and that's the million and a 
half children who will be hurt by this attempt at welfare reform. You've heard 
from him what it will mean in terms of their ability to have a roof over their 
head, their ability to have food on the table and quality child care. 
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The other aspect we ought to be concerned about is that besides the harm 
there, this proposal is really a double whammy for them because it doesn't even 
constitute real welfare reform. I think we are all in agreement that we need to 
reform the welfare system, but this initiative does nothing to make health care 
and child care available so that parents can work. It does nothing to improve 
the training and education so that parents are better equipped to find jobs. It 
does nothing to create the jobs for the many parents who desperately want them 
and now can't get them. So we are eager to work with you all to fashion real 
welfare reform; this is not that. 
Finally, the third reason we're so concerned is that we really believe that 
Prop. 165 will cost taxpayers and children a lot more in the long run. You 
know, it's not simply the immediate harm to children that we're looking at, from 
depriving them of the basics, but it's very clear that this is bad for kids in 
the long run. As you probably know, kids who grow up in a poverty situation are 
much more likely, three times as likely, to die before their first birthday, 
four times as likely to become pregnant as teenagers, and much more likely to 
drop out of school later on. 
You know, each year we do this report card on children which looks at how 
our kids are doing on staying in school, getting prenatal care, and I am willing 
to predict to you today that if Prop. 165 passes, kids are going to be worse off 
on nearly every measure that we look at in this report card and taxpayers are 
going to pay a lot more when we have to treat untreated health problems in 
expensive hospital settings and when we have to somehow deal with kids who have 
dropped out of school and are not prepared for the job market. 
Lastly, I want to say from the standpoint of costing taxpayers more, I don't 
know if people have focused on the fact but because AFDC is a federally matched 
program, California will lose an estimated $400 million in matching funds at 
exactly the time when we certainly need the investment that we can find from 
revenues from other sources. 
So for the sake of the 7.8 million kids in California, we really appreciate 
your airing of this subject and hope that you'll help us let voters know why 
this will be so bad for California's children. 
Thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: We also appreciate your input and the statistics that 
you brought to us today. Children Now has been prevalent in the halls of 
Sacramento, always advocating for children and we're going to send you up to the 
Secretary of Child Development and Education. 
Thank you so very much. Any questions, Members? All right. 
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We're going to ask now for Genevieve Heron. Ms. Heron, I think you have 
somebody with you that you want to introduce when you come up also. Genevieve 
is an In-Home Supportive Services provider for Frankie Banks and she'll tell you 
about Frankie Banks. Welcome. 
MS. GENEVIEVE HERON: This is my Auntie Frankie Banks; she's 100 years old, 
my great aunt. And she's been living with me since '78. And she had a stroke 
during 1983; she was 92 at the time she had a stroke. And she has a provider 
which is my daughter, I take care of her only at night and I have someone at 
home because I'm sick myself. I've done home-care work since 1959 off and on 
and I've been nursing in convalescent homes and hospitals. And I specialize 
with geriatric people. 
This Prop. 165 and the devastation that it will have on the older people --
And as Frankie, the doctors when Frankie had her stroke -- it was on her left 
side and they were very surprised that Frankie recovered, but I think it's 
because she was at home and I knew what to do for her and to give her the proper 
care because they didn't give her very much chance to survive because older 
people don't survive. And by working with older people in a home and 
convalescent homes, I know that it's best for an older person to stay in the 
home with their family. I took care of my mother and father, my grandmothers, 
and they do much better in their own home, in their own surroundings, with their 
own family and people that can see that they get the proper care. 
My mother had a girlfriend just put into the convalescent home. The 
convalescent homes do not provide lotions, they do not provide incontinent pads, 
because I had to take it to her. Her clothes get stolen, they get very upset. 
I've seen people come into the convalescent home and a couple of weeks, they'd 
be dead -- that's a fact -- because it's not good for them. And I think the 
best thing in the world is for them to have the providers because a lot of these 
people, they don't have families and their providers become a part of them, 
their life; they are their arms, legs and their sight. They take care of them, 
they take care of their business, they become their children, and they have 
somebody to take care of. In the convalescent homes, in the high sanitariums, 
they don't have the personal touch or the personal care. And these are people 
that have given their lives to this country; they helped build this country to 
where it is today. And I think that we do them a very disservice when we don't 
provide for them. 
Do you have anything to say, Frankie? No? Okay. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Did she want to say something? 
MS. HERON: "No," she said. 
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Well, we're just so happy to have you here, Ms. Banks, 
and anyone who can survive as long as you is a testament to proper living and 
good care. We hope that you can stay in your home and receive that service. 
I understand that cuts in IHSS are going into effect today and that will cut 
back some of the hours that -- 12 percent cuts will cut back some of the hours 
that the clients will be served, and that's going to have a devastating effect 
on many of the clients. However, to the extent that the family and neighbors 
come in, you know, they can kind of close that gap. But the intention of that 
program was to care for people in their homes where, as you point out, they can 
be in a mindset to try to get well. In the familiar surroundings, I think the 
studies will show they thrive. 
So we're hoping that we can offset in many ways the reduction in fees for 
these services but it doesn't look too good right now. But I'm hoping the next 
fiscal year will be a better, more encouraging time for this program. 
But thank you so much for coming and we certainly welcome you to stay until 
the end of our hearing if you can. What we have to do is to join together in a 
coalition to be sure that 165 is defeated November the 3rd. So get that word 
out to everybody: We don't want it. 
Thank you. 
Claire Deffense, Chair of the Area Board X Governmental Affairs Committee. 
MS. CLAIRE DEFFENSE: Hello, my name is Claire Deffense. I'm the parent of 
a child with a developmental disability. I also chair the Governmental Affairs 
Committee of Area Board X, but I'm not speaking for Area Board X today; I'm 
speaking for myself and for my son, and I know that there are other parents and 
children like us and I hope I speak for them, too. 
At the outset I'd like to ask a favor of you and the audience. My testimony 
will contain my story but it's not just my story, it's the story of my son, too, 
and he's still a child. I would ask that you in the audience to please respect 
his privacy and use discretion in any retelling of his story. 
You've asked about the effect of Proposition 165 on children with 
disabilities and their parents. I've read Proposition 165 and I'm concerned 
that it attempts to give the governor virtually unchecked power to repeal or 
suspend the laws, such as the Lanterman Act, which have been adopted by the 
Legislature to protect children and adults with disabilities. Proposition 165 
will do this by allowing the governor to suspend entitlements whenever the 
Legislature fails to adopt the governor's budget and whenever the governor's own 
budget estimates are incorrect. An entitlement is my son's right to receive 
treatment for his disability as provided by the Lanterman Act. An entitlement 
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is my son's right to an education as provided by California special education 
laws. Without an entitlement there is no right to services, and generally where 
there's no right to services there are no services or they're inadequate 
services or there are fewer services. These services mean the world to our 
children. They provide the opportunity for a normal home life, for an 
education, for jobs, and for independence. 
In my own son's case, he is at home with me today only because of his 
entitlement to services. Two years ago my son, 10 years old at the time, 
experienced a severe behavioral regression. He was hospitalized for 40 days but 
he could not handle being away from me and being sent to an isolation room for 
hours on end, and he was released in worse condition. His old school didn't 
want him back and he was refused admittance to every school he applied to. 
School and regional center professionals recommended out-of-home placement but 
even residential institutions were refusing placement. Meanwhile, without 
school or services, he was getting worse. The regional center began to 
recommend the state hospital. 
I knew from experience that he would never recover from another 
hospitalization but I was beginning to believe that it was the only option. 
Fortunately, we had friends who believed in Renoe. One was a clinical director 
of a children's day treatment program and she finagled an admittance for him. 
Another suggested in-home behavior intervention and referred me to an agency. I 
began to get the idea that maybe Renoe could get the services he needed at home. 
I will admit that his treatment was expensive. The first year probably cost 
as much as a year in the state hospital, but it worked. In less than a year he 
was able to move to a special education school and his behavior intervention 
hours were cut. The second year probably cost less than half of a year at the 
state hospital. This year he's moved to a public school campus and instead of 
behavior intervention he gets only after-school care. This year will probably 
cost less than one-fifth of a year at the state hospital, and there's a good 
reason to believe that the next year will cost even less. He's doing very well 
in school and at home and he's back to his normal, happy, cheerful self. 
What scares me, though, is the thought of what would have happened if Renoe 
had not had a right to treatment. I had to fight every step of the way to get 
the services he needed and won only because he was entitled by law to those 
services. If he had not had the entitlement, he would have been sent to the 
state hospital and he would have stayed there. 
Now that he's at home I still get scared at the thought that his services 
could be cut. I know that if the entitlement is suspended, the first services 
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to be cut will be those to children at home, such as In-Home Support Services. 
The theory being that they don't really need the services since they're already 
at home. But without those supports, I'm not sure if I could keep my son at 
home. He needs the structure and I need the respite and the security of knowing 
that if anything happens again I can quickly access the right treatment. 
I didn't want to end this testimony on a depressing note. I'm very proud of 
my son and very grateful for the services and people that worked for him. I 
want to end this testimony by reading a poem written by this 12-year-old 
autistic child. 
The man had tears after all his years. 
He went to grind grain over near the plane. 
He stood to gleam and he started to dream. 
He dreamed he heard the stomping of pilgrims' feet 
and the bumping of freedom's feet. 
Then it all went away and he heard the screaming 
of passion's stress and people shot in the 
wilderness. 
He heard people using strife at the sound of 
people locked in chains and people losing their 
life. 
Then it all went away. 
California also has a lot to gain from its people with disabilities. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you so much. Any questions or comments from 
committee members? 
How will your son be impacted by the reduction in rates? 
MS. DEFFENSE: The reduction in rates for In-Home Supportive Services? 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Yes. 
MS. DEFFENSE: He receives through the regional center services under 
behavior intervention. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Oh, yes. And you know the plan with the budget that 
was adopted is to further regionalize the centers that provide you with the 
services. 
MS. DEFFENSE: Right. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: How's that going to affect you? 
MS. DEFFENSE: Well, to the extent that they can attract workers at the 
rates that they're required to pay, then he may not get the services. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Now, you said your son was in a public school, special 
classes? 
MS. DEFFENSE: Right. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: So he does not require special education in a different 
institution but he can go to whatever they have in the public school. 
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MS. DEFFENSE: To a special education class in a public school, and the goal 
is ultimately to mainstream him so that he will need no services. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Very good. What kind of transportation services do you 
receive? 
MS. DEFFENSE: He gets bussed to the school. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Uh huh. And how far away from your home is that? 
MS. DEFFENSE: It's pretty far. They usually are to find the right place. 
It's about 10 miles, about an hour. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: What area do you live in? 
MS. DEFFENSE: I live in woodland Hills. The school is in Northridge. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Thank you so very much. 
MS. DEFFENSE: Thank you. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Dr. Lewis King, who is Dean of the College of Medicine 
at Drew Medical School. Dr. King, welcome. 
DR. LEWIS M. KING: Madam Chairperson and Members, my name is Lewis M. King. 
I am Dean of the College of Medicine, Charles R. Drew University of Medicine and 
Science. Simultaneously I am also the Associate Dean for the College of 
Medicine at UCLA and a professor at UCLA. 
I have served a community for over 20 years situated at the heart of South 
Central Los Angeles, better known as Watts. Our medical center, anchored by the 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Hospital, serves a population of 1.6 million people: 44 
percent of them Black, 36 percent Hispanic, and the rest, 20 percent, consisting 
of Native Americans, white, and Pacific Rim migrants. These people are 
generally poor, 41 percent under the poverty line, relying on the safety net of 
welfare and medical benefits for basic survival. About 81 percent of all 
patients at my center are Medi-Cal patients, or have no ability to pay. 
My testimony today is directed particularly to the implications of 
Proposition 165 for health care of California. 
Proposition 165 is based on the premise that basic health care funding is a 
luxury ... a luxury over which the governor should be allowed discretion. It is 
therefore, at least on this issue, if not all others, fundamentally flawed in 
treating health care for the poor as a luxury. Health is a right; a fundamental 
human right that must never be at the discretion of any individual. 
This proposition takes dead aim at poor people, 54 percent of them white. 
The mortality rate for poor of all colors with incomes below the poverty line is 
approximately 50 percent higher than for others. For all chronic diseases that 
lead the state's list of killers, low income is a special risk factor -- heart 
disease, 25 percent higher for low income; cancer; infectious disease; traumatic 
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injury and death; increase in disability days, increase in mental health 
problems. Proposition 165, if enacted, would place in the hands of the governor 
power to do the following: 
1. To turn off the life support system of 15 percent of California 
citizens, or over 45 percent of the patients of my hospital center. 
2. Deny 750,000 patients access visits to care, or at my center 150,000 
patient access visits each year to our facility. 
3. Further undermine a very fragile primary care and prevention system 
deferring urgent care for the increasing populations of AIDS 
patients, substance abuse patients, infectious disease patients, 
high-risk pregnancies, trauma and violence, promoting only 
hospital-based emergency care. 
4. Promote late diagnosis leading to higher costs for health care 
services. 
5. Simply transfer on paper fiscal costs as a magical solution, but in 
reality creating greater costs and real human suffering, resulting 
in the exhibition of depression, delinquency, disease, and death. 
I recall on the April 29 rebellion working with the gangs, and their major 
concern was the health care for their mothers and children and their 
grandmothers and mothers, and one of the things we provided at the medical 
center was health care for these women. Their constant pain may be in fact the 
absence of these services. 
A line item reduction of Medi-Cal service costs by any governor will not 
only create a community of very ill people but also destroy our medical 
education training programs which develop a new cadre of health care 
professionals and particularly our network of community-based physicians who 
historically have been the only providers of care for the poor. Even now at 
this present time restrictions in Medi-Cal have driven out of practice in South 
Central Los Angeles 40 percent of the community-based physicians. Any further 
tampering with Medi-Cal funding will result in almost a complete elimination of 
the community-based physician, the bedrock of health care for the poor in our 
communities. 
Proposition 165 is a narrow, ideologically driven, fiscal control strategy 
that demonstrates no concern for real human consequences. It is the equivalent 
of the 1812 British law that declared that "anyone attempting to commit suicide 
would be put to death." It is the equivalent of solving the problems of a 
delinquent parent or father who fails to be an adequate parent by giving the 
police chief the right to deny his child the right to food. The problem is not 
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the poor; it is the poverty of our leadership. 
This proposition, the product of false consciousness, promotes mediocrity 
and diminishes the value of humans in a state that has previously been the 
standard bearer in the search for excellence and the protector of rights of 
every human being to adequate health care. Health care funding must be stable 
and predictable since it deals with issues of life and death. At the minimum, 
it should be exempt from any continuous tinkering. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: Dr. King, you certainly have a reputation of looking at 
our young people at risk. You have done some research over the years as to how 
we validate them by trying to assess their intelligence. Can you kind of tie 
that work in to what you would see as the consequences if this were to go 
forward? We already have had tremendous cuts in the budget already that are 
impacting right now and the cuts that impacted last year. Can you kind of 
expand as to behavior and what you see relative to education? 
DR. KING: Thanks for the opportunity, Senator. 
One of the things we have seen over the years is the very fragile 
institutional structures we have in our communities, dependent largely upon the 
safety net of governments. As we begin to undermine these safety net actions 
which support the family structures, which support the historical community 
institutions, we further promote the feelings of distrust, fear, and anxiety 
among our youth. And we further promote a cadre of youth who would be relegated 
to a particular attitude in their community which sees that some of us are 
better prepared and some of us are less prepared. 
What you make reference to is my work having to do with how youth are 
evaluated and streamed into various groupings at an early age by use of very 
common testing instruments which negate their very existence. Testing 
instruments which begin early in life which I'll call "intelligence tests" which 
are only based upon the western value system which are defined largely by codes 
of a narrow class in this society. 
What we do when we undermine this fragile economic base for these youth is 
to force them further and further away from opportunity structures to correct 
historical destabilization in family structures, in institutional structures, in 
economic systems and social structures, in the kind of lifestyles that ought to 
be there as a bedrock, as a safety net for these youth. 
I can elaborate with more examples but I know your time is short. But in 
essence, if you give the authority to one individual to make such cuts in our 
system, what you are doing essentially is giving this individual the authority 
to decide on individual life, authority over the rights of individuals, health, 
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education, and welfare, and that, in a fundamental sense, is inappropriate and 
incorrect. 
CHAIRPERSON WATSON: I keep having to point to the fact that we have two 
basic policies in this one proposition. One would give the governor authority 
to declare a fiscal emergency and take over that process, and the other is to 
address the welfare program and make these cuts there. I see them going 
hand-in-hand and I just wanted you to bring out your studies that you've been 
doing because once we start to destabilize even more so -- I mean, poverty in 
itself is a destabilizer, and then not being able to, to just finish this up, 
being able to pay one's rent. It means they're forced out and we don't have 
adequate number of housing units as replacement housing so we further 
destabilize. 
Go ahead, please. 
DR. KING: You emphasize another important point. One of the issues of my 
work over the last 20 years in the community has been how does one overcome 
dependency and how do you break into the consciousness born of a dependent 
person. The classic example that I may refer you to is our alcoholism program. 
Alcoholism is a problem of dependency. If you construct treatment models that 
are based upon dependency you cannot treat a problem of dependency by 
institutions of dependency. If you continuously erode the possibilities to 
develop institutions that remove themselves from dependency, if you erode that 
you only create further and exacerbate the problems of dependency. That's a 
very important point to understand. 
You can only break in to welfare and education and health issues if you can 
break in to the psychological consciousness which emanates out of a poverty 
circumstance, and you do that by constructing a net of activity which 
facilitates the development of independent institutions which would become the 
context for the evolution of consciousness of independence rather than 
consciousness of dependency. And every time you threatened the stability of 
funding as these propositions clearly do, you foster another level of dependency 
and you begin to reduce the person again to survival at the worst level and 
remove the possibilities of them breaking free psychologically and becoming 
independent, free citizens which can evolve independent strategies for their own 
development and reconstructional reality. 
That is the fundamental issue that undergirds these kinds of propositions, 
the destabilization, the uncertainties, the indiscriminate cuts: no one knows 
for certain what will happen because their fundamental rights can be threatened 
by one single individual. That is really the fundamental issue. 
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CHAIRPERSON WATSON: I appreciate your input on that. I just wanted to hear 
what you've been doing. Are there any questions from our colleagues here? 
Well, with that, I want to thank you so much for coming down and testifying. 
I want to thank the few people who are left in our audience, but I think it has 
expanded, our hearing today has expanded our informational base and has really 
pointed this proposition up as it should be seen in its true light, and that is 
a fraud on the public. It's just a very mean-spirited grab of the legislative 
process on the budget and also the welfare cuts at the expense of our children, 
that cynical plan to just cut and cut and cut until we are going to force 
youngsters into chaotic situations. 
So we have an obligation to defeat this measure and I think this second 
hearing today will help us to do that. And with that, if there are no closing 
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I have been asked to place California's budget problems and policies in a national 
perspective. My comments are divided into three parts: 
o Causes of fiscal problems 
o Comparison of taxes and service levels with other states 
o Policies in response to these problems 
Causes of Fiscal Problems 
California's fiscal problems are much more severe than those in the typical state. On 
the other hand, California has some things going for it that make other states envious. 
There are three principal reasons why California is in worse shape than most other 
states. Two of these are long-run, and the third is short-run: 
1. California must cope with bigger increases in populations to be served than most 
other states. California has had unusually large increases in public school enrollment 
and immigration. For example, public school enrollment increased 3.4% between 
1991 and 1992 vs. a 1.5% increase nationally. 
(The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities has shown that welfare rolls have not been 
growing much faster than in other states, when account is taken of California's rapid 
population growth in general.) 
2. The fiscal limitations adopted since 1978--especially Proposition 13, the Gann 
limits, and Proposition 98--have forced California to get along with much smaller 
increases in resources than most other states. The restrictive effect of the limitations 
themselves was particularly marked because California was one of the very few states 
that avoided a general tax increase in the 1980s. 
California has changed from a high-tax, high-spending state to an average-tax, average-
spending state. I will elaborate on this point below. 
3. A third, less permanent difference is your relative economic performance, which 
has been weaker than the national average during this recession. As the Center for the 
Continuing Study of the California Economy has shown, defense cutbacks and the 
volatile, depressed construction industry account for the unusual severity of the 
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recession in California. Longer term, the high cost of living and doing business in 
California will be a continuing negative, but on other hand, the traditional strengths of 
the California economy and your exposure to the Pacific Rim will probably help you to 
out-perform the national economy. 
There is one other factor that has contributed to the severity of this downturn in 
California relative to other states--the reliance of the state government on a highly 
progressive personal income tax. While that income tax structure is laudable from the 
viewpoint of equity, it also has the effect of making tax revenue unusually volatile. 
This volatility is exacerbated in a downturn by the indexation of the income tax. 
Adding it all up, the $14.3 billion deficit in 1991 and this year's $10 billion deficit 
were much larger than the gaps in most other states, even taking into account the 
difference in the size of state budgets. They were certainly among the largest in the 
country. Their relatively large size resulted from many of the factors I have 
mentioned--larger than average workload increases, a sharper than average economic 
downturn, and the volatility and indexation of the income tax--as well as your indexing 
of certain spending programs (like welfare benefits) that are rarely indexed elsewhere. 
Does California Have Cadillac Services? How High Is Its Tax Burden? 
In 1978, state and local tax revenue per $100 of personal income was $14.62, the 
fourth highest in the nation; the national average then was $12.08. In 1990, 
California's state-local tax revenue was $11.41 per $100 of personal income--about 
equal to the national average, $11.46. 
Although California imposes a relatively high personal income tax burden on high-
income taxpayers, other taxes are not particularly high. Thanks to Proposition 13, 
local taxes are significantly below the national average (although these figures do not 













California's tax burden is still not particularly high despite last year's tax increases. I 
estimate that in fiscal year 1992 state tax revenue per $100 of personal income in 
California was $7.61, while nationally it was $6.95. 
Recently I heard Governor Wilson assert on a nationally televised program that 
California has a "Cadillac system of government services" in comparison with other 
states. Valid comparisons of services among states are extremely difficult to make, but 
the Governor's statement is open to question in several respects. While some aspects 
of California service levels seem high compared to other states, the opposite appears to 
be the case for certain services. Because of the legacy of Proposition 13, California 
has had to stretch its resources much more than is common elsewhere. 
Ewmples of low service levels 
o Elementary-secondary schools are probably the most important service for 
which states and local governments are responsible, and the average class 
size in California is nearly the highest in the country. In the Fall of 1990, 
only Utah had a higher pupil/teacher ratio. 
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o According to Care of the Mentally Ill: A Rating of State Programs (1990 
edition), California's mental health programs are below average. California 
was identified as one of the four states where the quality of programs was 
deteriorating most. (This study was published by the Public Citizen 
Research Group and the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill.) 
New Yorkers often look to California as a place that delivers services at much lower 
cost than they do. For example, your average reimbursement for nursing homes is half 
of that in New York, and the ratio of prisoners to prison staff is also much lower. 
Possible examples of high-level services 
o Higher education. California has traditionally had a high-quality, low-cost 
(to students, if not to the state) educational system. As a result of fee 
increases over the previous four years, the university system in 1991-92 had 
tuition and fees that were slightly above average, although community 
college tuition and fees were the lowest in the nation. 
o Welfare benefits. In nominal dollars, California benefits are considerably 
higher than those in most states, but account must be taken of the cost of 
housing, which is also well above average. The Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities estimates that benefits adjusted for housing costs are only 
the 17th highest in the country. Another important point is that even in the 
most generous state, welfare benefits and food stamps fall well short of the 
poverty line. 
o Medicaid. California is among the most generous states in the number of 
optional services covered by Medicaid. Elimination of many of the 
optional services would not, however, save the state a great deal of money. 
While the priority of particular optional services is a valid issue, most of 
them may be regarded as desirable because the cost of prevention is often 
less than the cost of dealing with an illness after it has worsened. 
Can the adjective Cadillac be fairly applied to the general level of services in 
California? Not really. No service is more important (and has stronger political 
support) than elementary-secondary education, but with such large class sizes California 
compares unfavorably to nearly all other states. The broad coverage of the Medicaid 
program and the past high quality of the higher education system may warrant the term 
Cadillac, but they are not typical of the general level of services. 
Spending depends on salaries and the level of employment. A recent study published 
by the Center for the Study of the States shows that California has considerably higher 
salaries for state and local employees than most other states. The study does not reach 
a judgment about the justification for those salaries, maintaining that each state should 
compare salaries to those of private sector employees with similar responsibilities (also 
taking fringe benefits into account). The relatively high cost of living certainly 
088 
warrants somewhat higher salaries in California than in other states. The key question 
is: How much higher? 
Policies 
There are some important similarities between the policies adopted recently in 
California and those in other states. 
Nationally, in 1991 and 1992, state fiscal policies can be summarized as follows: 
Taxes 
There were many tax increases in 1991 and few in 1992. Last year, 34 states 
raised taxes, for a total increase of $14.4 billion. This represented close to 5 
percent of total tax revenue and is often touted as the largest increase ever 
enacted in a single year. That is misleading for three reasons: 
o Two-thirds of the increase was in two states, California and Pennsylvania. 
o Only 12 states raised taxes as much as 5 percent. (In 1983, there were 
twice as many.) 
o In real dollars, increases in 1967, 1969, and 1971 were higher. 
This year, tax increases were only $1. 1 billion, not counting continuation of temporary 
increases ($1.4 billion) and taxes on health care providers ($1.8 billion). 
Approximately a half dozen states had large tax increases. 
Spending 
Little information is available yet summarizing spending policies this year. It appears, 
however that the following generalizations can be made about policies adopted in 1991 
and 1992. 
Spending increased about 5 percent each year. 
Three programs--Medicaid, elementary-secondary education, and corrections--
accounted for virtually the entire rise. 
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Higher education was a prime target for cuts: nationally, it received less money 
in 1991-92 than in 1990-91. As a result, tuition is soaring. 
Welfare was cut in many states, especially ones with relatively generous 
benefits. General assistance was hit more often than AFDC. 
Gimmicks 
Many states, like California, relied in part on gimmickry to avoid the pains of 
expenditure cuts or tax increases. 
Devices included accrual accounting, delays in local aid, cutbacks of pension 
contributions, asset sales (in some cases, to state agencies), unrealistic estimates 
of spending or revenues, and plain old fashioned borrowing. 
Taxes on health care providers played a major role in balancing the budget in 
many states. The revenue from these taxes can be used as a match for federal 
aid. 
How does California fit with these national patterns? 
California is similar to many other states in several ways: 
Heavy reliance on tax increases in 1991 (including higher income taxes on the 
affluent) and avoidance of substantial tax increases in 1992 
Welfare cuts 
Tuition or fee increases for higher education 
Partial reliance on gimmicks and optimistic assumptions 
Governor Wilson is to be applauded for attempting to force contemplation of long run 
trends. Your local government realignment enacted last year was the most far-reaching 
change in state-local relations adopted in many years. 
Outlook 
In my book, The State Fiscal Agenda for the 1990s (NCSL, 1990), I predicted that 
states would face a very difficult fiscal environment in the 1990s. 
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The economy will grow more slowly. 
Federal policy will add to state problems, e.g., through mandates. 
Demographic developments will cause spending to increase, especially the 
growing school-age population, senior citizens over 85 years old, and increasing 
immigration. 
Courts will force higher spending for schools, prisons, Medicaid, and mental 
hospitals. 
AIDS and the drug war will become more expensive. 
More will have to be spent on children and for adult retraining. 
Voters will resist tax increases. 
Confronting these problems, states ought to reform spending, taxes, intergovernmental 
policies. 
The delivery of services must be reformed, increasing reliance on incentives and 
markets, giving greater weight to accountability, and targeting resources more 
carefully. In cutting budgets, states should be careful (a) not do long run 
damage to important institutions and (b) to maintain equity. 
Reforms should not just be fiscally driven. I doubt that the best way to design 
reforms is in the budget process, especially when dealing with complicated 
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intergovernmental issues. The 1990s are a period when bipartisan commissions 
can play an important role in developing innovative policies that are difficult to 
structure in the legislative process. Such commissions may be able to assemble 
reform packages that reflect trade offs and concessions that parties would be 
unlikely to accept on a piecemeal basis. Some commissions might focus on 
particular problems, but others might be permanent, such as a state Advisory 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations. 
Tax systems should be reformed, but tax levels will continue to increase. The 
long run budget gaps facing states are so substantial that it is unrealistic and 
undesirable to deal with them solely by cutting or restraining spending. From a 
national perspective, two obvious areas for California to consider are 
broadening the sales tax base and increasing local taxes. California is among 
the lowest states in terms of the number of services subject to the sales tax. 
In this period of fend-for-yourself federalism, state policies affecting local 
governments should be reformed, including reconsideration of sorting out, 
reform of aid programs, greater local revenue diversification, and relaxation of 
many mandates. 
In the years ahead, state and local governments should face up to the need to 
restructure their programs. Some useful themes are found in the book Reinventing 
Government by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, but the approaches discussed there do 
not offer easy answers for the challenges confronting governments. 
States have taken a much more prominent role in our federal system as the federal 
government has cut back since the late 1970s. They need to rethink many of their 
traditional policies in the coming decade, or else the pendulum will swing back toward 
greater control by Washington, which can hopefully be avoided. 
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GOOD MORNING, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS. MY NAME IS RICHARD 
SYBERT. I AM STATE PLANNING DIRECTOR AND THE HEAD OF THE 
GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH. I AM HERE AT YOUR 
INVITATION TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE PROPOSED BUDGET-CUTTING 
MECHANISMS UNDER PROPOSITION 185, THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT ON 
THIS NOVEMBER'S BALLOT. 
I UNDERSTAND THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DEPARTMENT OP FINANCE; 
THE OFFICE OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION.,....ANB THI! DEPARTMEM!f 
eF &MPLOVMENT BE~ELOPMENT WILL TESTIFY ON OTHER ASPECTS OF THE 
ACT, SO I WILL CONFINE MY OWN COMMENTS TO A COMPARISON OF THESE 
BUDGET-CUTTING MECHANISMS TO THOSE OF OTHER STATES. 
AS YOU KNOW, THE ACT WOULD PROVIDE CALIFORNIA'S GOVERNOR WITH THE 
ABILITY TO REDUCE SPENDING TO MEET REVENUES WHEN THERE IS A 
DEFICIT, AND THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT OR HAS NOT ACTED TO CLOSE IT. 
IN CERTAIN DEFINED CIRCUMSTANCES, THE GOVERNOR WOULD THEN BE 
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EMPOWERED TO CLOSE THE DEFICIT THROUGH CUTS IN APPROXIMATElY 60/. 
OF BUDGET CATEGORIES. 
SEVERAL MONTHS AGO THE OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH CONDUCTED A 
COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY OF THE FIFTY STATES TO COMPARE THE MECHANISMS 
AVAILABLE TO OTHER STATES' GOVERNORS TO REDUCE A DEFICIT. 
WHAT WE FOUND, IN A NUTSHELL, WAS THAT CALIFORNIA WAS ALMOST ALONE 
IN HAMSTRINGING ITS CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN THIS AREA. AT LEAST 
FORTY -FOUR OTHER STATES GIVE THEIR GOVERNORS MORE AUTHORITY THAN 
CALIFORNIA CURRENTLY DOES TO BRING SPENDING INTO LINE WITH 
REVENUES. ONLY 6 OTHER STATES--FLORIDA, LOUISIANA, MAINE, 
MICHIGAN, AND NEW HAMPSHIRE--DENY THEIR GOVERNOR SUCH AUTHORITY, 
AND AT LEAST ONE OF THESE--FLORIDA--IS WORKING TO CORRECT THIS. 
MOREOVER, WE FOUND THAT THE POWERS PROPOSED BY PROP. 166 FALL 
ABOUT IN THE MIDDLE OF THE RANGE OF SUCH AUTHORITY GRANTED OTHER 
STATE GOVERNORS. IN OTHER WORDS, PROP 165 IS A FAIRLY MODERATE 
VERSION OF WHAT IS FAIRLY STANDARD GUBERNATORIAL AUTHORITY. ONE 
MAY ARGUE WHETHER OR NOT, ON THE MERITS, A GOVERNOR SHOULD HAVE 
THIS AUTHORITY, BUT IT IS SIMPLY INACCURATE TO CLAIM IT IS UNUSUAL 
OR EXTREME. 
THE EXTENT OF THE GOVERNOR'S INDEPENDENT BUDGET AUTHORITY VARIES 
AMONG THESE 44 OTHER STATES. AT THE LOWER END, A GOVERNOR IS 
PERMITTED TO ACHIEVE MINOR SAVINGS BY REORGANIZING EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH DEPARTMENTS. FIVE STATES--KENTUCKY, MONTANA, NEBRASKA, 
ILLINOIS, AND ARKANSAS--GRANT THIS LIMITED AUTHORITY. 
AT THE UPPER END, A GOVERNOR IS PERMITTED TO REDUCE ANY 
EXPENDITURES NECESSARY TO BRING THEM INTO LINE WITH REVENUES, WITH 
FEW OR NO LIMITS AS TO THE BUDGET CATEGORIES THAT MAY BE CUT, AND 
TO REORGANIZE THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. 20 STATES GIVE THEIR 
GOVERNORS THIS KIND OF AUTHORITY, INCLUDING ARIZONA, NEVADA, AND 
OREGON. 
IN BETWEEN THESE TWO ENDS OF THE SPECTRUM, THE REMAINING 1 9 STATES 
GIVE THEIR GOVERNORS A VARIETY OF LIMITED MECHANISMS. RELATIVELY 
CRUDE ONES INCLUDE REQUIRING THAT CUTS BE MADE ACROSS THE BOARD, 
AS IN ALABAMA AND GEORGIA; OR THAT CUTS BE MADE UNDER AN AGREED 
SET OF PRIORITIES, AS IN ARKANSAS. IN OTHER STATES, SUCH AS 
CONNECTICUT, THE GOVERNOR HAS DISCRETION TO MAKE CUTS UP TO A 
CERTAIN PERCENT AGE, OR, AS IN MISSOURI, CAN MAKE CUTS ONLY IN 
CERTAIN NON-EXEMPT CATEGORIES OF THE BUDGET. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH 
CANNOT BE UNILATERALLY REORGANIZED IN THESE STATES. 
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PROP 186 AGAIN IS IN THIS MIDDLE GROUND Of MECHANISMS. IT WOULD 
NOT PROVIDE THE GOVERNOR WITH UNLIMITED DISCRETION AS TO WHERE TO 
MAKE CUTS, BUT INSTEAD WOULD ALLOW HIM TO MAKE NECESSARY SPENDING 
REDUCTIONS IN ABOUT 601. Of THE BUDGET. THE OTHER HALF OF THE 
BUDGET, INCLUDING DEBT SERVICE, EDUCATION, LOCAL SUBVENTIONS, AND 
85/. OF STATE EMPLOYEES' SALARIES, WOULD BE EXEMPT FROM ANY CUTS. 
THIS MAY BE CONTRASTED, FOR EXAMPLE, WITH PENNSYLVANIA, WHERE NONE 
Of THE BUDGET IS EXEMPTED FROM CUTS; NEW YORK, WHERE ONLY 6.8/. IS 
EXEMPTED; OR ARIZONA AND COLORADO, WHERE ONLY EDUCATION IS 
EXEMPTED. 
I BELIEVE IT IS INACCURATE TO CLAIM, AS SOME HAVE, THAT 
PROP. 165 WOULD GIVE THE GOVERNOR UNLIMITED BUDGET POWER. 
INSTEAD, PROP. 165 GIVES THE GOVERNOR THE ABILITY, IF HE AND THE 
LEGISLATURE CANNOT AGREE ON A BUDGET, AND ONLY If THERE IS A 
PROJECTED DEFICIT, TO MAKE CUTS, BASED ON THE THEN CURRENT OR MOST 
RECENT BUDGET BASELINE, IN ABOUT HALF OF BUDGET CATEGORIES, AND 
THEN ONLY ENOUGH TO CLOSE THE PROJECTED DEFICIT. THOSE ARE TWO 
QUITE DIFFERENT THINGS. PROP. 165 DOES NOT LET A GOVERNOR WRITE A 
BUDGET. IT LETS HIM CLOSE A DEFICIT ACCORDING TO SET CRITERIA AND 
AN ESTABLISHED BASELINE, EITHER WHILE THE BUDGET DEBATE GOES ON, 
OR WITH THE CURRENT BUDGET STILL IN PLACE. 
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WE ALSO FOUND THAT THERE IS A CORRELATION BETWEEN GREA TEA 
GUBERNATORIAL AUTHORITY AND BETTER STATE FISCAL MANAGEMENT. THE 
STATES WHOSE GOVERNORS HAVE SIGNIFICANT OR FULL BUDGET-CUTTING 
• 
AUTHORITY THIS YEAR HAVE FACED AVERAGE BUDGET SHORTFALLS OF 2.5Y. 
OF PLANNED EXPENDITURES, LESS THAN HALF THE AVERAGE 5.7i. SHORTFALL 
OF STATES LIKE CALIFORNIA WHOSE' GOVERNOR HAS LITTLE OR NO 
AUTHORITY. PUT ANOTHER WAY, STATES WHOSE GOVERNORS CAN REDUCE 
SPENDING WHEN THE LEGISLATURE CANNOT, TEND TO RUN SUBSTANTIALLY 
SMALLER DEFICITS. 
FINALLY, IN OTHER STATES THESE PROVISIONS ARE OCCASIONALLY 
CHALLENGED AS A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL SEPARATION OF 
POWERS. HOWEVER, MOST ARE UPHELD. THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT SUCH 
AUTHORITY IS CONSTITUTIONAL, AND DOES NOT VIOLATE THE SEPARATION 
OF POWERS, IF IT IS CONSTRAINED WITHIN BROAD POLICY LIMITS SET IN 
STATUTE. THE TAXPAYER PROTECTION ACT APPEARS TO MEET THIS TEST, 
AS IT SETS WHICH BUDGET CATEGORIES MAY BE CUT, AND WHICH NOT. 
IN SUMMARY, MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS, THE BREADTH OF THE 
GOVERNOR'S AUTHORITY TO CUT THE BUDGET ESTABLISHED IN THE TAXPAYER 
PROTECTION ACT IS COMMON AND NORMAL IN MANY OTHER STATES, AND 
GENERALLY PASSES LEGAL MUSTER. IN FACT, PROP 165 IS A FAIRLY MILD 
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VERSION OF SUCH AUTHORITY, FALLING ABOUT IN THE MIDDLE OF SUCH 
MEASURES. THE ALTERNATIVE IS DEFICIT SPENDING, WHICH IS FORBIDDEN 
UNDER MOST STATE CONSTITUTIONS INCLUDING CALIFORNIA'S. PUT 
SIMPLY, WHEN THE MONEY ISN'T COMING IN AS PLANNED, AND THERE IS 
POLITICAL GRIDLOCK, SOMEONE HAS TO BE ABLE TO RESPOND. 
THANK YOU FOR THIS OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT. I WOULD BE PLEASED TO 
RESPOND TO ANY QUESTIONS OR COMMENTS THAT THE CHAIRMAN OR MEMBERS 
MAY HAVE. 
Governor's Authority to Act on State Budget, 










in the Absence of Legislative Action 
FULL AUTHORITY 
can Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval 
can Reorganize Departments without Legislative Approval 
(20 States) 
Idaho y-Nevada Rhode Island 
Indiana North Carolina Tennessee 
Kansas North Dakota Vermont 
Maryland Oklahoma Wisconsin 
Minnesota ., Oregon Wyoming 
SUBSTANTIAL, BUT CONSTRAINED AUTHORITY 
Can Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval 
Cannot Reorganize Departments without Legislative Approval 
(19 States) 
Mississippi Ohio Utah 
Missouri Pennsylvania Virginia 
New Jersey South Carolina Washington 
New Mexico South Dakota West Virginia 
Massachusetts New York Texas 
VERY LIMITED AUTHORITY 
Cannot Reduce Budget without Legislative Approval 
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Abstracted from Budgetary Processes in the States, published by the National Association of State Budget Officers. 






















































debt service, other items that may be exempted by proviso 
in the appropriation legislation 
federal and state mandated programs 
debt service, pledged revenues associated with bond issues 
law enforcement, prisons, mental health 
Medicaid 
core safety net programs such as cash assistance 
K-12 education 
K-12 education (partial and if revenues improve) 
direct care programs 
direct care programs 
K-12 education, Medicaid 
debt services, Proposition 98 (R-14 education), 
constitutional expenditures, State employees' salaries 
K-12 education, higher education, revenue sharing, certain 
mental health programs, student financial aid 
K-12 education, local aid, entitlements under specified 
conditions 
human services, education, correction, revenue-generating 
programs 
military officers and Armory Board, State Supreme Court, 
Court of Appeals, State Fair Commission, higher education, 
local aid 
prisons, Medicaid, human resources 
all program areas are exempt, except allotments to agencies 
under the Governor's control 
Post-budget cuts were not necessary in 1991 in the other 23 states that give their governors budget-
cutting authority. 
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Good Morning. My name is Janis Nielsen and I am here today 
representing the League of Women Voters. The League has made the 
defeat of Proposition 165 its highest priority this fall. The League, and 
its members throughout California are working to educate California's 
citizens about the dangerous changes in our system that the enactment of 
Proposition 165 would bring. 
The League is adamantly non-partisan, we never support candidates, but 
we do take strong stands on issues. We have taken the strongest possible 
stand opposing Proposition 165. Based on '·the latest Field Poll data, 
California voters appear to inclined to agree. After hearing of the 
Toni Martinez-Burgoyne 
Amy Mccombs proposition, 50% indicate opposition, while only 37% support the 
Rose Matsui Ochi. Esq. 
Deena G. Peterson. Esq. 
Lynn Preisler-Ganz measure. The ballot label assigned to Proposition 165 nearly says it all, 
Cindy Rubin 






balance budget during "Fiscal Emergency". 
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Proposition 165 upsets the balance of power between the executive and the 
legislative branch. It destroys our systems of checks and balances and puts 
unprecedented, unilateral control of the state budget in the hands of one person. 
How does this happen? 
Currently the governor submits his proposed budget to the legislature by January 
10. Proposition 165 would delay that submission until March 1 allowing seven 
fewer weeks for legislative and public scrutiny. If the budget is not passed and 
signed by July 1 the governor can declare a fiscal emergency and make cuts in any 
area not constitutionally protected: health care, law enforcement, transportation, 
family planning, environmental protection, and yes .... education, a point to which 
I will return in a few moments. 
To understand the real magnitude of this constitutional shift of power you have to 
read section 12.2(b) in the initiative. That section clearly indicates that no one can 
stop the governor's cuts because the legislative override provision is effectively 
eliminated. Section 12.2(b) reads, " Any reductions proposed under subdivision 
(a) shall become effective 30 days after the proposal is transmitted to the legislature 
unless, prior to the end of the 30-day-calendar period, the legislature passes the 
\ 
budget bill and the bill is signed by the governor". 
The League of Women Voters believes that any override of a governor's actions 
requiring the governor's approval is no override at all. Indeed, the Department of 
Finance testified Monday that they believe that 165's veto override provisions are 
in direct conflict with existing constitutional provisions. 
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Two weeks ago the League of Women Voters and the PTA unveiled the coalitions 
radio campaign opposing Proposition 165. The radio spots point out the 
unprecedented and unchecked powers that 165 would give this and all future 
governors. In response the proponents issued a press release calling our spots, 11 a 
disgrace ... that blatantly lie to the voters of California. 11 Furthermore, the release 
stated that "the legislature can override the governor at any time." 
On Monday, after several hours of harsh questioning by both republicans and 
democrats, the proponents of 165 were forced to admit the initiative is flawed. 
They admitted that the wording that would enable the governor to virtually control 
the entire budget process was the result of a technical error, that was essentially 
inconsequential. They further stated that, "the court can disregard the literal 
meaning of the language of a law. " The operative word is "can." Maybe the court 
can disregard the language. Can we be sure they will? 
Initiatives often have a great deal of fine print that we as voters are encouraged to 
read. The proponents of this initiative ask us to take a giant step backwards. They 
are asking the voters to ignore the fme print and trust that the issue will be 
resolved after the election. 
I can imagine how most legislators must feel about this. Throughout California's 
history, you and the public have had one real weapon against dictatorial powers of 
the executive. By a two-thirds vote of both houses, you can tell a governor "NO". 
Proposition 165 changes that rule. When its provisions are triggered, you could 
override the governor's spending decisions by a 100% vote of both houses, but the 
3 
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governor could still ignore your vote simply by refusing to sign the override. 
I would think the legislature would be very hesitant to give up their veto override. 
Certainly the League of Women Voters has grave concerns about it. We do not 
single out one governor on this matter. We do not believe that this or any future 
governor should have such immunity from checks and balances. 
Even after the budget is passed and enacted the danger continues. Section 12.5 
gives the governor the power to declare a "fiscal emergency" anytime the budget 
is out of balance by 3% or more. Simple miscalculations by the Department of 
Finance could trigger a so called "emergency". We all know how hard fiscal 
projections are to make. In 7 of the last 10 years the Department of Finance has 
made these miscalculations and since the Director of Finance is appointed by and 
works for the governor, the chances of similar miscalculations might increase as 
soon as 165 becomes law. 
Once again, any override would have to be approved by the governor. Section 
12.5(b) reads, "Any reduction proposed under subdivision (a) shall become 
effective 30 days after the proposal is transmitted to the legislature unless, prior to 
the end of the 30-day-calendar period, the legislature enacts in each house by 
\ 
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring, 
alternate legislation to bring anticipated revenues and expenditures for the fiscal 
year into balance and that legislation is signed by the Governor." 
The proponents of Proposition 165 state that governors in 44 other states have 
similar authority to keep their budgets balanced. That is simply not true. Despite 
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any claims to the contrary, Prop 165 would give the governor of California more 
power over the enactment of our state budget than any other governor in the 
country. In no other state has the publics ability to participate in the budget 
process been so limited and the legislative override provision been eliminated. 
Returning to education funding for a moment, assertions that Proposition 165 does 
not affect the level of school funding are misleading. Proposition 165 does not 
expressly exempt school funding from spending reductions as stated by the 
proponents. All of the discretionary money above the Proposition 98 guarantee 
could be cut by one person alone. It allows the governor to unilaterally reduce 
funding while still complying with the provisions of Proposition 98. This past year 
the governor proposed to cut education funding by $2.3 billion, an action he could 
have taken unilaterally had 165 been the law. And of course, higher education is 
not protected at all. 
The governor claims that this initiative would give him and all future governors a 
powerful incentive to improve legislative action. In truth, this initiative would give 
the governor's own party an incentive to delay the process so that their own leader 
could ultimately define the budget, perhaps ignoring public priorities. Why 
compromise when you can have it all? 
Although he proposed the initiative, the issue here is not Governor Wilson. This 
constitutional amendment will give this and all future governors virtually unchecked 
power. The governor remains in control of the budget process from beginning to 
end. We fear the chilling effect on regulatory agencies and independent boards and 
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commissions whose budgets depend on the whim of the governor alone. 
We are familiar with our current governor and past governors, but what about 
governors in the future. What would happen if a particular governor disagreed 
with strict oversight of the nursing homes that care for our elderly, or for tight 
enforcement of our environmental protection laws or our worker safety laws? 
The proponents of 165 like to focus the discussion on the welfare aspects of this 
initiative. 165 does nothing to strengthen the already worn safety net for 
California's 1.5 million poor children and their families. It provides no additional 
job training, child care services or health care for the working poor, and does not 
address the inadequate supply of jobs in California. Talking about welfare just gets 
us off the main subject of this initiative ... a consolidation of power in one person. 
The League of Women Voters fully recognizes the disenchantment and frustration 
Californians feel with the budget and legislative process. We share that frustration 
and constantly work to enact legislation that will make the process more efficient. 
We are confident that when the public learns the true content of this initiative, that 
they will not be seduced by the welfare provisions and will vigorously reject the 
unprecedented and dangerous new powers 165 would put into the hands of one 
\ 
person. 
This is a constitutional amendment. Californians will take a great risk of losing 
our checks and balances if they support this initiative and gamble on a court 
decision. If this initiative wins and goes to court, it will be the taxpayers who foot 
the bill for a change in wording that never should have been there in the first place. 
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If it wins and doesn't go to court, we will have sacrificed public and legislative 
participation for unchecked gubernatorial power. The only way for Californians 
to win is to oppose 165. 
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PROPOSITION 165. BUDGET PROCESS. WELFARE. 
PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE 
INITIATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND STATUTE 
statement of Dr. Naomi Caiden, Professor of Public Administration, 
California State University San Bernardino, before the Senate 
Health and Human Services Committee, Senate Committee on Budget and 
Fiscal Review, and Assembly Ways and Means Committee, Los Angeles, 
Thursday, October 1 1992. 
1. I should like to thank the committees for the opportunity to 
be here today and to testify before them on Proposition 165. I am 
currently Chair of the Department of Public .1\dministration at 
California State University San Bernardino. I have taught, 
researched and written on public budgeting in a wide variety of 
contexts for over twenty years. For the last four years, I have 
been the editor of Public Budgeting and Finance, a quarterly 
journal for academics and practitioners. 
2. Proposition 165 seeks to amend the Constitution of the State 
of California to augment the powers of the governor in the budget 
process. It would allow the governor to declare fiscal 
emergencies during which ha would have unlimited authority to make 
increases or decreases in the budget. If passed, this proposal 
would contravene the separation of powers and substitute 
dictatorial executive power, without contributing to the democratic 
resolution of conflicts, informed realistic and productive budget 
debate, or resolution of the current California budgetary crisis. 
3. At the heart of the proposal is the power of the governor to 
declare a "fiscal emergency" in two sets of circumstances and to 
take certain actions during that emergency. Both the 
circumstances and substantive powers granted to the governor allow 
him or her unilateral, virtually unchecked power. First, the 
provision to allow the governor to declare an emergency if a new 
budget has not been signed by June 15 each year gives the governor 
discretion when to call an emergency. A budget may have been duly 
passed by a two-thirds majority of the legislature, but if the 
governor chooses not to sign it, he or she may declare a fiscal 
emergency. Each year the decision is up to the governor. Second, 
the governor may declare a fiscal emergency during the fiscal year 
if revenues are 3 percent below budgetary forecasts or expenditures 
are 3 percent above budgetary forecasts, or each is 1.5 percent 
below or above forecasts respectively. Apart from normal 
forecasting difficulties, particularly for revenues, forecasts are 
notoriously easy to manipulate since they are not firm figures but 
estimates, opening the possibility for deliberate under or over 
estimates, and thus triggering declaration of fiscal crisis. 
4. Once a fiscal crisis has been declared, the governor has power 
to change the budget. In both cases, the legislature cannot 
override the governor, even if it musters two-thirds rna j or it y, 
since the governor's signature is required. Thus, the governor's 
version necessarily prevails, his or her priorities stand, and the 
state of fiscal emergency continues, until the governor's agreement 
is obtained. The legislature cannot override the governor who, 
during the fiscal emergency, has complete power to put into place 
his or her own budget priorities. The cards are stacked: in this 
arrangement the governor cannot lose. 
5. Where similar unlimited powers over the budget are granted to 
the executive in other countries, these are checked by the Cabinet 
system of government. The executive is dependent on retaining a 
majority of the legislature, and if it loses a vote on the budget, 
it has to resign. There is no similar provision in a separation 
of powers system, where executive power is independent of the 
legislature, and the two branches of government share powers and 
check each other. Proposition 165 embodies the worst of both 
systems, allowing the executive unlimited power over the budget, 
without reciprocal power by the legislature to vote it out of 
office. 
6. Other provisions of the proposition are clumsy and possibly 
counterproductive. The suspension of salaries if the budget is 
not passed by June 15 is a collective punishment, more 
characteristic of a colonial relationship than modern democratic 
institutions, and which provides even more leverage for an 
irresponsible minority. The furlough and salary cut provisions in 
case of budgetary imbalance during the year single out non-contract 
employees, would have unpredictable results on programs, and would 
probably adversely affect morale. 
7. What are the problems the proposition ostensibly seeks to 
remedy? They may be briefly inferred as (a) budgetary 
irresponsibility; (b) automatic· (auto-pilot) spending; (c) 
failure to reach agreement; (d) budget imbalance. The 
proposition, if passed, would not solve any of these problems, and 
would probably worsen them. 
(a) Budgetary irresponsibility is likely to increase: the 
governor is given unilateral power over the budget, while the 
legislature which constitutionally holds the power of the 
purse, may be ignored, even if it can muster a two-thirds 
majority. Neither has an incentive to responsible behavior. 
The governor already has considerable budgetary power, notably 
a line item veto. 
(b) The proposition excludes the major areas of automatic 
spending which are protected by the constitution, with the 
exception of the welfare area. It therefore does not prevent 
automatic increases in spending in these areas, and provides 
an incentive to protect more expenditures through 
constitutional means, further reducing flexibility. 
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(c) The proposition would shorten legislative debate on the 
budget by about two months because presentation of he 
governor's budget would take place in March instead of 
January. The reduction of time for debate would make gaining 
agreement more difficult, rather than easier. In any case, 
the governor would have no incentive to try to reach agreement 
since the executive could impose its will by unilateral fiat. 
(d) The proposition would not cure budget imbalance, which is 
related to substantive political and economic issues that 
cannot be resolved by gimmicks. The failure of the Gramm-
Rudman legislation at federal level exemplifies the poverty of 
this approach. Giving more power to the governor, bullying 
the legislature, and complicating processes through 
mechanistic measures, does not substitute for reasoned 
analysis and debate toward the understanding and resolution of 
problems. 
8. In conclusion, Proposition 165, if passed, would not achieve 
its ostensible aims. It would result in a dangerous transfer of 
power to the governor, allowing unilateral implementation of 
executive priorities. And it would contribute to a worsening of 
the budgetary climate, making agreement, compromise, and 
responsibility more difficult to achieve. It would be better at 
this time to facilitate budgetary agreements by making it easier to 
pass budgets through the removal of the two-thirds majority 
provision, than to incre~se budgetary conflicts and submit to the 
vagaries of arbitrary power that our constitution is designed to 
prevent. 
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My name is Diane Brahams and I am the Community Concerns Advocate for the California 
State PTA. I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today. 
The California State PTA is strongly opposed to Proposition 165. No single issue on the 
ballot could be more devastating to education, as well as other services to children and 
families, than Proposition 165. And no single issue could be more devastating to our 
traditional American system of checks and balances in government. 
While the proponents of this measure want the public to believe education is protected from 
cuts, this is simply not true. 
As you know, Prop 98 provides only the "minimum guarantee• of funding for schools. 
Because of a strong-commitment to public education, the state has provided, until this year, 
funding above the Prop 98 minimum. If prop 165 becomes law, during a Governor declared 
"fiscal emergency" the governor would be able to cut education down to the Prop 98 level. 
As we learned this year Prop 98 does not truly protect education. If prop 165 becomes part of 
our Constitution the Governor will have new unilateral power over the budget to further erode 
Prop 98 funding by cutting the base on which it is predicated. 
What would that mean? Well, earlier this summer Governor Wilson proposed $2.3 billion in 
education cuts. Under Prop 165 he could have single handed made those cuts. He also 
could have prevented 110,000 little children from starting kindergarten this year. 
All of that could have happened without any provision for legislative override. And without 
violating or manipulating Prop 98. 
Budget funding levels are always based on estimates of General Fund revenues, personal 
income, school enrollment, and property taxes. As part of the "fiscal emergency" language in 
the initiative, the Department of Finance, appointed by the Governor and the determinants of 
the revenue calculations. could re-calculate the Prop 98 funding level, at any time, to lower 
than when the budget was adopted. Nothing in Prop 165 prevents the Dept. of Finance from 
declaring, as part of the fiscal emergency, that their earlier estimate of the Prop 98 
guaranteed was in error. Therefore, the Departments over estimated budget calculations will 
have caused an apparent ·over-funding• of public schools. The Governor would then be free 
to cut school funding to the Departments newly calculated Prop. 98 minimum level and still 
stay within the Constitutional Language of Prop 98. 
Another way that education funding could be hurt under Prop 165. 
If, during the budget deliberation , the legislature casts a two-thirds vote to suspend Prop 98, 
there is then no limit to what the governor can cut from the education portion of the budget in 
a "fiscal emergency,· because the education funding would no longer be protected. 
Although budget cuts are always harsh, these cuts would be particularly devastating because 
they would occur during the middle of the year. Classes would be eliminated. Teachers 
would be laid off. And children's lives would be painfully disrupted. 
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I am a member of PTA because children are my first concern. But as a citizen of California 1 
am also concerned about good government. And, simply put, Prop 165 is bad government 
and violates American Constitutional principals. 
Although this year's budget battle was the worst ever, there was eventually a negotiated 
solution between the Legislature and the Governor. And the Legislature stood firm behind 
education. 
Under Prop 165, why bother electing a legislature? Their ability to override the governor is 
eliminated because the language of the initiative clearly states the governor must "sign" the 
budget. 
Earlier this week the proponents of 165 asked the citizens of California to ignore this exact 
language in the initiative, assuring us the courts would straighten this, and I quote •technical 
error: 
This is not just a technical error, it is a major revision in the Constitution! We are asking the 
governor to withdraw his support of Proposition 165. The citizens of California should not 
have to rely on the courts or pay for an expensive legal proceeding to restore our system of 
Constitutional separation of balance of power. 
Prop 165 gives one person too much power over the state budget. No one governor, 
Democrat or Republican, should have that much power to hurt education or placed his or her 
priorities above the will of the people. 
our public schools are too important. Our children are too important. That's why the 
California PTA is strongly opposed to Proposition 165. 
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G OOD AFfERNOON. MY NAME IS PHILLIP F. STRALING. I AM A Catholic bishop with jurisdiction over the counties of San Bernardino and Riverside making up the Catholic Diocese of San Bernardino. I also serve as the vice-presi-
dent of the California Catholic Conference. 
I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear here today and discuss the 
concerns of the California Catholic Conference with Proposition 165, the welfare- and 
budget-reform act. 
As I begin my testimony I would like to context my remarks against the 
realities of our current economic and social scene in southern California. I feel it is 
essential to do so, for too frequently in today' s world we rush off to solve major problems 
lacking both knowledge and understanding. The result of our ill-conceived action then 
compounds our problems and further jeopardizes all our well-being. 
The major problem that we see with Proposition 165 is that it represents a 
series of ill-conceived solutions to major social and economic problems of our day. It 
appears that those who developed Proposition 165 did so based on myths and stereotypes 
that ill serve the seriousness of the issues addressed. Further, lacking both knowledge and 
understanding of the real issues, Proposition 165 would, if passed, produce immeasurable 
suffering in the lives of the most vulnerable members of our society, poor children. At 
the same time, it would deliver a mortal blow to effective government in our state. 
Permit me to share with you my concerns in the first area mentioned. The 
premise of Proposition 165 is that California's budget problems are being created, in part, 
by an uncontrolled growth in welfare triggered by a benefit that is making California the 
U.S. Mecca for people who don't want to work. I wonder, if those who developed 
Proposition 165 have been following the news recently or have any memory of recent 
history. News headlines daily give us information of the worse economic recession to hit 
southern California since the Great Depression. Perhaps they have been too quick to forget 
the devastation of the industrial base in the early '80s that turned cities and towns in Ohio 
and Pennsylvania into ghost towns and produced one of the largest in-country migrations 
from the Northeast to the West and Southwest. Or perhaps, they don't remember the 
unprecedented foreclosures and land sales that dislocated thousands of farm families in 
the mid-' 80s. Obviously, they remember nothing of the of the savings-and-loan collapse 
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coupled with one of the worse banking crises in our history, a collapse that is continuing 
to have a particularly adverse effect on the building industry throughout California. 
Perhaps, they choose to forget the great tax giveaways of the '80s that have created the 
worse income gap between rich and poor in our country since records began to kept in 
this area. And finally, perhaps, they fail to realize that the Cold War ended and ap-
proximately 20-plus percent of California's thriving economy of the '80s is fast disap-
peanng. 
l wonder if they ever read the newspapers: 
• The story of Sept. 3, 1992, in the San Bernardino Sun, that had the 
Commerce Department reporting that income growth, adjusted for inflation, declined by 
1.9 percent in 1991, the worse decline on record going back to 1970. 
• Or. the story of Aug. 12. 1992, Los Angeles Times, that reported that in 
cities with populations of 100,000-plus, more than one-fourth of the children are living 
in poverty; that approximately 10,000 American children "die of poverty'' each year. In 
the county in which I live, San Bernardino. the figure is 34.4 percent. The story concludes 
that. "Children are the poorest citizens in California and are suffering the consequences." 
• Or, the headline of Sept. 26, in the San Bernardino Sun, that read, "Job 
picture the worst in 10 years." 
Yes. California has some serious economic problems. contributing to some 
very serious social problems. And yes, these problems are placing severe strains on the 
fiscal well-being of the state. But, I think based on the evidence available to us that it is 
safe to say that the major causes of the state's fiscal problems are a changed world 
economy coupled with a changed world political reality. These factors coupled with the 
short-sighted, greed-oriented and failed economic po~icies of the '80s need to be addressed 
if we are to rebuild our national and state economy. I fail to see how any responsible 
person could blame the economic tragedy of the '90s on helpless children. Seventy percent 
of the recipients of AFDC in California are children - 1.6 million children. Of this 
number, 200,000 are infants. Or blame it on unemployed workers trying to hold a family 
together, or the aged, blind and/or disabled. 
Yet that in fact is what Proposition 165 would do - punish these groups 
as though they were the cause of our problems. Proposition 165 would, if passed. 
immediately reduce welfare benefits by 10 percent, and in six months, if the adult member 
of the family did not find work, benefits would be reduced an additional 15 percent. This 
would be in addition to the benefit cuts that will be experienced by most beneficiaries 
within the next month as a result of the this year's budget resolution. A family of three 
would have combined benefits- AFDC and food stamps- reduced to $751 a month 
or $9.012. a year. Using today' s poverty line of $11,570 for a family of three, that family 
would be made to I i ve at 79 percent of that which is established by the federal govern mcnt 
as barely sufficient for a family's survival. Further the benefit would be frozen at that 
level for seven years. If the present economic crisis continues for another two or three 
- 2 -
years, that family in 1995 would be living with an income level equivalent to 60-65 percent 
of the established poverty line. In a state where many AFDC families are already spending 
in excess of 50 percent, some as high as 70 and 80 percent, of their income for shelter 
reductions of this nature would serve only to increase the ~\ready unacceptable number 
of homeless families, as well as insure the destruction of many more innocent young lives. 
Further, these cuts would make the quality of all of our lives unbearable and surely, 
hamper any real possibility of any economic revival in our state. 
I could go on in this area for much longer but I honestly feel that we alL at 
least those of us in touch with the human faces of poverty in our streets, are sufficiently 
pained by present circumstances without imaging the horrors to come if the short-sighted-
ness and mean-spiritedness of Proposition 165 is adopted. 
Proposition 165 is not satisfied with wrecking havoc in the lives of poor 
children, their families, the aged and disabled. Proposition 165 would reconstruct our state 
government by effectively destroying the balance of powers between the legislative and 
executive branch of governments. It would, if passed, vest the equivalent of absolute fiscal 
power in whoever sits in the governor's chair. This would essentially destroy the systems 
of checks and balances designed by our forefathers and mothers as a safeguard for our 
democracy. Short-sighted and myopic thinking on the part of the proponents of 165 would 
jeopardize the established processes of good government designed to insure that the 
common welfare of all people is served by a balanced representative government. 
Recently, we Catholic bishops of the United States published a statement 
titled, Putting Children and Families First- A Challenge for our Church, Nation and 
World. Our motivation in issuing this statement is captured in the opening paragraph: 
"'Our nation is failing many of our children. Our world is a hostile and 
dangerous place for millions of children. As pastors in a community deeply committed 
to serving children and their families, and as teachers of a faith that celebrates the gift of 
children, we seek to call attention to this crisis and fashion a response that builds on the 
values of our faith, the experience of our community, and the love and compassion of our 
people.'' 
Further, in the same statement, we advance a criteria for national policy. I 
think, this criteria could serve us well in California. I will conclude my remarks this 
afternoon by applying this criteria to our state: 
Our great state of California must move beyond partisan and ideological 
rhetoric to help shape a new consensus that supports families in their essential roles and 
insists that public policy support families, especially poor and vulnerable children. In 
pursing this goal we as a state should advocate for policies and programs that: 
• Put children and families first. 
• Help. don't hurt, families and children. 
• Insure that those with the greatest need get the most help. 
• Support policies and programs that empower families to meet their respon-
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sibilities to their children. 
• Fight economic and social forces which threaten children and family life. 
• Build on the strengths of families, reward responsibility and sacrifice for 
children. 
While I find myself unable to see any real value in Proposition 165 by way 
of fashioning a response that will enhance the well-being of poor children, their families 
or. for that matter, any segment of our society, let me state categorically the defeat of 
Proposition 165 is not our exclusive goal. It is not our goal to embarrass any political 
personage or party. Our goal, looking beyond the defeat of Proposition 165, is to impel 
all to build with one another a society, state, nation, a world with a clear priority for all 
families and children in need. 
Thank you. 
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Presentation by Wendy Lazarus, Children Now 
10 REASONS WHY CALIFORNIANS SHOULD 
OPPOSE PROPOSITION 165 
(September update) 
Governor Wilson has proposed a ballot initiative, Proposition 165, which will be 
on the November ballot. While the proposal claims to help taxpayers and children, it 
will not In fact, it will seriously harm the poorest and most vulnerable children in 
California, could have adverse consequences for the well-being of more well-off 
children, and will cost taxpayers more in the long run. 
Millions of children who receive state services in any area from education to child 
abuse and neglect prevention could be affected by the proposition's dismantling of the 
constitutional checks and balances in budgeting. In addition, 1.5 million children --
one in five children in California - will be affected by the proposal because they live in 
families which receive Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC). AFDC, 
commonly known as welfare, is a federally mandated program run by the state. The 
program was set up as a transitional safety net to help families, mostly single mothers 
and their children, to get through financial crises such as divorce, unemployment, or 
illness. Cost of living adjustments to AFDC grants were signed into law by former 
Governor Reagan as an inflation buffer. The key features of the proposal follow: 
Budeetary chanees: 
• Move the introduction of the budget by the Governor from January 10 to 
March 1, and maintain the July 1 deadline for legislative approval. 
• Allow the Governor to declare a fiscal state of emergency if a budget is not 
passed and signed by July 1 or whenever state revenues drop 3% below 
projections. 
• Give the Governor, during a fiscal state of emergency, the authority to 
reduce spending on programs not specifically protected by the constitution. 
The reductions would automatically go into effect unless the Legislature 
passes a budget within 30 days and it is signed by the Governor. 
AFDC chanees: 
• A 10% cut from Jan. 19921evels in AFDC grants (from $663 to $597 each 
month for a family of three); 
• An additional 15% cut ($597 to $507 per month for a family of three) after 6 
months unless the adult recipient is unable to work; 
• Denial of additional benefits for children who are conceived while either 
parent is on AFDC; 
• One year of lower benefits to families who move to California from other 
states; 
• A $50 monthly bonus to teen parents if they stay in school, but a $50 
reduction in the grant if they drop out of school; 
• Elimination of special assistance for poor women pregnant with their first 
child. 
In addition to the aspects of the initiative that affect children, there are several other important 
features: 
• Cost-of-living reductions after 1996 for the elderly, blind and disabled 
under the Supplemental Security Income program-- SSI; 
• Elimination of the duty of counties to provide general assistance benefits for people 
with no other means of support, including disabled persons who are awaiting approval 
of their SSI applications. 
This fact sheet outlines ten reasons Californians should oppose this proposition. 
#1: The proposition is anti-child. 
Children make up 70% of all people on AFDC in California and they are the ones who will 
bear the consequences of this proposal. In most cases the plan would cut Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children grants by 25% from January 1992levels- from $7,956 annually for a 
family of three to $6,084. Even with the additional food stamp money available, a grant of this 
size leaves a family with only $8 a day to house, clothe and feed each child 
#2: The proposition gives the Governor unprecedented powers over the lives 
of California's children. 
Children's programs make up the majority of the state budget Under the "fiscal state of 
emergency", the Governor will have sole authority to cut these, or any other, programs. 
Because revenue projections are done by the Governor's own Department of Finance, it is 
very easy for him to create a fiscal state of emergency. The Legislature cannot even override 
the Governor's veto of a budget bill that it passes during a fiscal state of emergency. This is 
the ultimate violation of the constitutional system of checks and balances. 
#3: This proposition is based on myths about Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children. 
Governor Wilson has described California as a welfare magnet for people from other states and 
countries. In fact, a much greater cause of the growth in the number of people needing 
assistance is the condition of the economy. A recent state-by-state analysis by the nonpartisan 
Congressional Budget Office found that all of the "growth spurts" in AFDC since 1973 have 
occurred during periods of economic decline. In the current recession, California's welfare 
rolls have not grown as fast as other states' rolls. In 1990, California's population grew faster 
than 47 other states while its welfare rolls grew faster than 29 states. Five western states --
with benefits about half of California's -- all had greater AFDC growth rates than did 
California. 
Most families on AFDC are not recent immigrants. The nonpartisan Legislative Analyst, 
through a study of the birthplaces of children on AFDC, found that families do not move to 
California to take advantage of higher grant levels. In addition, undocumented persons are not 
eligible for welfare, and only 3% of California's AFDC recipients were on welfare in another 
state. 
page2 
Children Now 9/18/92 
Also, most families on Aid to Families with Dependent Children are small and on welfare for a 
short time. The typical family has one parent and two children and 90% of recipients have 
three or fewer children. Most AFDC recipients go off aid within three years. 
#4: The proposition punishes children when their parents cannot find jobs -- a 
particularly harsh measure in this recessionary job market. 
California has lost more than 600,000 jobs since May 1990. It is unrealistic to expect 
unemployed parents to find jobs after 6 months, while the state is losing jobs. This proposal 
penalizes children for the current economic conditions when their parents do not have adequate 
job opportunities. 
#5: Although the proposition claims to help taxpayers, it will have minimal 
impact on the state's budget problems and will cost taxpayers more in the long 
run. 
The AFDC program makes up only 6% of the state's general fund and the estimated $700 
million in welfare savings that would result from the governor's proposal represents less than 
2% of the total general fund. While these grant cuts will have a minimal impact on the budget 
shortfall, they will have serious long-term effects on children and taxpayers. 
Such sudden income reductions can have devastating effects on a child's health, educational 
success, and psychological well-being. Society will end up paying more later for this neglect 
in the form of higher health insurance premiums, higher prison costs, lost productivity to the 
economy, and higher costs of training undereducated workers. This proposal will clearly 
undermine the Governor's other preventive initiatives in preschool education and teen 
pregnancy prevention. 
#6: There are more sensible alternatives for dealing with the state's budget 
problems. 
Solving the state's budget problems by giving one person the sole authority over the state 
budget is undemocratic and a serious threat to important children's programs. There are other 
sound alternatives. The California State Commission on Finance has identified $21 billion in 
tax expenditures which could be eliminated to generate needed revenues. For example, limiting 
business meal and entertainment deductions to 50% would save the state $225 million and 
eliminating oil company tax loopholes would bring in another $2-300 million. Streamlining the 
state's many health programs and recouping the $3 billion in uncollected child support 
payments are also crucial parts of the solution. 
#7: The proposition will cause California to lose millions of dollars in badly 
needed federal matching funds. 
Because the federal government helps finance the A.FDC program, California will lose an 
estimated $400 million in federal matching funds if this proposal is adopted. At a time when 
the state economy is weak, it is important to bring in as much outside money as possible to 
stimulate growth. In addition, since more recipients will now tum to county-operated aid 
programs, this proposal in fact shifts costs from the federal government to the counties which 
face severe budget shortages and will simply be unable to find the dollars. 
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#8: The proposition will lead to more hunger and homelessness among 
children. 
Currently, AFDC grants do not cover a family's basic needs. Rental housing costs alone in 
most urban areas of California are higher than the entire AFDC grant, leaving no money for 
food, clothing and other basic necessities. If Prop. 165 passes, it is estimated that 170,000 
more children will be hungry and 95,000 families will become homeless. After a 4.4% 
reduction in AFDC grants was imposed in 1991, the Hamilton Family Shelter in San Francisco 
had to turn away an average of 439 people every month. This is a 395% increase over the 
months preceding the grant cut 
#9: The proposition claims to bring about welfare reform, but doesn't. 
Simply cutting grants will not result in more people going to work, as this proposal suggests. 
The most effective ways to put people back to work are to help create jobs, train people for 
them, and stimulate the economy. Access to affordable health care and child care are also 
necessary before people will be able to work. Programs such as GAIN (Greater A venues for 
Independence) provide people with job training and education so they are better equipped to 
find jobs. In addition, better enforcement of child support payments from absent parents is a 
crucial pan of any strategy to keep people off welfare. Better collection of child support can lift 
families out of poverty and off welfare and prevent them from going on welfare in the first 
place. 
#10: The proposition appears to violate constitutional protections. 
The provision to require a family needing assistance to wait one year before receiving full 
California benefits probably violates the Equal Protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. 
Several Supreme Coun decisions have found other such residency requirements to be 
unconstitutional. 
In sum, this proposition represents the single most harmful anti-child measure 
in recent memory. The initiative hurts the state's children by upsetting the 
constitutional checks and balances in state budgeting and by dramatically 
reducing AFDC grants. Because children cannot vote or represent themselves 
in this public debate, they need every Californian to become educated about 
the harm in this proposal. We all have a responsibility to protect children's 
interests as these decisions are made. We urge aU voters to oppose this 
measure and ask candidates to do the same. 
For more information on the No on 165 Campaign 
NOON 165 
980 Ninth 16th Floor 
Sacramento, CA 95814 
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APPENDIX l. 
Source: N.C.S.L . 
Deadline for Submission of Governor's Budget to the legislature and 
legal Source of Deadl;ne 
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of the governor's budget is constitutional. By statute, agency budget requests 




























13. New Jersey -
14. New Mexico -
Date listed is for final submission. Agency budgets are due November 1 . 
In even years, budget is due on first day of session. 
Budget must be submitted to the legislature at least 45 days prior to regular 
session. 
Budget must be submitted to the legislature 20 days prior to the session. 
Budget document that is submitted one ·or two weeks prior to the session does not 
necessarily reflect budget message that is given sometime during first three weeks 
of session. 
On or before eighth calendar day except in the session following election of a new 
governor, in which case budget must be submitted on or before the 21st calendar day. 
Budget must be submitted by tenth legislative day; newly elected governor submits by 
fifteenth legislative day. 
legislature convenes in December prior to first session. Budget is due no later 
than Friday following first Monday in January. In years with a new governor, budget 
is due no later than Friday following first Monday in February. 
long-range capital budget, 30 days. 
The governor's budget must be submitted to legislature by November 15, except in 
first year of a governor's term, when the deadline is January 31. 
On or before January 15 of each odd-numbered year. Governor in first year of term 
has until February 1 to submit budget. 
New governor allowed one month or more. 
Statutes provide later date (twenty-fifth legislative day), however; legislature 
traditionally receives budget on first day or at pre-session conference of standing 
finance committee. 









20. South Dakota -
21. Utah -
22. Washington -
. 23 • West Virginia -
Wisconsin -
25. Wyoming -
Budget submitted to legislative Council only on December 1; rest of legislature 
receives by third day of session. 
If new governor, by March 15 (approximately 75 days after convening). 
Budget must be submitted on the first day of session in January. 
Budget must be submitted on December 1; if new governor, february 1. 
Not later than the first Tuesday after the first Monday of December. 
Submitted within three days after start of session; confidential copy submitted to 
fiscal analyst 30 days prior to session. 
By December 20 prior to January's annual session; 20 days prior to any supplemental 
session. 
Within ten days, odd-numbered years .and the first day of session, even-numbered 
years. 
Convening date is determined by scheduling resolution while budget submission date 
is statutory. (Usual time difference has been about two weeks.) 
On or before December 1 of the year preceding the year the legislature convenes in 
budget session. 
Source: N.C.S.L. 
Amount of Time Legislature/Committee Has to Consider Budget 
State 
Number of Weeks from 
Time Governor Submits 
Budget Until the End 
of Legislative Session/ 
Fiscal Year legislature 
Has to Consider the Budget 
Number of Weeks 
Appropriations/ 
Finance Coamit-
tee Has to Con-
sider the Budget 
Arkansas 28 12 
Cal1fornia 20 ? 
Colorado N/L ! 
Connecticut Odd Year - 17 Odd Year - 12 ___ _ 
Even Year - 13 Even Year - 9 
Delaware 22 7 
Florida ~4 15 ii-Ge.::...;o::...;.r-'!-g-i-i a:;;.._ _________ _,,.;.. 5 - 6 
Hawaii 15 9 
Idaho N/L N/L 
Illinois N/R N/R 
Iowa 13 - 155 
~Ka_n_s_a_s ___________ ~-N~/~L Var~ie-s~y-----
KentucK,y 8 5 - 6 




Minnesota 15 - 11 66 l~ Mississippi ! 
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24 
Incumbent Governor - 32 
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Short I~il· - 14 
12 
16 
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Incumbent Governor - 26 
New Governor - 24 
8 
10 - 12 
Number of WeeKs from 
Time Governor Submits 
Budget Until the End 
of legislative Session/ 
Fiscal Year legislature 
State Has to Consider the Budget 
Number of WeeKs 
Appropriations/ 
Finance Cormait-
tee Has to Con-
sider the Budget 
South Carolina 22 4 - 8 
South Dakota 12 6 - 7 
Tennessee 12 - !8 i 
Vermont N/l House - 8 - 10 
Senate - 10 - 12 
Virginia 8 1/2 6 
Was hi n'ton 3 12 
Wisconsin 12 - 16 
~u~~~~--------------------------------~12 ------------------------~~~1~0~----------­nYOmlng 
KEY: N/l - No limit 









Budget to.be submitted December 15, legislature 
convenes second or third Monday in January, regular 
session limited to 120 days. 
Theoretically, the entire session, but recent 
practice is for the first body to pass the General 
Appropriations Bill for the operating budget by the 
90th day of the session. 
The Joint Budget Committee begins budget 
considerations in early or mid-November and 
introduces a budget bill several weeks prior to the 
end of the legislative session. This occurs in 
March or April in most years. 
This includes a one-week recess for budget hearings. 
Until the end of the session; late April - even 
years; early May - odd years. 
Tech'nically, from the time the governor delivers the 
budget message until the end of session. 
Consideration of "regular" appropriations bills is 
subject to self-imposed schedule and varies 
accordingly "The budget," as a whole, is typically 
considered throughout the session and the wrap-up or 
"omnibus" bill is often the last or nearly last bill 









15. New Jersey -




Typically, both House and Senate committees have 
approximately 4 weeks each. 
In each legislature's first regular session 
(odd-numbered years) until mid-June. "Current 
services" budget is passed usually by April. 
In first regular session, Appropriations Committee 
receives "current services" and "supplemental" 
budgets in January. Each, of course, must be 
finalized by mid-June (statutory adjournment). 
Conference committee can and does meet until day of 
adjournment in odd-numbered budget years. 
In the first year of a four-year administration; in 
the second, third, and fourth year, the legislature 
has 12 weeks to consider. 
In the first year of a four-year administration; in 
the second, third, and fourth year, the committee 
has 11 weeks to consider. 
Eight weeks in joint subcommittee; three weeks 
additional to complete in House Appropriations 
Committee. 
Sixteen to 18 weeks available but committees 
typically use 10 to 12 weeks for formal 
deliberation. 
The governor submits his proposed budget to the 
Budget Section of the legislature at its 
organizational (2-3 day) session in December of 
every even year. The legislature goes into session 
on the first Tuesday in January of every odd year. 
The 1987 session completed its work on April 19, 
1987 - 105 calendar days. 
The first house usually has until the 31st 
legislative day to consider the budget. The second 
house usually has until the 48th legislative day to 
consider the budget. Conference committees made up 
of members from both houses often work on the budget 
to the last legislative day. 
The regular session is limited to 140 calendar days, 
beginning the second Tuesday in January of 
odd-numbered years. The fiscal year begins on 
September 1. If the budget is not adopted in 
regular session, the governor would call a special 
session (30 day-limit). 
No specific limit, but the House and Senate usually 
have passed their bills by the 15th week (105 days) 




conference committee and final passage of the 
general appropriations bill. 
Until June 30 or "upon passage of budget." 
Generally hold hearings for four weeks prior to the 
start of the session. A fifth week is spent in 
hearings, reviewing budget action already taken, and 













Provisions or Procedures to Finance the Current Operations of 
State Agencies Until Passage of the Appropriations Act(s) 
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7. New Mexico 
8. South Dakota -
9. Virginia -
There are two exceptions: 1) payment for debt service (General Obligation Bonds) 
is continous; and 2) dedicated revenue for the Department of Transportation would 
be available to be spent by that department. 
The state has a very limited "Emergency Contingency Fund" ($5-$6 million), which in 
very rare circumstances may be used at the discretion of the state budget agency. 
No specific provisions. 
No General Fund appropriations; although this situation has not occurred in Maine, 
dedicated revenue funds could be allocated by "financial order." 
Budget must be enacted; otherwise session cannot adjourn sine die . 
Except for payment of the public d~bt. 
In FY83/84, the state discontinued the use of a continuing resolution within the 
Appropriations Act. 
Appropriations always are completed by the first week of March, the new fiscal year 
starts on the following July 1. 
Since a biennial process is used, failure to amend the Appropriations Act during a 
























STATE BALANCED BUDGETS: 
CONSTITUfiONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
GUBERNATORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY 
Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Gubernatorial Authority 
Governor Ug/s/a/Urt! Governor Can rtrdua Votrs rt!quirtrd 
must mbmit a must pass a must sign a Go!H!nlor budg~t without RestrlctlotU to ovurid~ 
balanctrd bafanctrd balant:ffl May carry htu lin~ l~lslat/v~ on budg~ gubematorlal 
Stat~ budgt!t budgt!t budgt!t 0~ d~jiclt Item veto approval rt!ductlotU 111!10 
Alaltlal ............ c,s c.s c.s ... * * ATB Majority elected Alulla ••............ s s * • • ... :J/4 elected (a) Arizona •............ c c c • (b) • • (c) 213 elected Arb- ........... s s s . . . • ... ATB,MR Majority elected CallforDia ........... c ... . .. * * * 2/l elected 
Colomlo ........... c c ... * * 2/3 elected Conn«tkat ......... s s ... * * MR 2/l elected DelaW11re ........... c c c ... * * (e) • 3/~ elected florida ............. s c s ... * * (f) 211 elected Geoflll ............. c c c . . . • * ATB 2/l elected 
Hawlll ............. c.s c.s . . . * * ... 213 elected Idaho .............. c c . . . * * ... 213 elected IUiaola ...•.......... c c . . . * ... . .. 31' elected India ............... c c c ... * Majority loW11 ............... c c ... . .. * * ATB 2/3 elected 
ICIMII ............. c c c ... • * MR (h) 2/l elected Kentedly ........... c,s c c . . . * ... * 213 elected Louisa• ............ c.s s c,s • * * MR 211 present Maine ............. s c s . . . . . . . .. ATB (I) 213 present 
Marylaad .......... c c . . . . .. . . . * ... (lc) 
Massadlaeethl ....... c c c * * * ... 2/3 present Mklllpa ........... c c c . . . * ... 213 elected Mln-aa .......... s s ... * * MR 2/l elected Mtfllllsttppl .......... s s s * * MR 2/3 elected MIS!Oari ............ c . . . c . . . * * ... 2/3 elected 
Montaaa ............ c c . . . ... * * (m) MR 2/l elected Nebraska ........... c . . . * . . . ... 3/S elected Ne•ada ............. s c . . . . . . . .. * ... 213 elected New Hampshire ..... s * ... * 213 elected New .Jereey •......... c c c . . . * * (n) ... 2/l elected 
New Meldco. . . . . . . . . ' c . . . . . . • * (o) ... 2/3 present New 'fork .......... c (p) * * * (q) (q) 213 elected Nortll Carolla1 ...... c ... . .. * Nortll Dakoll ....... s s ... * • ATB 211 elected Ohio ... ······ (5) (s) * * ... l/~ elected 
Oklahoma .......... c,s c c ... * * ATB 2/l elected (t) Oreco• ............ c c c ... * (u) 2/l elected Pennsylnnla ........ c,s c * (v) * * ... 2/3 elected Rhode Island ...... c c s . . . ... * liS elected Soutll Carolina ...... (w) c c * * ATB 213 present 
South Dakota ....... c c c . . . * * ... 213 elected Tenneseee .......... c c c * * ... Majority elected Tnas .............. c c ... * * 213 elected Utah ...... ...... s c s ... * * ATB 2/l elected Vennoat ............ . . . . . . ... * * (x) 213 present 
Sec footnotes at end of table. 
I.Lglslatlv~ Authority 
Votes nquirtd Votes fY!tiUirtrd 
to pass nv~nu~ to pass 
lnt:rt!tut! budg~ 
Majority Majority 
Majority elected Majority elected 
1/2 elected Ill elected 
l/4 elected 314 elected 
2/l elected 213 elected 
MaJority present Majority present 
Ma ority present (d) Majority present (d) 
l/' elected Majority elected 
Majority Majority 
Majority Majority 
Majority elected Majority elected(&) 
Majority Majority 
Majority elected 3/S elected 
Majority Majority 
Majority Majority 
Majority elected Majority 
Majority elected Majority present 
2/3 elected l/2 elected 
Majority elected (j) 
Majority Majority 
Majority Majority (I) 
Majority elected Majority elected 
Majority elected Majority elected 
213 elected Majority 
Majority elected Majority elected 
Majority Majority 
Majority liS elected 
Majority Majority 





Majority (r) Majority (r) 
Majority elected Majority elected 
Majority Majority (t) 
Majority Majority 
Majority elected Majority elected 
Majority Majority 
Majority Majority 
2/3 elected Majority elected 
Majority elected Majority elected 






STATE BALANCED BUDGETS-Continued 
Constitutiont~l 11nd St11tutory Provisions Gubern11torial Authority Legislative Authority 
Govttrnor ugislaturt Governor Can reduce Votes required 
must Sllbmit a must pass a must sign a Governor budget without Restrictions to override Votes required Votes required 
balanced balanced balanced May carry has lint legislative on budget gubernatorial to pass revenue to pass 
State budget budget budget over deficit item veto approval reductions veto increase budget 
Vlrpala ............. s . . . . . . (y) 
Wuld111toa ......... s ... 
West Vlralnla ....... c c ... 
WIKoasla ........... c c c . . . 
Wyomlna ........... c c c . . . 
Souree: N;uional Association of State Budaet Orfi"n, Bud(ttary Processes in the States (July 1989); 
updated April 1982 by The Council or State Governments. Update renects literal readina or state consti-
tutions and statutes. 
Key: C · Constitutional 
S - Statutory 
A TB - Across the board 
MR · Maximum reduction dictated 
•- Yes 
. . . -No 
(a) Joint session. 
(b) May carry over "casual deficits," i.e., not anticipated. 
• (c:) Governor may redu" budaets or administration-appointed qencies only. 
(d) Must have quorum. 
(e) Budaet reductions are limited to executive branch only. 
(f) The Governor and elected cabinet may redu" the budaet. The reductions must be reported to the 
lqislature and advi" as to proposed reductions may be offered. 
(J) If aeneral fund expenditure "ilina is exceeded, 213 vote required; otherwise majority of elected 
members. 
(h) Reductions allowed only to aet back to a balanced budaet. 
(i) Oovernor may expend funda up to one year. Certain restrictions apply to A TB reductions. 
(j) For emeraency enactment, 2/J votes required. 
(k) Governor has no veto power over the budaet bill, but vote or 3/S elected required to override veto 
on other bills. 
(I) For capital budaet. 2/3 votes required. 






• MR (z) 2/3 present Majority elected 
• ATB 213 elected Sl 'It 
'(aa) ATB (aa) 2/3 elected Majority 
... 213 present Majority present 
• ... 2/3 elected Majority 
propriations, school foundation proarams, and salaries of elected officials. 
(n) May not redua debt servi". 
(o) May redua budaet of aaencies under Governor's control only. 
Majority elected 




(p) Technically, the Governor is not required to sian a balanced budset, however, in order to consum· 
mate the sprina borrowina the Governor must certify that the budaet is in balance. 
(q) May redua budaet without approval only for state operations; only restriction on reductions is 
that reductions in aid to localities cannot be made without leaislative approval. 
(r) Emeraency measures and measures that amend a statute that has been referred or enacted throush 
an initiated measure within the last seven years must pass both houses by a 2/3 majority . 
(s) There is no constitutional or statutory requirement thai the Governor submit or the leaislature enact 
a balanced budaet. There is a constitutional requirement thai the leaislature provide surficient revenues 
to meet s\ate expenses. The Governor is required by statute to examine monthly the relationship between 
appropriations and estimated revenues and to reduce expenditures to prevent imbalance. 
(t) Emeraency measures require a 3/4 majority for override. Budget bills usually require Emergency 
Clauses and therefore require 213 vote for passage. 
(u) Governor recommends a biennial budget that is subject to legislative approval. 
(v) May carry over deficit into subsequent year only. 
(w) Formal budaet submitted by Budaet and Control Board, not Governor. 
(x) May not chanae legislative intent when reducing budaet. 
(y) The Constitution specifies that expenditures shall not exceed revenues at the end of the biennial 
period. 
(z) The Governor has power to withhold allotments or appropriations, but cannot reduce leaislative 
appropriations. 
(aa) May reduce spending authority. 
SOURCE: Council of State Governments, BOOK OF THE STATES: 1992-1993 
Source: N.A.S.B.O. 
Gubernatorial Budget Authority and Responsibility 
MustPruenz Must Sign Reorganize Spend Uruvuictpa~ed Reduce Budget RulrictioM 
llalmtced Bai.anced Line Item De~ wlo Fetkral Funds withouz on Budget 
Sl4k Buds_et Bud~et Veto Lee_. Aee.roval wlo I.e~: Aeeroval I.e&_. Ae.e.roval Reductiof!S 
Alabama X X ATB 
Alaab X X X X 
A.rizoM X X X X X 
Atkanaa X X X X X 
California X X X 
Colorado X X X x• X 
~ X X X X MR. 
Del&ware X X X X X 
Florida X X X -· x•• MR. 
Georgia X X X X X X ATB 
Hawaii X X X -· partial• x• 
Idaho -· • X X X X 
DWioi• X X 
IDdiaaa X X X X X 
Iowa X X X X ATB 
Kulu X X X X ATB 
Kealuclcy X X X X X 
Louiliau X X X X MR. 
\faine X X x• ATB 
\farvland X • x•• X X X 
duaach~Ue~U X X X X X 
dicb.iga.o X X X x• -·· ••• 
.tilme.at~~ x X X X X MR 
.{iaaiuippi X X X X 
.(isaouri X X X -· X 
oioalalla X X X X MR. 
februb X X X X X 
icmcla X X X -· X MR. 
..... Hamplb.in: X X ...,J_ X X X X 
lftf Mexi<:o X X X X 
lnr York X -· X X x•• .... 
lorlh Carol.iDa X X X x• 
lonh Dakota X X X x• -·· X ATB 
lbio X X X X X 
ltlahoma X X X x• x•• x• X 
'regon X X X X ATB,MR 
eaasytvuaia X X X x• _ ... x••• 
bode b1ud X X X X X 
outh Carolina X X X X X 
ausb Dakoca X X X X - X X X X X eDI X X X X 
.lab X X X X X ATB 
ermolll X X X 
irJinia X X x• MR. 
~~ X X X X ATB 
'eaV"qinia X X X X X 
'ilcODiiD X X X X 
X X X ATB 
IICftO JUco X X X X X X 
OOia: ATB .... .Aci'OIII-Che-board cuta only 
MR .•. Jdaximum reduction dictated 
SOURCE: National Association of State Budget Officers, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES: 1992 
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APPENDIX 6. 
Executive Authority to Cut the Enacted Budget 
Can cut Maximum Must consult 
No only across percent with the 
State restrictions 1 the board reduction legislature Other Authority 
Alabama X Constitutional: Amendment No. 26 
Alaska X Statutory: AS 37.07.080 (g) (1) and (2)2 
Arizona X3 None3 
Arkansas X4 Biennial legislation 
California None 
Colorado xs Constitutional: Article X, Sec. 16 
Statutory: C.R.S. 24-75-201.5 
Connecticut 5%6 x7 Statutory: Sec. 4-85 
PA 91-3 JSJ (Sec. 20 and 46) 





Hawaii X Constitutional: Article Ill, Sec. 16 
Idaho X9 Constitutional and statutory 
Illinois xto xu x12 N/R 
Indiana X Statutory: 4-12-1-12 
Can cut Maximum Must consult 
No only across percent with the 
State restrictions 1 the board reduction legislature Other Authority 
Iowa X Statutory: Chap. 8.31 
Kansas xB xt4 Statutory: KSA 75-6704 (across-the-board) 
and KSA 75-3722 et. seq. (other) 
Kentucky 5%15 Statutory: 48.130 
Louisiana to%16 xt7 N/R 
Maine (N/R) 
Maryland 25%18 xt9 Statutory: State Finance and Procurement 
Article, Sec. 7-213 
··Massachusetts (N/R) 
Michigan X x2o Constitutional: Article V, Sec. 20 
Statutory: 18.1371-18.1372, 18.1382, 18.1384, 
18.1391-18.1392, 18.1395, and 18.1453; 
Michigan Compiled Laws 
Minnesota (N/R) 
Mississippi x21 Statutory: 27-104-13 and 31-17-123 
Missouri x22 Constitutional: Article IV, Sec. 27 
Statutory: Sec. 33.290 RSMO 
Montana 15%23 Statutory: Sec. 17-7-140 
Nebraska None24 
Nevada x25 Statutory: NRS 353.225 
New Hampshire x26 Statutory: RSA 9: 16-a 




Can cut Maximum Must consult 
No only across percent with the 
State restrictions 1 the board reduction legislature Other Authority 
New Jersey (N/R) 
New Mexico X27 Constitutional: Article IV, Sec. 30 
New York X Constitutional: Article VII, Sec. 2 
North Carolina X x28 Statutory: Executive Budget Act, 
General Statutes 143-25 
North Dakota x29 Statutory: 54-44.1-12 and 54-44.1-13 
Ohio X Constitutional: Article VIII, Sec. 1 
Statutory: Title I, Vol. 2, Chap. 126.08 
'Oklahoma X Constitutional: Article 10, Sec. 23 
Oregon X30 
__ 30 
Pennsylvania X Constitutional: Article IV, Sec. t631 
Puerto Rico (N/R) 
Rhode Island X X32 N/R 
South Carolina X X Statutory: Appropriations biD 
South Dakota X SDCL 4-8-23 
Tennessee X X33 Constitutional: Tenn. Code Annotations, 
Article 3, Sec. 18 
Texas x34 Constitutional: Article 16, Sec. 69 
Statutory: Chap. 317, Government Code35 




















Statutory: Appropriations· bill 
Virginia (N/R) 
Washington (N/R) 




Statutory: WV Statutes 5A-2-20 to 5A-2-22 
Statutory: Sec. 16.50 (5) 
Constitutional and statutory 
N/R: No response. 
·.Notes: 








Executive can cut selectively or across the board in all areas, without consulting the legislature. 
A court decision puts this authority under question. 
Although the governor has unilaterally reduced state spending, there is some question about his legal authority to do so (Arizona Legislative Council 
memo, June 22, 1982). In practice, the legislature has usually approved reductions exceeding 1 percent of expenditures, through amendments to the 
original general appropriations bill. 
The governor must make cuts according to the guidelines established by the legislature in a bill passed every two years concerning the distribution of 
funds. 
Sec. 24-75-201.5 requires the governor to take the following steps when a revenue shortfall occurs: ( l) formulate a plan for reducing general fund 
expenditures so that the general fund reserve does not fall below one-third of the 3 percent reserve (or below one-half of the 4 percent reserve 
beginning with the 1992-93 fiscal year); (2) promptly notify the General Assembly of the plan; (3) promptly implement the plan usill$ procedures 
available under Sec. 24-2-103,24-30-206, 24-50-109.5, and any other lawful means; and (4) transfer general fund money from the capttal construction 
fund to the general fund (and restrict capital construction proje(..1s) if the s.overnor's plan reduces general fund expenditures by at least 1 percent of 
the total amount or general fund appropriations for the fiscal year. (Dcta1ls of these procedures are contained in a memorandum dated :september 
12, 1991, from the Colorado Office of Legislative Legal Services to Senator Ted Strickland.) 
Five percent of an appropriation or 3 percent of a fund. 
The Appropriations Act of 1991, Sec. 20, authorizes secretary of the Office of Policy and Management to reduce other expense accounts by 
$.33,064,213 and allows the governor to reduce agen(..)' allotments to achieve these savings without regard to statutory limits on his authority to do so. 
Sec. 46 requires the governor to submit a plan to reduce allotments within 30 days of a comptroller's report that projects a general fund deficit of 
more then l percent of general fund appropriations. 
No specific statutes detail how deficits are to be handled. It has been the practice in the state, however, for the governor lo require agencies 10 






































The governor can, by executive order, reduce agency allotments as necessary. Reduction of legislative and judicial budgets requires permission of 
those branches of government. Legislative concurrence is not required. 
With respect to executive agem:y operations and capitai. 
Two Ia~ t~is year direct the governor to establish formal_re~rves: (I) early retirement: $50 million in savings; up to 1.5 percent of the agency's total 
appropnatwn but not more than 5 percent from any one hne ttem and (2) FYJ992 Emergency Budget Act: reserve up to $350 million with specific 
amounts established by agency but not program or line items. Both are repealed July l, 1992. 
To pass laws and allow reductions in grants and agencies not under control of the governor. 
Effective July 1, 1991, the governor has new authority to cut across the board, with certain limitations, to restore the state general fund estimated 
year-end balance to not more than $100 million. 
As interpreted by the attorney general's opinion, law allows the governor to reduce appropriations as he sees fit (no legislative or judiciary 
reductions), but only to the extent that cuts would result in year-end zero balance. In the two instances where such reductions have occurred, budget 
reductions were sanctioned by appropriations acts that permitted the lapse of funds. 
Five percent of budget. If revenues are up to 2.5 percent below official estimates, branch heads are authorized to reduce spending to the extent funds 
are available in the budget reserve fund and the general fund surplus account. If the revenues are 2.5 percent to 5 percent below official estimates, 
an enacted reduction plan is implemented, which includes application of budget reserve funds and general fund surplus account resources prior to 
other budget reduction actions. The law is silent on shortfalls greater than 5 percent. 
Ten percent of a budgetary unit. 
Appropriations for certain retirement programs and minimum foundation program for education may not be reduced. 
Twenty-fiVe percent of any item of appropriation. 
These items may not be reduced: appropriations for payment of interest and retirement of state debt; appropriations to the legislature, public 
schools, and the judiciary; and salaries of public officers during term (Maryland Statutes, Finance and Procurement Article, Sec. 7-213). Salaries of 
merit system employees may be reduced through the secretary of personnel. 
The following may not be reduced: expenditures of the legislative and judicial branches and funds for constitutionally dedicated purposes (Michigan 
Constitution of 1963, Article 5, Sec. 20). 
The governor can cut selectively up to 5 percent. After all agencies are cut up to 5 percent, then additional cuts must be equal and uniform. 
Authority for cuts exists in two statutes. Under one statute, cuts are initiated at the governor's discretion. The governor, by another statute, is 
required to cut if revenues fall below 98 percent of the estimate after October. 
If revenues do not meet projections used when the budget was passed. 
Fifteen percent of the budget. The governor may not reduce apfropriations for ( 1) interest and retirement of state debt; (2) legislative branch; (3) 
judicial branch; (4) school foundation program, including specia education; and (5) salaries of elected officials during their terms of otrtce. 
The governor has no legal authority to reduce appropriations, other than administrative controls that may be applied to agencies under the 
governor's direct control, to mana~e spending. However, he can request agencies to reduce their expenditures, and he can enforce that request for 
those agencies where he has appomted the department head. Only the legJslature can reduce the appropriation to an agency by amend~ the 
appropriation during a regular session or special session called by the governor. 
The governor may set aside a reserve of any amount in agencies of the executive branch from general funds appropriated or any other funds available 
to the agencies. 
26. New Hampshire With prior approval of the Legislative Fiscal Committee for executive branch appropriations only . 
27. New Mexico Executive may order the limitation on expenditures for agencies only under his direct control. The judicial branch, universities, and public schools 
operate separately. The legislature is the only entity that can actually reduce appropriations levels. 
t-t> ,.. 
28. North Carolina 
29. North Dakota 
30. Oregon 
31. Pennsylvania 





31. West Virginia 
38. Wisconsin 
The governor also may transfer money from reserve funds and revert capital improvement appropriations. He may not reduce the principal and 
interest payments on bonds and notes of the state (Constitutional: Article Ill, Sec. 5 (3)). 
The executive branch can cut across the board without consulting the legislature except when the budget reduction is the direct result of an initiative 
or referendum action. 
An opinion of Oregon's attorney general has concluded that, given a projected revenue shortfall, the executive department may reduce allotments to 
prevent a deficit during the current biennium but not a future biennium. This "new" power has not been used, the governor choosing to call special 
legislative sessions to deal with two subsequently projected deficits in 1982. Projected deficits for 1993-95 have raised the issue again for the 1991-93 
biennium. 
Budget Reform Code requires a balanced bud~et. The only way a deficit could occur is if revenues do not reach earlier estimates. Because of the 
balanced budget requirement, there is no reqUirement as to what the governor and/or legislature must do should a deficit situation occur (governor 
has line item veto). 
Appropriations for the general assembly and legislative agencies may not be reduced (Rhode Island Statutes, Sec. 35-3-16). 
The governor may call a special session to deal with a deficit. 
The Legislative Budget Board must approve. 
The governor may plead for agencies to reduce spending and/or call the legislature into special sessions to cut appropriations or propose cuts (not to 
exceed 10 percent) using constitutional and statutory budget execution authority. The governor's proposed cuts, using budget execution authority, 
requires Legislative Budget Board approval. 
However, the governor may control the rate of expenditure~ state agencies through his allotment powers. In so doing, he may reduce an allotment 
if he determines that a lesser amount than was appropriated ts required. But he has no statutory authority to unilaterally reduce appropriations in 
order to balance the budget. 
In order to balance the budget, the governor may make equal and pro rata reductions in all appropriations out of general revenue. Legislative and 
judicial branches do not have to participate in cuts but usually do. 
Following budget enactment, if previously authorized expenditures are determined by the secretary of administration to exceed available revenue-but 
by less than 0.5 percent of the total general fund appropriations for the year-the secretary may unilaterally take action to adjust agency expenditures 
(except for aid programs) to meet the revenue shortfall. If estimated expenditures are expected to exceed available revenues by more than 0.5 
percent or total appropriations, then the governor is required to submit a bill to the legislature to correct the imbalance. 
Source: NCSL survey of the National Association of Legislative Fiscal Officers, Autumn 1991. 
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Chairpersons and Members: 
My name is Lewis M. King. I am Dean of the College of Medicine, Charles R. 
Drew University of Medicine and Science, situated in the heart of south central Los 
Angeles, in an area known as Watts. our medical center, anchored by the Martin 
Luther King, Jr. Hospital, serves a population of 1. 6 million people; 44% Black, 36% 
Hispanic, and the rest, 20%, consisting of native Americans, white and pacific rim 
m1grants. These people are generally poor, 41% under the poverty line, relying on 
the safety net of welfare ( 33%) and Medi-Cal benefits ( 64%) for basic survival. 
About 81% of our patients are on Medi-Cal, or have no ability to pay. My testimony 
today is directed particularly to the implications of Proposition 165 for health care 
of California. 
Proposition 165 is based on the premise that basic health care funding is a 
luxury ... a luxury over which the governor should be allowed discretion. It is 
therefore 1 at least on this issue 1 if not all others 1 fundamentally flawed in treating 
health care for the poor as a luxury. Health is a right, a fundamental human right 
that must never be at the discretion of an individual. 
This proposition takes dead aim at poor people, 54% of them white. The 
mortality rates for people of all colors with incomes below the poverty line is 
approximately 50% higher. For all chronic diseases that lead the state's list of 
killers, low mcome is a special risk factor (heart diseases - higher f.::>r low 
income, cancer, infectious diseases, traumatic injury and death, mer ease in 
disability days, increase in mental health problems) . Proposition 165, 1f enacted, 
would place in the hands of the governor, power to: ( 1) turn off the life support 
system of 15% of California citizens, or over 45% of the patients at our King/Drew 
hospital; ( 2) deny 7 50, COO patients access visits tc care, (or 150, 000 patients access 
v1s1ts each year to our facility); ( 3) further undermme a very fragile pnmary care 
and prevention system deferring urgent care for the increasing populati::m of AIDS, 
substance ab~Jse, infectious disease, high risk :)regnancies. and tn.uma -=tnd 
violence, promoting only hospital based emergency care; 1 4) promote late dL1gnosis 
leaC.in<;' to higher costs for health care services; ( 5) simply transfer on paper fiscal 
costs as a mag1cal solution, but :;.n reality creating greater costs and ::::-eal :l '_lman 
.;u:fering, resultinq in the exacerbation of depression, :::1elinc::uency, :~isease -=tnd 
death. 
;::., line item reduction on Medi-Cal service costs by any governor ·.vul n:>t ·:>nly 
create community of very ill people, but also destroy our medical educatiJn training 
~)rograms, and our network of community based physicians, who histJncally have 
been the only providers of care for the poor. Even now, at this present time. 
restriction in Hedi-Cal has driven cut of practice in south Central Los A;1geles 
:>f the community based physicians. Any further tampermg with Medi-Cal funding 
will result in almost a complete elimination of the community based physician I the 
bedroc:~ of health care for the poor. 
Proposition 165 is a narrow, ideologically driven 1 fiscal control stn.tegy that 
demonstrates no concern for real human consequences. It is the equivalent of the 
1812 British Law that declared that "anyone attempting to commit suicide will be put 
to death"; it is the equivalent of solving the problem of a delinquent father, who 
fails to be an adequate parent, by giving the police chief the right to deny his child 
the right to food. 
The problem 1s not the poor 1 but the poverty of our leadersh1p. This 
proposition 1 the product of false consciousness, promotes mediocrity and 
the value of humans in a state that has previously been the standard bearer in the 
search for excellence and the protector of right of every human being to adequate 
health care. 
Health care funding must be stable and predictable since it deals with issues 
of life and death. At a minimum, it should be exempt from continuous tinkering. 
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SUMMARY OF REPORT 
In November, Californians will vote on Proposi-
tion 16), "The Government Accountability and 
Taxpa\er Protection Act of 1992" sponsored by 
Governur Pete Wilson. Proponents claim that various 
r-nwisions in the Proposition will reduce welfare 
spendmg and dependency. The largest welfare program 
affected by the Initiative is Aid to Families With 
Dependent Children (AFDC), a program specifically 
designed to protect the well-being of poor children. 
Monev for AFOC comes from both the federal and 
state gewernments, but the state government alone 
decides the amount of AFDC grants. Children consti-
tute 70"\J of the recipients of AFDC; over 1.6 million 
California children, including 200,000 infants, cur-
rently rece1ve support. Based on estimates from 
national studies, as many as one third of all children 
born in the 1980's will need support from AFDC at 
,;ome puint before thev reach 18. 
This report is the first to examine the probable 
effects nt the proposals in Proposition 165 on the 
physic!! health, academic performance and emotional 
well-bemg nf children. Our goal1s tel provide the public 
with the mfe1rmation necessary tn evaluate the 
lnttiattw·s full costs and benefits. Tel Jo this, we have 
examtned a large body of research, statistics and 
empincal studies that describe and evaluate the AFDC 
program in California and elsewhere. We also have 
done '' •me original analyses of data to obtain a better 
~ense , f who receives suppnrt, why the\' need support, 
how r,1renh are likely to respond to the various 
dements of the Initiative and hmv children will be 
,lt"fectecl. 
The AFDC Program. AFDC pnl\'ldes support to 
children who live in families with very low incomes. 
AbelUt /)'~·;, ot the children live with a single parent. 
virruallv always their mother. The other parent is 
permanently ,~bsent, generally due to death, divorce, or 
-;epar~lt!<m. Approximately 20':X) nf the children live in 
two-parent families where the pnmary wage earner IS 
unemr'ldyeJ <lr working part-time and not earning 
enough to r'rovide hasic support to the family. Ahout 
)'\,of the children live w1th a twn-parent relattve or 
nther caretaker. AFDC also provides support to the 
children's parents. Caretakers, other than parents, 
receiH' ,urpurt if they are needy. Poor :,mgle pregnant 
women wirh<lllt other chtldren also are eligible for 
support trom the time of conception. 
E11111lie, receive cbh grant' rh.1r v,1rv with fa1111l\' 
,1:e. The nuxtmum ca,h grant fur~~ famdy of three is 
$663 .1 month. Families abel are d1gible tn receive food 
stallll'' .mclt11ll,;t <lt their medical care ts covered by 
\!edi-(:.d.l:urrentlv, the ecHnbtnL'd value nfthe cash 
• 
grants and food stamps for a family consisting of a 
mother and two young children - the most typical 
AFDC family - is $10,200 a vear. 
The Proposals. Proposition 165 would reduce bv 
10% the cash support provided to all virtually families 
receiving AFDC; families that receive AFDC for longer 
than six months will have this support reduced by an 
additional15%. The reduction in the cash grant wtll he 
partially offset by an increase m food stamp benefits. 
Nonetheless, the income of a family of three would be 
reduced to $9012 a year. The benefit reductions will 
apply even to single mothers with children younger 
than one year of age, to parents who cannot find 
employment or child care, and to recipients who are m 
education or job-training programs or working parr-
time. Pregnant women without other children no 
longer will receive AFDC. 
In addition, families that have newborns while the 
family is receiving benefits would not receive an 
increase in the cash grant to cover the costs of this 
child and recipients who have lived in another state m 
the year before they apply for benefits would be lumteJ 
to the benefit amount available in that state. Finallv, 
the Initiative contains several proposals focusing 
exclusively on teenage mothers and pregnant teens. 
Most importantly, teenage mothers who do not attend 
school regularly will lose $5C a month; those who do 
attend regularly will receive an extra $50 per month. 
According to the Initiative's sponsors: ( 1) the 
renefit reductions and other provisions will reduce the 
number of applicants for AFDC and the length of time 
recipients receive support; ( 2) the benefit reductions 
and legislative changes accompanying the Initlati\·e 
will result in more recipients working; (3) rec1p1ents 
will be able to replace the lost mcome through earn-
ings; ( 4) and the various provisions regarding teenagers 
v;ill reduce the number of births to mothers youngt::r 
than 18 and will induce more teenage mothers to 
complete high school. 
Evaluating The Proposals. The current AFDC 
svstem does not work well, from the perspecti1·e ot 
recipients as well as of the general public. Although 
there is need for reform. some changes may beneftt 
children, while others may harm them. Evaluating 
Proposition 165 requires two different types of assess-
ments. First, what will be the actual effects of the 
,pecitk proposals on bnth parental behavior and un the 
11·ell-being of children. Tu 11 hat degree will the gu:1ls ell 
the proponents he achieved! Will the proposals have 
undesired effects or unintended consequences? In 
analy:ing these questions it is necessary to consider the 
, 'vera II effect of the entire package of proposals. since :1 
ballot initiative, unlike legislation, is an aU-or-nothing 
approach. 
Second, are the value judgments reflected in the 
proposals the right ones? Among the most important 
value issues are: Should getting AFDC recipients into 
the workforce be the top priority of welfare policy, 
regardless of harm to children resulting f110m the means 
used to encourage work? If not, what is the proper 
balance between the goals of protecting children and 
encouraging work? Should mothers of very young 
children be forced to work? Should this depend on the 
quality of child care available to them? 
Using this framework, we have examined both the 
benefits and the harms that children are likely to 
experience if the Initiative is adopted. 
\Vhy Parents Require AFDC Support. The first step 
in our analysis is an examination of the reasons why 
families need AFDC. Understanding the situo.tions of 
these families is essential to understanding how the 
parents are likely to respond to and be affected by the 
benefit reductions and other provisions. 
In this regard, it is useful to think of AFDC 
families as fitting into one of three categories (these are 
our constructs, not legal categories). Among the single 
mothers, one group is composed primarily of women 
above 25 years of age, with high school or greater 
educations, who apply for AFDC following a divorce or 
separation. One national study found that 1 out of 6 
mothers who were not receiving AFDC before a 
divorce or separation became recipients afterwards. 
Most of these mothers have little or no earnings before 
the divorce; their spouses earned most of the family 
income. These mothers need AFDC to enable them to 
reorganize their lives following the loss of their spouses' 
earnings. The fact that nearly half of these mothers 
have children 5 or vounger makes it extremely difficult 
for them to find jobs which pay enough to support a 
family, especially given the cost of child care. Although 
the fathers are required to pay child support, most 
rrovide little or no support. 
The second group is composed primarily of never-
married mothers between 20 and 30, the majority of 
whom have not completed high school. Many have 
worked at some point but due to their limited educa-
tion they cannot earn enough to support their children. 
Some are not proficient in English. Contrary to popular 
images, few of the recipients in this group are teens -
5.R'X) are 18 or 19 and only 1.8°/t) (9,000) are under 18. 
Many of mothers who begin receiving AFDC in their 
20's had their first child as a teen, however. Again, the 
fathers ,lf these children contribute little support. 
The final group consists of two-parent families. 
The parents in these families have very little educa-
tion. Over 30'7h of the parents are refugees, predomi-
n;ltely from the war-rom countries of Southeast Asia .. 
• 
More than half of all recipients in this group are not 
sufficiently profiCient in English to be able to find jobs 
with wages adequate to support a family: m times of 
high unemployment they cannot find anv JObs. 
Between 50 and 60% of all families that enter the 
AFDC system receive support for less than a year. 
although some families enter and exit the system 
several times. The mothers in the first group tend to be 
the early leavers; still a number of them require 18 to 
24 months of support before they can be self-sufficient, 
especially if they are trying to complete their educa-
tion. Without this education they cannot obtam Jobs 
that pay enough to provide adequately for their family. 
Mothers in the second group generally receive surport 
for 1 to 5 years, although 10 to 15% will remain 
recipients longer. Their lack of education makes tt 
extremely difficult for them to find jobs that pay wages 
above the poverty level. Finally, at least half of the 
two-parent families need support for two or more years, 
although they may also he working. They too have 
difficulty earning enough to he completely independenr 
of AFDC, given their lack of education and proftctencv 
in English. 
Conclusions. We have carefully reviewed a large 
body of research that helps us predict how parents are 
likely to be affected by, and respond to, the provistons 
in the Initiative. The effects on children will derend 
upon how parents are affected. Based on these analyse~ 
and data we have reached the following conclusions. 
First, an analysis of the economic needs of families 
makes it clear that current grants are too low to allow 
parents to meet the basic needs of their children. These 
families all have incomes below the poverty line. v.:hich 
is $11, 570 a year for a familv of three. The poverty line 
is the federal standard for the minimum income needed 
to meet the basic needs of children. According to the 
National Commission on Children, "AFDC fails ro 
meet most families' mintmum economic needs." A 
large percentage of current recipients lack enough 
income to provide children with safe housing and 
consistently adequate food; a recent report by Congres-
sional Republicans concludes that AFDC does nut 
provide enough for "baste survival." The proposed 
reductions would leave a family of three wtth an 
income 20% below the povertv line. ln public upmion 
polls Californians state that nearly twice as much 
income is needed for a minimally adequate income. 
The children who receive AFDC already are m 
great jeopardy because their families have so ltttle 
income. The National Commission on Children 
concluded that "poverty and economic instahlit\· take 
a dreadful toll on children." This conclusion is cum-
pelted by numerous studies showmg that poor children 
have significantly greater health, academic and 
emotional problems than children from non-roor 
families. This is equally true for children living lli 
families receiving AFOC and for children living in 
"worktng poor" families, that is families with incomes 
below the poverty line that do not receive AFOC. 
Second, contrary to the expectations of the 
Initiative's proponents, passage of the Initiative is 
extremely unlikely to result in a reduction in AFOC 
caseloads: at most there will be a slight decrease in the 
number of people who enter the welfare sy.stem and a 
small reduction in the length of time some recipients 
require support. Even with reduced benefits the vast 
majority of recipients could not earn enough to avoid 
needing AFOC support. In fact, many experts believe 
that the entire package of proposals actually will 
increase caseloads. 
Third, at least half of all recipient families will not 
be able to replace any of the lost income. This group 
will remain unemployed for much of the time they 
receive support. Benefit cuts do not address the reasons 
these parents remain unemployed. Many of these 
parents lack the skills to get reasonably paying, or any, 
jobs. Others cannot find or afford child care. Child care 
is an especially great problem since more than 40% of 
the children in these families are 5 or younger. Even 
among the 40 to 50% of the parents who may find jobs, 
most will still wind up with less money. A parent with 
even modest child care costs would have to work at 
least 20 hours a week at $5 an hour just to make up for 
the benefit reduction. Particularly among more long-
term recipients, most parents will not be able to work 
this much, unless they receive further education or job 
training. 
Fourth, the children in these families will be 
considerably worse off overall. As is the case for 
children in all families, the greatest determinant of 
their well-being is the care provided by their parents 
and other caretakers. The loss of income will force 
parents to live in less safe housing and neighborhoods 
and to rely on poor quality child care; many parents 
themselves will provide less adequate care of their 
children, due to the greater economic and emotional 
stress they will experience. At greatest jeopardy are the 
200,000 infants currently receiving support. If their 
mothers do not seek or find employment they will lose 
support critical to meeting their infants' needs. Yet 
most ot those who are forced into the workforce will be 
unable ro find, let alone afford, the type of child care 
ahsolutdy essential for children younger than a year old 
- stahle, continuous care by a single caretaker. 
As a result, we can expect a decline in the physical 
health. academic performance, and emotional status of 
manv children. The harms will not, for the most part, 
be dramatic ones- such as more deaths or life-
threatening tllnesses - although there will be some of 
these. Rather, the effects will include more accidental 
injunes to children, more ongoing physical problems, 
such as earaches and dizzy spells, far more children .. 
falling behind in school, and more children with 
emotional problems. Children m families that become 
homeless or that have their mcome reduced for longer 
than a year and infants exposed to inadequate child 
care will be in special jeopardy. Not all of these 
problems will not be evident immediately; some will 
emerge throughout the children's childhoods and after 
they become adults. But it is certain that many 
children's development will be significantly impaired. 
Not all children will be hurt. A small percentage 
of the families currently receiving AFOC may be able 
to combine work with AFOC support and be better off 
economically; their children certainly will benefit from 
the increased income. In addition, as a result of one 
proposed change working families not currently 
receiving AFOC will become eligible to receive AFOC 
grants to supplement their present earnings; their 
children should benefit as a result. And older children 
of mothers who enter the workforce may benefit just 
from the fact that their parents are working, if the 
children receive high qualiry child care. 
It also appears that the provisions aimed at 
potential and actual teenage mothers will not achieve 
the desired effects. Teenage parenthood does pose 
special risks for both mothers and children. Preventing 
pregnancies and helping teenage mothers finish school 
would alleviate many social problems. Studies from 
other states indicate, however, that financial rewards 
and penalties do not induce most teenage mothers to 
complete school. Many of these teenagers have 
dropped out of school before becoming pregnant. To 
increase the number who return to or finish school 
requires programs that include outreach, special classes, 
and child care, not just financial incentives. 
The Initiative may have other unintended 
consequences. For example, the benefit cuts may force 
many recipients to abandon the education or job-
training programs provided through California's GAIN 
program, since the reductions apply even to parents in 
such programs. Also, pregnant mothers may feel 
themselves compelled to have abortions that would 
have otherwise been unwanted. In sum, it is clear that 
the number of children harmed will greatly exceed the 
number helped, under the approach to welfare reform 
taken in the Initiative. Because an Initiative is an all or 
nothing approach, there is no way to separate out its 
beneficial or possibly beneficial aspects. 
At the end of this report, we outline some other 
approaches to welfare reform that could help recipients 
leave the system and obtain jobs that pay adequately, 
wtthout jeopardizing their children's well-being. For 
example, single mothers with children 3 or older, and 
the primary wage earner in two-parent families, already 
are subject to the work requirements of California's 
GAIN program. This program requires that partici-
pants be enrolled in an education or job training 
program or be actively seeking employment. The 
program also helps with child care and exempts 
mothers of very young children. Early evaluations of 
the program are favorable. While it is not the purpose 
of this report to recommend specific approaches, we 
believe that a full evaluation of Proposition 165 
requires consideration of alternatives that will not 
harm, and may benefit, children. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In November, Californians will vote on a ballot 
initiative, Proposition 165, entitled the Government 
Accountability and Taxpayer Protection Act of 1992 
and sponsored by Governor Pete Wilson. Although the 
Initiative addresses several issues, it is being promoted 
primarily as a means for reducing welfare spending and 
dependency. Since virtually everybody believes that 
the current welfare works badly, the Initiative's promise 
of welfare reform may appeal to many voters. 
The Initiative raises issues far more complex than 
voting for or against the current welfare system, 
however. The largest program affected by the Initiative 
is Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFOC), 
a program specifically designed to protect the well-
being of poor children. Over 1.6 million children who 
live in poor families benefit from that program. 
Children constitute 70% of the recipients of AFOC; 
the remaining recipients are the parents or other 
caretakers of the children. If passed, the Initiative 
would reduce the support provided to virtually all 
children who receive AFOC by 10%; children in 
families that receive support for longer than six months 
will have their support reduced by an additional 15%. 
This report analyzes the Initiative from the 
vantage point of the several million California children 
who will be most deeply affected by it. It is the first 
study that examines the probable effects, both positive 
and negative, of the reductions and the other provi-
sions of the Initiative on the physical health, academic 
performance and emotional well-being of children. 
a 
Written with the assumption that all Californians are 
concerned abo.ut the well-being of children, the report 
is intended to provide the public with the information 
necessary to assess the full costs and benefits of the 
Initiative. 
The report reviews the findings of a large body of 
research, statistics and empirical studies describing and 
evaluating the AFOC program in California and 
elsewhere. It also contains original analyses of data, 
some of which was not previously available. 
The report is divided into ten sections. Section 
One describes the current AFOC program. Section 
Two presents the main elements of the the proposals in 
the Initiative that affect children. Section Three 
contains two proposals. The Fourth section presents 
the rationales that have been offered in support of the 
Initiative and a framework for evaluating its effects. 
Section Five looks at the current economic status of 
the families, in order to see how they might be effected 
by the Initiative. Sections Six and Seven describe why 
parents rely on AFOC, the characteristics of current 
recipients, and how long families require support. The 
next two sections examine the likely impacts of the 
Initiative, first on parents and then on children. 
Section Ten discusses whether the effects of the 
Initiative's cuts in benefits can be mitigated by the 
provision of alternative services to needy children. In 
the final section, we discuss other options for welfare 
reform that would not harm children. 
AFDC AND OTHER SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES 
The AFDC Program 
While the Initiative will affect several programs 
that provide support to needy individuals, the main 
program that will be altered is Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC). It is this program that 
most people probably equate with "welfare." This 
section outlines AFOC, as well as the other sources of 
support that may be available to families receiving 
AFDC. 
Established by Congress in 1935, the AFDC 
program provides cash grants to qualifying families 
whose other income, if any, is not adequate to meet 
their children's basic needs.1 States are not required to 
participate in AFDC, but all 50 states and the District 
of Columbia do participate. While each state must 
comply with certain federally-established guidelines, 
states are largely free to set their own benefit levels and 
to supervise their programs as they wish. Federal funds 
pay from 50 to 80% of the AFOC benefit costs in a 
state (54% on average), depending upon the state's per 
capita income; the higher the income the lower the 
federal contribution. In California, a state with a 
comparatively very high per capita income, the federal 
government contributes 50%, the state pays 47.5% and 
counties contribute 2.5%. 
AFDC consists of three major components: 
AFDC-Family Group (AFDC-FG), AFOC-Unem-
ployed Parent (AFDC-U), and AFDC-Foster Care 
(AFDC-FC). This last program, which provides support 
for children in foster homes, is not affected by the 
Initiative. In order to qualify for either of the other 
components, families must meet certain eligibility 
requirements, primarily regarding family structure, 
income, residential status, and assets. Eligibility of 
families is determined by local welfare offices. Families 
must provide information monthly, and each family's 
eligibility is reviewed annually. 
AFDC-FG provides support to needy children 
younger than 19 who have been deprived of parental 
support due to the death, incapacitation, or continuous 
absence of one of their parents. Support also is pro-
vided to their needy caretakers. Most of these children 
live with their mothers, although needy children living 
with single fathers, other relatives and unrelated 
individuals also are eligible. Additionally, AFDC-FG 
support is available to low-income, pregnant women 
during the final trimester of pregnancy. California 
currently extends this coverage by using state funds to 
support low-income pregnant women from the time of 
conception.' 
AFOC-U is available only to children in two-
parent families. The parent who is the primary wage 
II 
earner must be unemployed or working less than 100 
hours per month, but he or she must have some history 
of labor force participation. This parent also must be 
registered for work and be available for, and seeking, 
employment. In effect, the program provides support to 
families in which an unemployed primary wage earner 
is not covered by unemployment benefits. 
To qualify for support for either component a 
family must have limited assets. The maximum a family 
may own is $1,000 of real and personal property, 
excluding the family home, an automobile worth 
$1,500 or less, burial plots or burial insurance, tools of 
trade needed for employment, household furniture, and 
other "items essential to day-to-day living." Recipients 
must be U.S. citizens or legal aliens admitted to the 
U.S. for permanent residence. Aliens classified as 
refugees, conditional entrants, parolees or asylees may 
also be eligible. 
If a family meets these quaiifications, and some 
additional eligibility requirements, it is entitled to a 
monthly cash grant that vanes according to family size. 
Currently, the maximum monthly grants in California 
are: 
Table I 
Maximum Monthly Grant by Family Size 
Oune 1992) 











Source: California Welfare & Institutions Code, 11450. 
Parents who work may be eligible for partial 
support if the family's gross income falls below a certain 
amount, which varies by family size. If a family has 
earned income, the amount of the AFDC grant is 
reduced by the amount of earnings. However, to 
encourage recipients to take even low-paying jobs, 
recipients are allowed to disregard certain expenses in 
calculatmg their earned income. These include actual 
childcare expenses up to $175 a month per child ($200 
for children under two), and $90 of work-related 
expenses. In addition, the first $30 a family earns each 
month is not counted as income for one year and an 
additional one-third of the recipient's earnings is 
disregarded for the first four months of employment 
(referred to as the 30 and one-third rule). 3 
California recipients also are subject to the 
requirements of the Greater Avenues for Independence 
program (GAIN).4 This program, established by the 
state legislature in 1985, is designed to help recipients 
become self-sufficient and to ensure that able-bodied 
recipients do work. Participation in GAIN is manda-
tory for all principal wage-earners in two-parent 
families (usually fathers) and all single parents with no 
children under three (primarily mothers). In some cases 
both parents in an AFDC-U household are required to 
participate. Parents who have a disability, a family 
cnsts, or similar conditions are exempted. Those not 
required to participate may volunteer. 
Participation is mandatory until the parent finds a 
job or stops receiving AFDC. Refusal to enroll or 
failure to attend GAIN activities is punished by 
sanctions. For the first sanction, the AFDC grant is 
patd to a third parry for "money management." A 
second sanction results in the loss of all or part of the 
grant for three months; further non-compliance results 
in a six month penalty. In rerum for participation, the 
state provides remedial education, job search assis-
tance, assessment, skills training, education, on-the-job 
training, and pre-employment preparation (work 
experience assignment in a public or nonprofit agency), 
as appropnate for each participant. 
Other Sources of Support 
Families receiving AFDC are eligible for several 
other federal and state benefit programs, which may 
supplement their incomes. While the Initiative does 
not directly alter these programs, they are relevant to 
assessing the impact on recipient families of the 
proposed cuts in AFDC grants. 
Food Stamps. Established by the Food Stamp Act of 
1964, the Food Stamp program provides low-income 
families with coupons redeemable for food at retail food 
stores. The program is not restricted to AFDC recipi-
ents; any household with a gross income below 130% of 
the federal poverty line, a net income (gross income 
less certain deductions) below the poverty line, and less 
than $2,000 in disposable assets may qualify.5 In 
California, approximately 76% of AFDC families 
receive food stamps, so the program provides an 
important supplement to the AFDC grant.6 
• 
The dollar amount dtspensed in food stamps ts 
determined by the level of a family's income: As a 
result, AFDC families restding in states where A FIX: 
cash grants are lower receive higher food stamp benefits 
than in states where AFDC payments are higher, such 
as California. 
Non-Cash Benefits. AFDC and Food Stamps are 
the two major programs providing cash or its equiva-
lent directly to low-income families in California. The 
level of these benefits determines how a family lives on 
a day-to-day basis. In addition, all AFDC recipients are 
eligible for health-care benefits through state Medicaid 
programs, Medi-Cal in California. This program pays 
providers directly for authorized medical services. 
Another source of support available to some 
AFDC families throughout the country is public or 
subsidized housing, which can substantially reduce a 
family's housing costs. The availability of public and 
subsidized housing varies considerably from one state to 
another. In California, only 12% of the state's AFDC 
families live in public housing or receive housing 
subsidies, ranking California 50th among the states.; 
Families on AFDC may be eligible for other 
benefits, primarily school lunches and breakfasts, 
assistance with energy costs, and subsidized childcare. 
While helpful to many children and parents, support 
from these programs does not significantly alter most 
families' economic status. s 
Participation Rates 
During 1992, at any given point in time, approxi-
mately 2.3 million Californians are receiving some 
support from the AFDC-FG and AFDC-U programs. 
This equals a little over 7% of the state's population." 
As noted, the overwhelming majority of recipients, 1.6 
million or 70%, are children. Seventy-eight percent of 
the recipients are in the AFDC-FG program, 22% are 
in AFDC-U. About 14,000 pregnant women without 
other children also receive support. In recent years, an 
increasing proportion of total cases are AFDC-U, as 
more two-parent families experienced unemployment. 
While only a relatively small proportion of the 
state's parents and children receive support at any one 
time, a much larger percentage need aid at some point. 
It has been estimated that, nationwide, over a third of 
all families with children will experience poverty at 
least once before the children are 18 and that from 25 
to 30% of all children will receive AFDC for some 
period before they tum eighteen. 1c Thus, AFDC is a 
critical source of support for a substantial portion of the 
population. 
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THE PROPOSALS 
Proposition 165 contains six proposals that relate 
toAFOC. 
I. The Initiative would reduce by 10% the monthly 
cash grant that is provided to all families receiving 
AFDC. In addition, the statutory requirement that 
benefits be adjusted to reflect the cost-of-living 
would be repealed. Because federal food stamp 
benefits automatically increase when income 
drops, a part of the AFDC cuts would be offset by 
increased food stamp benefits. 
2. The monthly cash grant would be reduced by 
another 15% after the family has received support 
for six months, except in cases where the mother is 
younger than nineteen and regularly attending 
high school or vocational school or where the 
parent(s) is disabled or older than 60. 
3. Under current law, families receive a basic grant 
tor the parent(s) and an additional amount for 
each child. The Initiative would eliminate the 
additional amount received for all children 
conceived while the family is receiving AFOC, 
until the family has not received any support for 24 
months. 
4. Under current law, a pregnant woman is eligible 
for support from the time she becomes pregnant, if 
she meets certain income requirements. The 
Initianve eliminates this support to poor pregnant 
women, although they still would be eligible for 
Medi-Cal. 
5. The lmtiative establishes new regulations for 
families headed by mothers younger than nineteen 
• 
who have not graduated high school. If the mother 
attends school and has no more than four absences 
a month, the family grant would be increased h\-
$50. The basic grant would be reduced by $50 for 
every month in which the mother has more than 
two unexcused absences. The Initiative also 
requires teen parents under 18 years of age to live 
with their own parents or guardians, except in 
certain circumstances. 
6. Under current law, a qualifying family is eligible 
for a full AFDC grant immediately upon moving ro 
California. Under the Initiative, new recipients 
who have not been residents of California for at 
least one year prior to the time they apply for 
support would receive the same amount of support 
the family would have received in the state m 
which the family last resided before moving to 
California. 
In addition to these changes contained in the 
Initiative itself, the state has received permission from 
the federal government to alter the "30 and a third" 
rule, if the Initiative passes. The state was mandated to 
seek waivers by legislation passed last year. Under the 
new rule recipients with earned income will be allowed 
to have one-third of their earnings disregarded indefi-
nitely in calculating the amount of their grants; at 
present, this disregard applies for only four months. 
Parents who work while receiving support therefore 
will be able to retain a greater amount of their earn-
ings. As we discuss later, this change also mav increase 
the number of people who enter the welfare ;ystem. 11 
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 
If the Initiative passes poor children will become 
even poorer, unless their parents are able to make up 
for the benefit reductions through increased earnings or 
other sources of support. The cuts in benefits also will 
increase the risk of children experiencing developmen-
tal problems. Are these outcomes justified by potential 
benefits from the Initiative's proposals? This section 
reviews both the rationales that have been given to 
justify the Initiative and the concerns of those oppos-
ing it. We then offer a framework for assessing the 
potential costs and benefits of the Initiative. 
Nobody likes the current welfare system. AFbC 
clearly serves very important functions, most impor-
tantly providing income to children whose families are 
experiencing economic hardship. Unfortunately, the 
AFDC program often operates in wavs that seem to 
undermine its purposes. Those who have studied the 
system find that the benefits are too low to adequately 
provide for children's needs. Recipients find the system 
demeaning. At the same time. critics of all political 
persuasions worry that the current structure induces 
some people to rely on welfare who are able to be self-
sufficient, discourages recipients from working, allows 
some recipients to remain in the system longer than 
necessary, and fails to provide a route to self-sufficiency 
for those recipients who want to leave the system but 
can't overcome various barriers to employment. 
Efforts at reform are being tried throughout the 
country. California was a leader m this regard, through 
its adoption of the GAIN program. While further 
reform may be needed, both the goals of reform efforts 
and the appropriateness of the means selected to try to 
achieve the goals require careful scrutiny. There is a 
tension between the goal of protecting needy children 
and that of minimizing welfare participation and 
expenditures. An adequate evaluation of any reform 
proposal must consider how any given proposal affects 
each of these objectives of welfare policy. 
The goals of the sponsors have been articulated in 
the Preamble of the Initiative, in the ballot arguments 
in the Yuter handbook, and in speeches and press 
releases by Governor Wilson and members of his 
administration. All of these documents make it clear 
that the Initiative focuses exclusively on the cost 
aspects ,Jf the current system. 1: The stated goals of the 
proponents are to discourage welfare "dependency," to 
encourage work by recipients, and to reduce welfare 
expenditures. The specific means that have been 
selected to try to achieve these ends are based on the 
following premises and assumptions: 
II 
I. Californians who are capable of supporting thetr 
families are relying on welfare rather than work. 
The size of the AFOC population, which has been 
growing in recent years, is heavily influenced bv 
California's relatively high cash grants. Thererore, 
if benefit levels are lowered, fewer people wdl 
'apply for welfare. 
2. People receive AFOC for longer periods than 
necessary, in part because parents can obtam more 
income from AFOC than they could by W<)rking. 
In order to make low-paying jobs more attracttve, 
benefits should be further reduced after six 
months, so that work becomes relatively more 
attractive. It is assumed, moreover, that JObs w1ll 
be available for all current and future adult 
recipients, since the mability to find a job dues not 
prevent the loss of benefits. 
3. The number of famdtes receiving benefits m 
California has been mmg rapidlv in recent years. 
One of the reasons 1s an increase m births tu 
unmarried teenage g1rls, espectally those yuunger 
than 18. It is assumed that some teenagers are 
having children solelv to be able to establish their 
own homes. To discourage such births, the 
Initiative would requtre most mothers younger 
than 18 to continue to live with their own parents 
or guardian. 
4. Recipients who begm receiving welfare as teenage 
parents generally remam in the system for longer 
periods of time than clther recipients. On the 
assumption that teenage mothers become eco-
nomically self-sufficient more quickly if they 
complete high schooL the proposals reward teen 
mothers who stay in school by providing them an 
additional $50 a month and penalize those who 
miss school by deductmg $50 a month from their 
grants. 
5. People who are receiving support should not have 
additional children. Parents should have children 
only if they can afford them. In order to end anv 
"incentive" for such btrths, recipients who have 
additional children while receiving AFOC will not 
get the increase in benefits that currently accom-
panies an increase in family size. 
6. California's AFDC caseload is being increased by 
people in other states coming to California in 
order to take advantage of California's relatively 
high cash grants. T,) reduce any incentive to 
migrate solely for this purpose, new recipients from 
out of state will receive only the amount they 
would have received in their previous state, for a 
period of 12 months. 
7. Allowing pregnant women to receive support from 
the time of conception is a waste of money. These 
women can work until late in their pregnancies. 
Therefore, California's special grant program 
should be eliminated. 
In addition to these premises which have been 
stated explicitly, there are two other value judgments 
implicit in the proposals. First, proponents of the 
Initiative must believe that getting parents receiving 
welfare into the workforce is an all-important goal, 
regardless of the ages of their child or the type of care 
the child will receive while the parent is employed, 
since the benefit cuts apply even to mothers of new-
borns and regardless of whether they can find 
childcare. Second, proponents apparently believe that 
it is more important for a parent to take a low-paying 
job than to receive education or training that might 
prepare the parent for a higher-paying job, since 
benefits are reduced even for those parents participat-
ing in JOb-training or education programs. 
Supporters of the Initiative have not addressed the 
question of its impact on children, except for one 
point. They claim that one of the reasons to discourage 
long-term welfare receipt is that children who grow-up 
in homes receiving welfare are likely to become AFOC 
recipients as adults. 
Opponents of the Initiative make a number of 
counter-arguments. First, they take issue with some of 
the proponents' value judgments. For example, they 
believe that if the Initiative is adopted many families 
will certainly have reduced income, that this will be 
harmful to children and parents, and that it is wrong to 
jeopardize children's well-being in order to reduce the 
state hudget. Second, they believe that the empirical 
assumptions underlying several of the proposals are 
incorrect the assumption, for example, that 
California's caseload size is driven by the relatively 
high cash grants - and that these proposals therefore 
are unJustified. Third, they argue that others proposals, 
such a' the penalties for missing school, will not have 
their Jestred effect and may even be counter-produc-
tive. 
In dectding whether to support the Initiative, a 
voter thus must make two different assessments. First, 
each V<)ter must decide whether the value judgments 
reflected in the Initiative are the right ones. Among 
the most important value issues are, should getting 
welfare recipients into the workforce be the top prioritv 
nf welfare policy, regardless of anv negative effects on . 
children c)l the means used to encuurage work? If not, 
what '' the proper balance between the goals of 
protecting children and encouragmg work? Should 
mother:. llf verv young children he forced to work? 
Should this depend on the qualitv of childcare avail-
ahle t<) rhem: 
.. 
Second, a voter must determine what the actual 
effects of the specific proposals in the Initiative are 
likely to be on parental behavior and on the well-being 
of children. To what degree will the means adopted in 
the Initiative have desired effects? Undesired effects 7 
Will there be unintended consequences? What will be 
the overall impact of the entire package of proposals? 
Since a ballot initiative, unlike legislation, is an aU-or-
nothing approach, voters must decide whether the 
Initiative as a whole is desirable. 
The starting point for an analysts of these ques-
tions is to examine the evidence regarding each of the 
empirical assumptions that seem to underlie the 
proposals: For example, what is actually known about 
whether higher beneftt levels induce more welfare use 
or whether financial penalties prod teen mothers to 
increase school attendance? At the time of the prepara-
tion of this document, supporters of the Initiative had 
not provided any comprehensive analysis of the 
evidence suggesting that the proposed changes would. 
in fact, be likely to achieve the goals sreCified m their 
literature. 
Knowing whether a particular provtston might 
have some of the desired effects on parents is only the 
first step in an adequate analysis, howe\'er. The 
proposals obviously will affect different people differ-
ently. For example, as a result of the cuts, some 
mothers might indeed decide to take JObs that they 
otherwise might not have taken; others wtll not. 
Among those who seek employment, some wtll find 
and retain jobs; others will nor. Some of these Johs may 
tum out to be good, others less so. Some mothers will 
find adequate childcare, while others wtll not. Some 
teens may decide not to have children (by stopping sex, 
using contraceptives or having abortions); others will 
have children nonetheless. Unquestionablv, the most 
that can be hoped for wtth regard to each of the 
proposals is that the behavior of some parents wtll he 
influenced as the proponents would like. 
To the degree that a proposal does not have its 
desired effects, children will wind up in poorer house-
holds. Thus, assessing the likely effects of the Initiative 
requires weighing the rrohahilities of various outcomes. 
An adequate analysis c1f the proponents' claims would 
seek to determine: 
I. To what degree will the cuts and the other 
proposals reduce the number of new AFDC 
recipients? 
2. To what degree will the proposals increase the 
workforce participation hv current recipients' Will 
working parents he ahle t< 1 replace the lust mcome' 
3. To what degree wdl the \'arious rmrosals reduce 
the birthrate among current recipients and among 
teenagers? 
4. To what degree will the proposals facilitate long 
term self-sufficiency for current recipients? 
The impact of each proposal on children then· 
must be considered. A proposal might have the desired 
effect on parents, yet the outcome wtll be worse for 
children. For example, if the Initiative is successful in 
forcmg mothers of infants into the workforce the goals 
of the Initiative's proponents may be achieved, but the 
results for children might be quite bad, if they do not 
receive adequate childcare. 
A full assessment requires evaluating the package 
as a whole. Since each of the proposals potentially can 
affect differing numbers of people, it is necessary to 
consider whether any potential benefits from one 
proposal are outweighed by the possible negative 
impacts of another proposal that applies to larger 
numbers of people. For example, the proposals address-
ing migration and teenage mothers each can poten-
tially affect, either positively or negatively, less than 
10% of the total families recetving support. In contrast, 
the I 0% cut in benefits affects all reCipients. 
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Finally, any assessment of the desirability of the 
Initiative requires some examination of alternative 
means to achieve the same goals, that may offer le~s 
risk to children's well-being. For example, California 
already has a program, GAIN, designed to move people 
from welfare to work. This approach is based on verv 
different premises than the Initiative; its effects are . 
currently being carefully studied. 11 Other states have 
taken alternative approaches in trying to achieve many 
of the same goals that Initiative proponents hope to 
achieve. 
The remainder of this report will analyze the 
Initiative according to this framework. Since we begin 
with the value premise that in any welfare reform 
children's interests must at least be considered, if not 
made paramount, we examine the Initiative both in 
terms of its sponsors goals and its likely impacts on the 
well-being of children. 
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THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF FAMILIES RECEIVING AFDC IN CALIFORNIA 
Defining Adequate Income 
The central provisions of the Initiative are the cuts 
in benefits. In order to get a sense of how poor parents 
and children are likely to be affected by the proposed 
cuts, it is useful to understand more about the eco-
nomiC situations faced by these families. We will look 
at the cuts from the perspective of a child in the typical 
AFDC family-that is, a single mother with two chil-
dren, one of them under five, living in an urban or 
suburban area of the state. 
Combining AFDC and food stamps, a family of 
three currently is eligible to receive a maximum of 
$850 a month or $10,200 a year. Under the Initiative, 
that amount will be reduced to a maximum of $814 per 
month for all such families; after a family has received 
benefits for six months the amount will be reduced 
further, to $751 a month or $9,012 a year. 14 The cash 
grant will be frozen for at least seven years, regardless of 
changes in the cost of living. 
How should voters think about these amounts? As 
with all aspects of the welfare system, how one views 
the adequacy of grants depends on one's goals. It is 
well-known that California has one of the highest cash 
grants for AFDC recipients of all the states. As noted, 
proponents of the Initiative look at the grant solely in 
terms of welfare costs, arguing that current grants are 
too high in light of the need to cut state expenditures. 
In contrast, a very different focus is appropriate if 
one is concerned with protecting the well-being of 
children. From this perspective, the issue is whether 
the grant level is sufficient to provide every child with 
adequate food, shelter, clothing and health care. 
Focusing on children, one would also want to know 
how familv mcome affects a child's chances of success 
at school and, ultimately, obtaining a good job. 
Unfortunately, the goals of protecting the well-
being of poor children and of controlling expenditures 
in the AFIX: Program may cont1ict, especially when 
the long-run economic and social costs of leaving 
children m poverty are ignored. In this section, we 
examine whether the benefits are adequate to meet the 
basic needs of children and their parents. In later 
sections, we discuss the relationship between benefit 
levels and rates of AFDC participation. 
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Because California's cash grants are relativelv high, 
some people may assume that AFDC families can 
absorb cuts in benefits without a significant Impatr-
ment in their standard of living. Governor Wilson has 
suggested that the curs will force recipients to cut down 
on extras, not on basic necessities. The evidence is to 
the contrary. This can be seen by comparing 
California's benefits with three widely used measure> 
for assessing the economic well-being of families: I ) the 
federally established poverty standard; 2) cost-of-living 
studies; and 3) median family income in the United 
States. 
The Poverty Line. The most widely used standard 
for measuring the economic well-being of families ts 
the poverty line. The poverty line is a measure of the 
income necessary to meet people's minimum material 
needs for shelter, food and clothing. Devised hv rhe 
federal government in 1964, it was based on the 
"thrifty food plan," which was developed bv the 
U.S.Department of Agriculture (USDA) to provide 
families in need with a dietary guide for temporan me. 
in times of economic emergency. 1' In 1964, famtiies 
generally spent one-third of their income on food; 
therefore, the federal poverty line was set at exactlv 
three times the cost of the thrifty food plan. Since 
1969, the poverty line has been adjusted annually on 
the basis of the consumer pnce index rather than on 
the basis of food costs alone. Currently, the poverrv 
line is set at $11,570 per year for a family of three and 
$13,950 per year for a famdv c)ffour. 
At present, the maximum combmed AFDC .gr.mt 
and food stamps for a California famtlv of three equab 
only 94% of the poverty line- and not all famdies 
qualify for the maximum. Under the proposed cuts, 
benefits will be reduced to 85°itJ of the poverty I me 
immediately and to 79% for families who recetve 
support for longer than six months. Families in which 
the mother has an additional child while receiving 
support will live even further below the povertv lme 
since there will be no support for the added chdd. /\' 
shown in Tables 2 and 3, the situation for all families 
will worsen each year, since the lninative repeals the 
statutory requirement of cost-of-living adjustments m 
the cash grants; such adjustments alreadv had been 
statutorily suspended until 1996-97 . 
Table 2 
AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits in California During 
the First Six Months of Aid, Under Proposition 165 
Max. 
Maximum Food AFDC and 
AFDC Benefit Stamp Food Stamps 
Year Family of 3 Benefit Combined 
1992-93 $597 $217 $814 
1993-94 597 232 829 
1994-95 597 248 845 
1995-96 597 264 861 
























AFDC and Food Stamp Benefits in California After 
Six Months of Receiving Aid, Under Proposition 165 
Maximum Food AFDC and 
AFDC Benefit Stamp Food Stamps 
Year Family of 3 Benefit Combined 
1992-93 $507 $244 $751 
1993-94 507 259 766 
1994-95 507 275 782 
1995-96 507 291 798 
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C. 
What is life like for people living at or near the 
poverty line? Although there is some controversy about 
the meaning of the term poverty, and how income and 
assets should be counted in determining whether a 
family is poor, the vast majority of people who study 
income and welfare agree that, for most families, living 
below the poverty line jeopardizes the basic well-being 
of all family members. 1" In fact, the Republican 
members of the U.S. House of Representatives Com-
mittee on Ways and Means recently concluded that 
people with incomes at the poverty line often do not 
have enough money for basic survival. 17 
Most cntically, it is very difficult for a family with 
income below - or even somewhat above the poverty 
line to obtain adequate housing, especially in urban 
areas. In the years since the poverty line was estab-
lished, housing costs have risen far more rapidly than 
• 
AFDC/Food 
Poverty AFDC as Stamps as 
Line Percent of Percent of 
Family of 3 Poverty Poverty 
$951 53.3% 78.9% 
986 51.4 77.7 
1,021 49.6 76.6 
1,058 47.9 75.4 
other aspects of the cost of living and food costs have 
declined as a percentage of the family's budget, but the 
poverty line has not been adjusted to reflect this. It is 
hardly surprising that a 1989 study by the U.S. Census 
Bureau found that nearly one out of every five families 
( 18%) with incomes below the poverty line lived in 
housing that had one or more major physical problems, 
such as frequent breakdowns in heating or plumbing, 
serious electrical problems, lack of hot or cold water or 
a toilet, holes in floors or ceilings, or rats. 18 Some of 
this housing, built before 1960, also has lead-based 
paint dangerous to children. 
California families receiving AFOC face special 
problems. According to the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, which calculates 
Fair Market Rents (FMR), California's rents are the 
highest in the country, with the possible exception of 
Massachusetts. 19 The average metropolitan FMR for a 
two-bedroom apartment in California is $750, more 
than $220 higher than the national average. Moreover, 
five California metropolitan areas, where many AFDC 
recipients reside, rank among the 10 most expensive 
metropolitan areas for fair market rents in the entire 
country. 
Obviously, families in poverty pay well below FMR 
for their housing; a recent study found that the average 
California AFDC family of three paid $342 per month 
on rent, not including utilities. To obtain housing 
within their budget, many AFDC families must live in 
the poorest quality apartments and in the most 
dangerous parts of their communities. Many poor 
families live in over-crowded conditions, often 
doubled-up with other families. As a result, poor 
families move frequently in search of better accommo-
dations. As we discuss below, all of these factors 
adversely affect poor children. 
Many poor families also have trouble buying 
enough adequate food. As we saw, the poverty line is 
based on the USDA "thrifty food plan." Studies by the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture have found that five of 
every six families whose food expenditures meet this 
plan are not eating a nutritionally adequate diet, 20 
despite the fact that poor families tend to use their 
dollars more wisely than other families. The basic 
problem is a lack of income. 
Of course, the circumstances of poor families vary 
depending upon many factors, such as how long they 
have been poor, the availability of support from others, 
and the area of the state in which they live. While not 
every family with income below the poverty line lives 
in inadequate housing or lacks money to buy adequate 
food, there is little doubt that families living below the 
poverty line are very poor indeed. 
Cost of Living Stuliies. In fact, a substantial body of 
research indicates that a family at the poverty line has 
far too little income for a minimally decent living.21 A 
more realistic estimate was developed recently by 
Consumers Union of America, which examined the 
"minimum cost of living" for a "bare minimum" 
existence in Califomia.22 The study identified the 
minimum amount needed for housing, food, clothing, 
personal care, public transportation and laundry. The 
cost of maintaining a car, household furnishings, 
Ill 
childcare, medical care and all other expenses families 
normally incur for children were excluded. For single-
parent households. the necessary monthly amount 1s 
approximately $1200 across all counties: The amount 
ranged from $994 in San Joaquin County to $1428 in 
San Francisco. Not surprisingly, the amount is similar 
to estimates made by the general public. In a 1989 
Gallup poll, respondents indicated that they believed a 
family in California required $16,790 to live above 
poverty. 23 This is considerably above the poverty line 
and 150% more than will be available to welfare 
recipients if the Initiative is adopted. 
Median Family Income. The standards discussed so 
far calculate the income necessary to meet the minimal 
needs of a family without jeopardizing children's 
physical well-being. But children can also be harmed 
by relative deprivation. Although large numbers of 
children overcome the barriers imposed by growing up 
in poverty, for manv children these barriers prove 
insuperable. Extremely low income forces children to 
live far from the mamstream nf American life. :\s a 
result, many children are unable to envision opportll· 
nity in the mainstream. 
While there is no way of identifying the pomt at 
which relative deprivation becomes a strong barrier. 
many experts consider that anyone living for a substan-
tial period of time at an mcome less than one-half of 
the median income IS likelv to be significantly de-
prived.24 Median income is the income that represents 
the exact middle for U.S. families, the pomt at which 
half earn more and half earn less. 
In 1990, median income for California households 
was $35,353.15 Welfare benefits equal only one·quarter 
of this amount. By this standard, welfare benefits would 
have to double to provide children with reasonably 
equal opportunity. 
AFDC in California and Other States 
By each of these three standards, California's 
benefits are far too low. Yet, relative to other states, 
California's AFDC grants are high. As Table 4 shows, 
California's $663 maximum monthly cash grant for a 
three-person family is significantly higher than the 
national average. In fact, only four states (Alaska, 
Connecticut, Vermont and Hawaii) offer higher 
maximum cash grants. 26 
Table 4 
Maximum AFDC Benefits for a Family of Three High States/ 
Low States, Ten Most Populous States (1/92) 
High/Low Max. Grant Most Pop. 
States Rank Family of 3 States Max. Grant 
Alaska I 924 California 663 
Connecticut 2 680 New York 577 
Vermont 3 673 Michigan 459 
Hawaii 4 666 New jersey 424 
California 5 663 Pennsylvania 421 
Louisiana 47 190 Illinois 367 
Tennessee 48 185 Ohio 334 
Texas 49 184 Florida 303 
Alabama 50 149 North Carolina 272 
Mississippi 51 120 Texas 184 
U.S. Average 395 Average 400 
Source: U.S. House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee, Overview of Entitlement Programs, 1992 (Green Book). 
Some people may assume that because families 
receiving AFOC in other states "get by" on less, 
California's families will not be adversely affected by 
the cuts. Such assumptions are dearly wrong. It must 
be recognized, to begin with, that despite the differ-
ences in cash grants, California's "benefit package" is 
not more generous than most other states. First, 
famtlies in other states generally receive more food 
stamps than do California families, since under federal 
law food stamps are reduced when cash grants are 
higher. In addition, a far greater percentage of recipi-
ents in other states receive housing subsidies. In fact, 
Caltfornia has the lowest percentage of families 
receiving subsidies. Only 12% of California's AFOC 
families receive any housing support, while nationally 
about 26% of recipients receive support; the figures go 
as high as 60%? The fact that Californians, on 
average, are more affluent than most Americans 
exacerbates the situation. Not only is the gap between 
the poor and middle class greater here, thus increasing 
relative deprivation, the more general affluence pushes 
up housing costs and leaves the poor even worse-off. In 
fact, when the relative costs of housing are added into 
the calculation, families in 30 other states receiving 
AFOC and food stamps have more income at their 
disposal (see Appendix B). 
The cost of housing is especially important when 
considering the effects of the Initiative. Housing must 
be paid for out of the cash grant - which will be 
reduced by $156 or 23%. Since housing costs already 
constitute the families' largest expense, it will be 
impossible for many families to continue living in their 
Ill 
current housing. They will have to move to even 
lower-quality apartments and will still have less cash 
available to meet other basic non-food expenses. 
Most importantly, whether California is more or 
less generous is beside the point from the perspective of 
children. It does not help a poor child achieve normal 
development to know that some other children are 
even poorer. Regardless of where California ranks, the 
critical fact is that AFOC recipients everywhere are 
vety poor. Just recently the National Commission on 
Children, the most broadly representative and politi-
cally diverse group of politicians, service provtders, 
community leaders and academicians ever to address 
the needs of children, concluded that "AFOC fails to 
meet most families' minimum economic needs .... In 
none of the 50 states do combined welfare benefits 
(AFOC, food stamps, Medicaid, and housing subsidies) 
provide even a modestly secure standard of living for 
families with children. "28 
The Commission went on to state: "Poverty and 
economic instability take a dreadful toll on children .... 
Families with an adequate income are better able to 
provide the emotional and intellectual, as well as the 
physical, care children need to become healthy, 
productive adults. Failure to prevent poverty and 
address the economic needs of families will inevitably 
lead to other social ills- more crime and delinquency, 
more teenage childbearing, more unhealthy babies, 
more child abuse and neglect, and lower productivity 
h k. l . "29 among t e wor mg-age popu anon. 
It is against this backdrop that the Initiative's 
approach to welfare reform should be evaluated. 
WHO RECEIVES AFDC? 
Why Parents Rely on AFDC 
We now tum to an examination of who is served 
by the AFDC system. We begin by describing, in a 
general fashion, the circumstances that cause parents to 
turn to the welfare system for support. We then look in 
more detail at some demographic information regarding 
the characteristics of current recipients, focusing on 
those characteristics most relevant for assessing reform 
proposals. The description concentrates on the AFOC-
FG population, since it constitutes the largest group of 
recipients. Where there are characteristics distinguish-
ing the AFDC-U population that are relevant for 
policy decisions, they are identified. 
In order to be eligible for AFDC, a parent must 
have very little or no income. One clear question that 
needs to be addressed is why are AFDC recipients 
unemployed or earning so little? We attempt to piece 
together the outlines of an answer, with the caveat that 
much more needs to be known before anyone can 
speak confidently about this question. It must also be 
recognized that the paths onto welfare are highly 
variable and no comprehensive generalizations are 
possible. 
As previOusly pointed out, in order to qualify for 
AFDC-FG there can be only one parent in the house-
hold; this is virtually always the mother. The starting 
point for understanding why single mothers often 
require support is the fact that, in general, women with 
children generally have low earnings. They earn little 
because many mothers work only part-time in order to 
be available to take care of their children and because 
women generally earn considerably less than men 
whether thev work part-time or full-time. Various 
explanations have been offered for this disparity, 
including the fact that some mothers take lower-paying 
jobs that offer more flexibility to be with children 
when necessary; that many women do not prepare 
themselves for high paying careers since they expect to 
spend time as primary caretakers of children; and 
discrimmatlon by employers.30 Regardless of the cause, 
rhe fact remains that most mothers depend upon 
income provided by fathers in order to live reasonably. 
When that income is lost, or when it has never been 
available, many mothers find themselves in precarious 
economic circumstances. 
The mothers receivmg AFOC become single-
parents in three ways. While many people may imagine 
that most women enter the system as unmarried 
teenagers with their first child and no work experience, 
this is not the case. Only half of all mothers who apply 
for support have never been married and fewer than 
8% of all mothers are teenagers. About 40% are 
Ill 
divorced or separated from a spouse, and 7% are the 
spouses of someone who is incarcerated or incapaci-
tated. Finally, 3% are widows.31 
Mothers who enter the welfare system following a 
divorce or separation usually do so because they have 
suddenly lost the support from their spouse and they 
are unable to find employment to make up for this lost 
income. The fact that divorce rates are highest among 
low-income families increases the likelihood that a 
divorce will leave custodial mothers in poverry. Even 
though many married women are in the labor force at 
the point they become single parents, they often have 
part-time or low-paying jobs. Even working full-time 
following divorce, many women still cannot earn 
enough to avoid poverty.l2 
The relationship between divorce and AFDC use 
was analyzed recently in a study by researchers at the 
U.S.Census Bureau. JJ Part of the study examined the 
income and marital status of a large group of women 
during the years 1983 to 1985. All of the women were 
married in 1983. During the following two years, about 
five percent of these women divorced or separated from 
their husbands. Some of these families were receiving 
AFDC prior to the breakup, and these women connn-
ued to receive AFDC following the split. Most signifi-
cantly, for present purposes, approximately one out of 
six mothers (16%) who had not been m the welfare 
system prior to the split had to apply for AFDC benefm 
following the divorce or separation. The loss of the 
fathers' income, the fact that most fathers did not pay 
child support, and the low wages of the mothers who 
were working all contributed to this outcome. 
Not only does divorce lead to the loss of the 
father's income, it is very difficult for those mothers 
who are not working prior to a separation or divorce tn 
begin working immediately. In fact, some mothers who 
had been working find it necessary to stop work. When 
a family breaks up, the mother often must search for 
new housing, help the children enter new schools <md 
deal with their emotional traumas. 34 Many mothers 
(and fathers) experience considerable depression ar thi, 
point, which can make job searching even more 
difficult. Some mothers will move to be closer to familv 
or other support systems, which may delay job searches. 
Finding childcare also may be difficult, especially since 
more than 50% of all divorces involve children 
younger than five. 35 Finally, some mothers cannot fmJ 
jobs. All of these problems are exacerbated by the 
frequent failure of fathers to pay child support. 
The situation of never-married mothers parallels, 
to a degree, that of divorced women, although the 
proportion of all never-married women who ever 
become recipients is considerably higher than the 
proportion of all divorced women who ever must rely 
on AFOC. The majority of never-married mothers who 
apply for AFOC women are in their early twenties. 
While many enter the welfare system upon birth of a 
child, others do so upon losing a job, after a personal 
illness or the illness of a child, or in the wake of losing 
support from another member of their household. This 
last route is far more common than generally recog-
nized. Many never-married mothers live with a 
relative, boyfriend, and even the child's father. Like 
married mothers, they may be totally or partially 
dependent upon this person for support. If that person 
moves out or loses a job, the mother may need to tum 
to welfare for support. Never-married mothers are 
unable to find employment for many of the same 
reasons facing married women upon separation or 
divorce. Moreover, because never-married mothers of 
any age tend to have less education than married 
women, these mothers have even less chance of finding 
adequately paying jobs. 
Among the never-marned mothers, teenage 
mothers constitute a group of special concern. The 
number of teen mothers actually is quite small as a 
percentage of all AFOC reetpients: As noted earlier, 
teenagers comprise only 7. 7% of mothers receiving 
AFDC at any given time. Those younger than 18 
constitute only 1.8% of all mothers currently receiving 
AFDC. 1" 
Nonetheless, teen mothers demand special 
concern because early child-bearing entails risks for 
both the mother and child, and because the teen 
mothers are very likely to need support from AFOC, 
either when they are teens or later on (or both). With 
regard to welfare participation, estimates from national 
surveys indicate that over half of all teen mothers will 
recetve AFOC for some period - as many as 40% of 
whites and 85% of blacks.37 The majority of those who 
receive support begin doing so following the birth of a 
child, although others do not enter the system until 
they are older- largely because they were married or 
were cared for by their family when they were younger. 
And while teen mothers constitute only a small 
percentage of recipients at any given time, nearly 60% 
of all women who receive AFDC at some point before 
they are 30 had their first child while they were teens. 38 
It is estimated that nearly half of.all teen mothers 
do not complete high school during their teen years-
about 55% of all whites and Hispanics and 30% of 
blacks.l'l And, approximately 20% of teen mothers 
have a second child before they tum 20. It is hardly 
surprising, m light of these facts, that early child-
bearing, especially by non-married adolescents, is a 
major reason women need support from AFOC. 
\Vhile most attention wtth respect to welfare 
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reform focuses on single mothers, the cuts will also 
affect two parent families in the AFOC-U program. 
There has been very little research regarding this 
group, perhaps because the program was not mandatory 
in all states until 1990. In fact, 40% of all AFOC-U 
recipients now reside in Califomia.40 Absent research, 
any characterization of recipients must be fairly 
tentative. 
Because of the entry requirements, all of the 
AFOC-U recipients are either unemployed or work less 
than 100 hours per month. However, all have worked 
at least part-time in the year and a half prior to 
applying for AFOC. The key information about these 
families is that the primary wage earners tend to have 
little education, limited proficiency in English, and 
large families. Over a thtrd of the fathers are older than 
forty, which may limit employment opportumties. In 
California, approximatelv a third are refugees, manv of 
whom face all of these barriers to finding adequate 
employment. Many others are agricultural workers, 
experiencing periodic unemployment. 
As this picture indicates, most parents m horh 
AFOC programs apply for support because famtly 
responsibilities keep them from working or hecause 
they can't find employment that pays enough to keep 
them out of poverty. The welfare system offers them J 
source of secure income which thev cannot nbtain m 
the labor market. Given their responsibilities to their 
children, AFOC often seems to be the only way to 
protect the children's well-being, as well as their own. 
Demographic Characteristics of Recipients 
Further insight into why these parents need 
support, and how children will be affected by the 
Initiative, can be gleaned by examining the avatiJble 
demographic data describing current recipients. As 
previously noted, approximately 2.3 million people 
currently receive AFDC, 1.6 million children and 
700,000 adults. About 6% of the family units consist of 
a child living with a non-parent caretaker. The 
remaining families all are comprised of children livmg 
with one or both parents, although in some of these 
families the child is the only AFOC recipient, either 
because the parent is ineligible for support or is 
receiving support under the social security disability 
program.41 
While many people probably have images of the 
"average" adult recipient, it actually is very difficult to 
develop a meaningful picture of the "average" adult or 
family. First, there is enormous variation in the age, 
race, education and other background characteristics of 
both adults and children. 
Moreover, the main source of published data 
characterizing recipients provides a somewhat distorted 
picture of the entire group of people who receive 
AFOC each year. This is because the published data are 
based on a survey, or "snapshot", of the characteristics 
of families receiving support on a given day each year. 
But a much larger number of families receive welfare at 
some time each year than are served on any given day. 
People who receive support for a short period of time 
and then leave the system are under-counted in any 
snapshot; the data therefore are skewed towards a 
picture of longer-term recipients. Since longer-term 
adult recipients tend to have less education, not to 
have been married, and to have had children when 
they were teenagers, the available data over-emphasize 
the degree to which all recipients have these character-
istics. These caveats should be kept in mind when 
considering the following description. 
In the FG program, over 96% of the adult recipi-
ents are women. As noted, few are very young - only 
9,000 mothers are younger than 18. Nearly half of the 
mothers are 30 or older and the average age is 29 (see 
Table 5). The children, in contrast, are young. Sixteen 
percent, or more than 200,000 children, are less than 1 
year old; approximately 44% are below the age of 6. 
The average is between 7 and 8. 
Table 5 
Age of Female Parent Recipients -
AFDC-FG (in percent) (Jan. 1991) 
Age % Recipients 











Source: Numbers derived from a special analysis of 
information in Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
Characteristics Survey, january 1991: State of California 
Health and Welfare Agency. 
Most families are small. Approximately 70% of the 
mothers have I or 2 children, the same as non-AFDC 
families. Onlv 4% have 5 or more children. AFDC-U 
families tend to have somewhat more children, but 
most have 3 nr less. 
.. 
There are ethnic differences in family size: Both 
African-American and white families average less than 
2 children per family, while Asian families and His-
panic families tend to have higher numbers of children 
(see Table 6). Because Asian and Hispanic adult 
recipients have larger families, children from these 
groups constitute a larger percentage of child recipients 
than their parents do of the adult group. 
Table 6 
Average Number of Children per Family by 
Ethnicity/Race of Parent or Guardian ( 1989-90) 






Source: Based on the author's calculations using information 
on ethnicity of children and parents from "Characteristics 
and Financial Circumstances of AFDC Recipients," U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services for fiscal years 
1988, 1989, and 1990. 
One unusual aspect of California's recipient 
population is that over 100,000 recipients are children 
living with a parent who is not a recipientY Some are 
children who live with parents receiving social securitv 
or other benefits, rather than AFDC. Others are 
children born in the U.S. to parents who entered the 
country as undocumented aliens. When these parents 
later became legal residents as a result of the "amnesty' 
program, under the terms of the program they were 
ineligible to receive AFDC. Their children born in the 
U.S., on the other hand. are citizens and therefore 
eligible if their parents have ltttle income. 
Another important feature of these families, often 
overlooked in analyzing their well-being, is that in 
approximately 45% of the families there are adults 
living in the household who are not receiving support 
These may be children older than 18, other relatives, 
parents who are ineligible for support (such as prevt-
ously undocumented persons), or unrelated individuals. 
In some cases, these other individuals may contribute 
to the household's incof11e, while in others thev requtre 
support. 
Recipients, like the population of California, come 
from many racial and ethnic backgrounds. The largest 
number are white; nonetheless, members of minoritY 
groups are disproportionately poor and, as a result, 
disproportionately rectpients of AFDC . 
1 ::·r· d..J 
There is a significant difference in the two 
programs with respect to the proportion of African-
Americans and of families from Southeast Asia. As 
shown in Table 7, African-Americans constitute 30% 
of the FG population, but virtually none of the AFOC-
U group. The reverse is true for Southeast Asians; 
people from these ethnic groups make up a large 
percentage of the AFDC-U population but little of the 
FG. Over 30% of AFDC-U recipients entered the 
country as refugees. Not surprisingly, given this 
difference, while 94% of FG recipients are ·u.s. 
citizens, approximately 40% of AFDC-U recipients are 
not. 
Table 7 
Ethnicity/Race of Parent/Guardian (in percent) 
(April 1990) 
FG AFDC-U 
Ethnicity/Race % Ethnicity/Race % 
White 35.3 White 33.0 
Hispanic 29.5 Hispanic 24.0 
Black 27.7 Vietnamese 17.6 




Source: Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
Characteristics Survey, April 1990; State of California Health 
and Welfare Agency. 
It is often assumed that welfare participation is 
higher in large cities or urban environments. In fact, 
while the majority of recipients live in urban areas 
along with the rest of the state's population, poverty 
rates and AFDC rates tend to be highest in rural areas 
and in areas of the state that have large agricultural 
populations, such as the Central Valley. In the most 
heavily populated counties. participation rates are 
re!atively low. Because of its size, however, Los Angeles 




Percentage of Population Receiving AFDC-FG 
by County Oan-June 1991) 
County Percent County Percent 
Alameda 6.0 Orange 2.2 
Alpine 7.5 Placer 3.2 
Amador 2.1 Plumas 5.2 
Butte 6.8 Riverside 5.2 
Calaveras 5.0 Sacramento 8.3 
Colusa 4.6 San Benito 4.5 
Contra Costa 4.2 San Bernadino 8.0 
Del Norte 7.5 San Diego 5.1 
ElDorado 3.2 San Francisco 3.5 
Fresno 10.4 San Joaquin 9.1 
Glenn 6.9 San Luis Obisbo 2.6 
Humboldt 7.4 San Mateo 1.7 
Imperial 9.5 Santa Barbara 2.9 
In yo 4.8 Santa Clara 3.9 
Kern 8.0 Santa Cruz 3.1 
Kings 7.6 Shasta 7.7 
Lake 9.2 Sierra 4.3 
Lassen 6.7 Siskiyou 7.4 
Los Angeles 6.3 Solano 4.8 
Madera 7.0 Sonoma 3.1 
Marin 1.3 Stanislaus 7.5 
Mariposa 5.2 Sutter 5.8 
Mendocino 7.2 Tehama 7.4 
Merced 9.6 Trinity 6.9 
Modoc 9.6 Tulare 10.3 
Mono 1.8 Tuolumne 4.8 
Monterey 4.1 Ventura 2.7 
Napa 2.7 Yolo 5.9 
Nevada 2.8 Yuba 10.8 
Source: Calculated by author from State of California, 
Department of Finance, Calif. Statistical Abstract Oct. 1991 ; 
and State Department of Social Services, Statistical Services 
Bureau, Public Welfare in California, January-June 1991. 
Unfortunately, the state does not regularly gather 
some information that might provide the public and 
policy-makers with a more complete picture of welfare 
recipients; most of the information collected focuses 
solely on data needed to establish eligibility. For 
example, no data are regularly collected on adult 
recipients' educational background, primary language, 
1"'"" \')I 
physical and mental status, how long thev have lived in 
California, or their work history prior to applying for 
AFDC. 
Some of this information can be pieced together 
from various research studies.43 It appears that about 
half of all parents who receive AFOC have not 
completed high schooL Approximately two-thirds of 
new recipients have worked in the two years prior to 
applying for AFOC, but most had income close to the 
poverry line. Almost 20% have some type of disability 
that limits their ability to work. Their own parents had 
less income than the national average for all families, 
in pan because recipients are more likely than non-
recipients to have lived with a single parent. 
In California, a very large percentage of all 
recipients lack proficiency in English. A recent study of 
GAIN recipients in six counties (Alameda, Butte, Los 
Angeles, Riverside, San Diego, and Tulare) found that 
from 5% to 32% of new applicants to the AFDC-FG 
program had limited proficiency in English; among 
applicants ro AFOC-U the range was 23% to 83%.44 
The highest percentages were in Los Angeles and San 
Diego, counties which include a substantial proportion 
of all recipients in the state. 
In short, the large majority of parents, both single 
and married, who receive AFDC lack the educatton 
and/or skills needed to earn a reasonable living. 
Perhaps one-fifth have physical or mental disabilities 
that affect their ability to work. Because their own 
parents and relatives also have low mcomes, they do 
not have access to support in times of financtal 
hardship. Many AFOC families live in the counttes 
with higher unemployment rates. 
Perhaps most importantly, the great maJOrity of 
adult recipients are single mothers. Even two-parent 
families with educational backgrounds similar to these 
mothers find it difficult to earn an adequate living. 
Single mothers, faced with childcare responstbility ancl 
without the back-up of another parent, often have 
little choice but to rely on AFDC for a period of time. 
The fact that so many enter the system is less surprising 
than the fact that most are able to exit the system 
within several years, as is shown in the next section. 
DURATION OF WELFARE RECEIPT 
Probably the major criticism of the welfare system 
is that too many people remain on welfare for periods 
longer than necessary. As with many other aspects of 
the system, perceptions of the problem are based partly 
on accurate data and partly on myths. This section will 
focus on what is known about the "dynamics" of 
welfare use, that is, the patterns of use after people 
enter the system. It must be recognized, however, that 
the data describing the length of time people receive 
support do not tell us anything about whether cutting 
benefits will influence the amount of welfare current 
usage. That issue will be discussed in the following 
section; this section provides only a discussion of the 
duration of welfare use and of the characteristics that 
distinguish "short-term" from "long-term" recipients. 
Any discussion about welfare dynamics must begin 
by pointing out that it is impossible to provide a totally 
accurate description of patterns of welfare use. Re-
searchers face extraordinarily difficult methodological 
problems in obtaining the type of data of most interest 
and relevance to policy-makers and the publicY Due to 
methodological problems reported findings often can 
be misleading.46 
Most impressions of welfare tenure in California 
are derived from the "snapshot" data published annu-
ally by the California Department of Social Services 
discussed in the previous section. These surveys show 
how many months each current recipient has been 
receiving support. In general, these snapshots reveal 
that, at any given time, about half of all current 
reCipients began receiving aid more than two vears 
pnor to the survey (see Table 9). California's ~ercent­
age of longtime recipients is slightly higher than in 
most states with comparable populations. 
Ill 
Table 9 
Time Elapsed Since Beginning of Current Spell 
(in percent) Oanuary 1991) 
Time FG u 
Less than 6 months 17.4 20.5 
6 months to < one year 16.5 
I year to < 2 years 19.9 
2 years to < 3 years 11.8 
3 years to < 4 years 7.5 
4 years to < 5 years 5.9 
5 years to < 6 years 5.6 
Over 6 years 15.4 
Unknown 0.2 
Source: Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 
Characteristics Survey, january 1991; State of California 









The data from these snapshots are useful because 
they reveal that over 80% of current recipients will 
experience the full 25% reduction in support. They are 
less useful in providing a true picture of welfare 
dynamics. For the reasons previously discussed, 
snapshots always contain a greater proportion <lf long-
term recipients, thereby suggesting longer stays ,m 
AFDC than is actually the case for all people who ever 
receive support. This concept is somewhat hard t<l 
understand. To explain the statistical issue, the start of 
the Ways and Means Committee of the U.S. House of 
Representatives deyeloped the following illustration, 
using the example of hospitalizations: 
Consider a 13-bed hospital in which 12 
beds are occupied for an entire year by 12 
chronically ill patients, while the other bed is 
used by 52 patients, each of whom stays 
exactly one week. On any given day, a 
hospital census would find that 85% of the 
patients ( 12/13) were in the midst of long 
spells of hospitalization. Nevertheless, viewed 
over the course of a year, short-term use 
clearly dominates: out of the 64 patients using 
hospital services, about 80% (52/64) spent 
only one week in the hospital. Exactly the 
same dynamic accounts for the results with 
regard to welfare experienceY 
Moreover, these snapshots do not reveal the fact 
that, even among longer-term recipients, some people 
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receive support for only part of a year, and others 
receive only partial support to supplement earnings. For 
example, a family could receive support from January to 
March of one year, work for nine months, and return 
the next January. This is not uncommon among low 
paid agricultural workers, with seasonal employment. 
Because of their data-gathering methods, many studies 
treat such families as having received continuous 
support for two or more years. 
Developing a true picture of welfare dynamics 
requires following a group of new recipients (a cohort) 
for an extensive period of time and looking at their 
welfare receipt on a month-to-month basis. (This is 
called a longitudinal cohort study.) There are very few 
such studies; none of a totally representative sample for 
California or for the country as a whole. Even the few 
studies with reasonably representative samples look at 
recipients who were on welfare from 10 to 20 years ago. 
Since the length of time people remain on welfare is 
influenced by economic cycles, as well as the particular 
characteristiCs of the recipients studied (for example, 
the percentage of recipients who are younger has risen 
in recent years), the findings of these studies do not 
necessanlv ret1ect current patterns of use. 
For all these reasons, claims about the dynamics of 
welfare ''dependency" must be treated cautiously. In 
particular, any claim of precision should be disregarded. 
This report attempts to identify some reasonable 
parameters; while these estimates may be off by as 
much as 20%, they provide a general sense of the 
nature of welfare use. 
The most relevant data for California come from a 
study looking at California recipients between 1983 
and 1985. This study, by David Maxwell-Jolly and Paul 
Warren, followed a cohort of people who first received 
AFDC in 1983.48 Their patterns of usage were tracked 
for a three-year period. The cohort reflected the 
general welfare population in the state, except that it 
excluded parents who were under eighteen. While such 
parents tend to have longer-than-average stays on 
welfare, they constitute only a very small percent of 
initial welfare "adult" recipients. Thus, the data wtll 
underestimate the length of stays for the entire 
population at that time only slightly. 
Table 10 
As shown in Table 10, about 45% of all AFDC-Fl i 
recipients in this study were off aid within one vear, 
55% within two years, and 60% wtthin three vears. 
About 40% were still receiving support after three 
years. There were significant regional differences, 
reflecting both variations in the availability ot emplov-
ment and in the characteristics of rectpients. The 
length of stay was shorter for AFDC-U participants. 




Bay South South of Bay South South of 
Length Area Valley State State Area Valley State State 
I year 43 42 41 47 57 53 54 57 
2 years 59 51 53 59 71 64 70 68 
3 years 63 55 59 64 76 68 76 74 
Source: D. Maxwell-Jolly and P. Warren, California's Welfare Dynamic, California State Senate Appropriations Committee and Joint 
Oversight Committee on GAIN Implementation, 1989. 
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Whether a recipient was still receiving support after a given period of time tells only part of the story, however. A 
number of recipients who were receiving welfare at the end of 2 or 3 years had left welfare for a period of time. In fact, 
over 80% left welfare at some point. Only 18% of FG families and 12% of AFDC-U families received aid continuously 
during the 3 years (see Table ll ). 
Table II 
Lengths of First Spells for Those Entering AFDC During February 1983 (cumulative percent) 
AFDC-FG AFDC-U 
On AFDC Bay South South Bay South South 
Less Than Area Valley State Area Valley State 
3 months 22 19 23 19 14 IS 
6 months 41 40 41 45 41 44 
I year 60 59 58 66 68 66 
2 years 76 76 75 81 85 82 
3 years 84 82 82 86 89 88 
Median months 9 9 9 6 7 7 
Source: Maxwell-Jolly and Warren. 
About half of those who left the rolls at some point needed to return before the end of three years; this accounts for 
the difference between the 45% and 80% figures. The length of time they remained off welfare ranged from l month to 
3 years; most returns occurred within 1 year (see Table 12). 
Table 12 
Cumulative Percent of Terminating Recipients Who Return (All Adult Recipients) 
AFDC-FG AFDC-U 
Time 
Since Bay South South 
Ending Aid Area Valley State 
I month 13 15 19 
6 months 29 36 34 
I year 36 44 41 
3 years 47 56 50 
Source: Maxwell-Jolly and Warren. 
As previously mentioned, changing demographics, 
economic cycles, rates of out-of-wedlock births and the 
nature of available jobs all will cause variation in the 
need for AFDC at different times. For example, one 
recent study by two economists, R. Mark Gritz and 
Thomas MaCurdy, involving a nationwide sample of 
young mothers who received AFDC for some period 
between their 16th and 24th birthdavs, indicates that 
even young mothers often leave the system relatively 
quickly. More than half of the mothers in their sample. 










Bay South South of 
Area Valley State State 
8 12 12 10 
21 34 25 29 
42 30 30 36 
37 55 38 46 
From these cohort studies, we can draw some 
general conclusions about welfare dynamics. At least 
half of those who enter the welfare system probably will 
leave within a year. Another 20-30% will leave the 
system, at least for a period of time, within 3 years. 
Between 20 to 25% of all initial recipients may receive 
continuous support for three years or longer. And a 
small proportion, perhaps 10 to 15%, will rely on 
AFDC support for 8 or more years. 
There is a good deal of movement on and off 
support. Of those receiving support in California at any 
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given time, approximately one~third {36%) have had 
previous periods of receipt. There are a number of 
reasons for this. Because a large proportion of adult 
recipients have low job skills, they often find employ-
ment in industries subject to economic fluctuations. 
This is particularly true for recipients working in 
agriculture, where employment is subject to seasonal 
fluctuations, weather and general economic conditions. 
Since many agricultural workers are not covered by 
unemployment insurance, AFOC serves this function. 
Among single mothers, many must leave jobs 
because of family responsibilities. The loss of childcare, 
personal or family illness, financial problems that force 
the parent to give up housing, the loss of transportation 
as well as other factors make it difficult for many single 
parents to remain employed. Such personal crises affect 
many people. But they have a far greater impact when 
a parent is single, since there is no one to step in at a 
time of emergency, and they can be particularly 
devastating when a person is poor and doesn't have the 
resources to cope with a crisis and continue to work. 
Finally, some lose jobs because of poor performance or 
leave jobs because they don't like the working condi-
tions or find the pay too low. 
For AFIX::>FG recipients, there are three routes off 
AFOC: full-time employment, marriage, and a move to 
other sources of support, such as disability benefits. 
While earlier studies found marriage to be the main 
means of exit, 5° the recent study by Gritz and MaCurdy 
found that most recipients younger than 24 left AFOC 
to work. Significantly, from the perspective of children, 
this study also found that most mothers who left 
welfare for work experienced a decline in income and 
greater month-to-month fluctuations in resources. 
Among AFOC-U recipients, increased earnings is the 
basic route of exiting the AFOC system. 
What distinguishes those parents who have longer 
spells of welfare receipt? Again, less is known about this 
than one might expect. Various studies report different 
findings. Since no study looked exclusively at Califor-
nia, inferences must be drawn from studies of popula-
tions somewhat different from California's recipients. 
The results of such studies have been summarized in a 
recent review by economist Robert Moffitt. He 
concludes that "exit rates are higher for women with 
higher wage rates, higher educational levels, greater 
levels of non-transfer non-wage income (that is support 
from others), and for those with fewer children."' 1 
One group that is generally thought to be at very 
high risk of requiring support for long periods of time is 
teenage mothers. Since about half of these mothers do 
not complete high school, this concern seems reason-
able. The evidence on this issue is not clear, however. 
Most studies have looked at samples of recipients in the 
1960's and 70's, or even earlier. During those periods, 
teenage mothers were less likely to complete high 
school than at present. 
A more recent study looked at a large group of 
women who were 14 to 16 years old in 1978.52 Their 
fertility and welfare receipt were tracked from 1979 to 
1985. Among all women in this sample who 
received AFOC, women who gave birth to a child as a 
teen did not have appreciably longer periods of welfare 
receipt than women who gave birth between 20 and 24 
years of age. The women's marital status and ethnicity 
were the biggest predictors of length of welfare receipt. 
Never married mothers were far more likely to require 
support for two or more years. 
One of the major questions is whether people 
become more "dependent" on welfare after they have 
remained on for a period of time; in other words, 
whether receiving welfare, in and of itself, makes it 
more difficult to get off the longer one stays on? One of 
the reasons proponents of the Initiative want to limit 
the length of time a recipient can receive welfare to a 
very short time is the assumption that length breeds 
dependency. Again, this is an issue about which there 
is considerable debate and uncertainty. It is difficult to 
distinguish conclusively between the effects of length 
itself and the fact that those who stay longer have 
fewer skills. 
Economist Rebecca Blank has studied this ques-
tion recently. 53 She reports that there is "some large 
group which enters AFOC with virtually no alternative 
opportunities, for whom the possibility of leaving 
improves slowly over time, but who will be on welfare a 
long time. There is another group which appears to 
have opportunities to escape AFOC early, but who 
become less and less likelv to leave AFOC as time 
passes." This latter group might be thought of as 
becoming "dependent. Yet, even this group continues 
to move off welfare at a relatively constant pace. Blank 
concludes therefore that, even though some women 
receive support for long periods of time, the evidence 
does not indicate that this is a result of their being on 
welfare. Instead, it reflects the fact that they have little 
chance to work their way off welfare, or to marry. In 
other words, length may generate dependency some-
what, but the impact seems smalL 
In sum, it appears, nor surprisingly, that single 
mothers with the best job skills (or marriage prospects) 
and who are weU situated to take jobs leave welfare 
most rapidly. The same holds true with respect to 
AFOC-U recipients. Wage earners with the strongest 
past ties to the labor force, and with the most skills, 
find jobs most easily. Among the AFOC-U group 
language barriers may play an especially important role. 
The recent six county evaluation of GAIN reports that 
among the recipients in the AFOC program for longer 
than 2 years the following percentages of recipients had 
limited proficiency in English: Alameda 55.5%; Butte 
24.4%; Los Angeles 82. 7%; Riverside 38.8%; San 
Diego 53.9%; and Tulare 42.8%. And, for all groups, 
the duration of receipt is related to unemployment 
levels: People leave faster when there are more jobs. 
These findings are highly relevant to an examination of 
the probable effects of the Initiative's provisions, which 
we tum to next. 
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ANALYZING THE PROPOSAI....S: THE EFFECTS ON PARENTAL... BEHAVIORS 
Our focus is on children. But assessing the 
Initiative's impact on children requires examining the 
likely effects on parents. The consequences for children 
will depend on how parents respond to the cuts in 
benefits and other new requirements. They also will 
depend on how the proposal affects parents' ability to 
provide adequate emotional support for their children. 
The General Cuts in Benefits 
We begin by the examining the likely effects of the 
two main provisions of the Initiative - the initial 
reduction in benefits and the additional reduction after 
six months. These cuts lie at the core of the Initiative, 
both in terms of children's well-being and the goals of 
the Initiative's sponsors. 
As previously suggested, these cuts are based on 
the following assumptions: 1) if grants are smaller, 
fewer people will find welfare attractive, leading to a 
decline in caseload size; and 2) that the additional cut 
after stx months will reduce long-term participation by 
inducing more recipients to find jobs that will enable 
them to leave the welfare system. Governor Wilson 
also has contended that, at a minimum, the proposal 
will do no harm because recipients can and will find 
part-time work to the lost income. 
Size of Case load and Participation Rates. In recent 
years the number of families entering the welfare 
system has been growing, both in absolute terms 
(caseload size) and in terms of the percentage of 
women ages 15-44 who are receiving support (the 
participation or dependency rate). 51 Proponents of the 
Initiative frequently note that between 1980 and 1989 
the number of people receiving welfare grew more 
rapidly in California than in the nation as a whole, and 
that welfare participation in California is somewhat 
higher than the national average. Based on these facts, 
Initiative proponents argue that California's relatively 
high cash benefit rates encourage people to enter the 
system.* 
These true, tell us nothing, however, 
about why caseloads grew. It certamly does not 
necessarily follow that either rising caseloads or higher 
participation rates are caused by California's benefit 
levels or that the proposed grant reductions will reduce 
them. The evidence indicates that the caseload 
increases and the participation are due to factors other 
than the grant level. 
Benefit levels are one of a number of factors that 
might influence caseload size or participation rates. 
Among the other important influences are economic 
conditions, overall growth in the general population 
size, the composition of the population (a state with a 
high proportion of people over 50 probably will have 
fewer recipients since this portion of the population ha, 
few children eligible for AFOC), and the number ot 
divorces and births to teens in the state. 
In fact, there is good reason to believe that benefit 
levels have only a small impact on caseloads and that 
the reductions proposed in the Initiative will nor 
reduce caseloads. Over the past twenty years, a half 
dozen studies by economtsts have exammed the 
relationship between beneftt levels and welfare 
participation. While none of rhe studies is fully 
applicable to California, given the particular mtx uf 
factors intluencing caseloads here, these studies find 
that while higher benefits mav mcrease parttciratton 
rates the magnitude of the mcrease generallv is verv 
small. 56 
Actually, despite rhe rhetoric in the lnittanve, 
even Governor Wilson arpears to agree rhat the 
proposals in the Initiative will have very little tmract 
on caseload size. According to the budget estimates he 
submitted to the Legislature this year, tf the Initiative t'J 
passed, all of the proposals combined would result in only 
a 4% decline in the number of new cases next vear. 
This includes the reductions that are anticipated from 
the residency requirements, the exclusion of chddren 
born to recipients and the provisions related to teens. 
A look at the evidence shows why Californta's 
caseload growth cannot be attnbuted to the grant level. 
First, in 4 of 5 years between 1983 and 1988, 
California's caseload growth was actually slower than 
the state's overall population growth. Second, the more 
recent "explosive" growth is recession related and not 
unique to California Table 13). In caseload 
growth in California since the recession has been 
slower than in many states that have been hit less hard 
*In dtscussing comparative caselor:ul size and growth, one issue that might be confusing w the publzc should be noted. The 
ballot statement for the Initiative says that CaliforniQ. has 12% of the nation's population but pays 26% the welfare benefits. 
Some people might take this w mean that California has 26% of the nation's welfare population, double the percentage one mrghr 
expect if recrptents were distributed randomly among the states. This, course, is not true. Californw 's payments account for a 
high percentage of tJ...e nation's payments primarily because California's cash grants are higher, rather than because California has 
a higher than at.erage number of recipients, although the latter is true to a much lesser degree. As previously discussed, Califc>mia 
zs not more generous when the entire benefit package is considered and cost of living factored in. 
and have lower benefits. Although, in 1990, 
California's population grew fourth fastest in the 
country and it experienced the eighth largest percent-
age increase in unemployment, the AFDC caseload 
grew at only the 21st fastest rate. Neighboring states 
with much lower benefits had much higher growth 
rates in caseloads than California in 1990. (N .M.,21 %; 
Ariz.,18.1; ldaho,ll.7; Nev.,1l.l; Ore.,l0.5; 
CA,l0.1) 57 
Table 13 
Percentage Growth in AFDC Caseload 
(1988-90) 
1988 1989 1990 
California 3.0% 6.9% 9.7% 
The West 2.8% 6.8% 9.6% 
The South 2.6% 8.7% 10.4% 
The Northeast 1.5% 3.5% 8.4% 
Nationwide 0.6% 3.3% 8.4% 
Source: Congressional Budget Office, 1991 
What then accounts for the increasing caseloads? 
This issue was studied recently by the California 
Legislative Analyst's Office (LA0). 58 It attributes the 
rising caseloads to a variety of factors other than 
benefit levels. According to the LAO, at least half the 
caseload growth is directly attributable to increases in 
the population of women aged 15-44 during the past 
ten years. In fact, between 1980 and 1988 the percent-
a~;e of growth in AFOC caseloads in California was 
proportionate to the percentage of growth in the state's 
overall populanon. There also was a large increase in 
fertility among all segments of the California popula-
tion during the 1980's, increasing the number of 
children at risk of needing support. Since California's 
population increased faster than that of the nation as a 
whole during the 1980's, it is not surprising that it also 
experienced a greater than average increase in AFOC 
caseloads. 
As noted above, the most recent caseload growth 
appears largely attributable to increased unemploy-
ment. In a comparison of 13 states in the West and 
Southwest, states with above average AFOC per capita 
caseload growth tended to have above-average in-
creases in the number of unemployed. 59 Among these 
states, California experienced the highest increase in 
the number of unemployed during 1990. Moreover, 
recent caseload growth has been disproportionately in 
the AFOC-U component, which is generally more 
sensitive to unemployment levels. 
The relationship between unemployment and the 
Ill 
recent caseload growth can also be seen by looking at 
caseload growth in different California counties. 
During the first six months of 1991, counties with 
above-average unemployment also tended to have an 
above-average percentage of its population on AFDC. 
On average, 5.95% of the entire California population 
received AFDC. However, Imperial County, which had 
the highest unemployment rate in 1990, at 19.1 %, had 
9.49% of its population on AFDC. In contrast, San 
Francisco and Santa Clara counties, each with the 
lowest unemployment rates during 1990, had only 
3.5% and 3.8% of their populations on AFDC, respec-
tively.60 
Among the factors discussed by the LAO, two 
others deserve mention. The increase in case loads is in 
part attributable to a substantial increase in births to 
teenagers and to unmarried older women. While these 
trends raise significant policy issues, they have been 
nationwide, unrelated to benefit levels.61 In addition, 
California's caseload has expanded because manv 
refugees, previously covered entirely by the federal 
government, now have been added to state rolls. While 
many state officials believe that the federal government 
should assume full responsibility for helping refugees 
who cannot find employment, the movement of this 
group from federal to state caseloads cannot be attrib-
uted to benefit levels. 
Increases in the overall population do not affect 
the "participation rate" since, by definition, this means 
the proportion of the population 15-44 receivmg 
support at any given time. Participation rates are 
influenced, however, by a number of other factors. 
Interstate comparisons must, therefore, be treated very 
carefully. Knowing that one state has a higher or lower 
participation rate than another state, or than the 
national average, tells us nothing about the reasons for 
this. Accounting for a state's AFDC participation rate 
is very difficult, as researchers recognize. All claims 
about causes must be viewed very cautiously, since 
many factors might account for observed differences. 
The LAO also has identified a number of factors 
that appear to account for California's relatively high 
AFDC participation rate. One important element is 
the composition of California's population, ~ince 
certain groups are at higher risk of needing welfare 
support. First, California's divorce rate and rate of 
births to teenage mothers are among the nation's 
highest.62 As noted, mothers in both these groups often 
need support from AFDC. California also has a large 
percent of citizens from ethnic groups that historically 
have experienced high rates of poverty. In addition, 
many refugees, admitted to California to enable them 
to escape political persecution in their native countries, 
need support from the welfare system while they obtain 
the language skills and education needed to find 
employment. 
For these, and other reasons discussed by the LAO, 
it would be expected that the participation rate would 
be higher in California than in most other states, 
regardless of benefit levels. This is not to say that 
benefit rates have no importance. Most studies con-
clude that they can have a small impact. But little 
change in the participation rate can be expected from 
the proposed cuts. 
It actually is possible that the entire package of 
proposals contained in the Initiative and the accompa-
nying waivers recently granted by the federal govern-
ment will increase caseloads or participation rates. 
Whde lowering cash grants, these proposals also 
change two other elements of the welfare system's 
economic structure: the amount a recipient can earn 
before having her or his family's cash grant reduced, 
and the total amount a recipient can earn and still 
retam eligibility for some benefits. While these changes 
will certamly help some poor children whose parents 
are able to work, it also will make eligible some people 
who are currently ineligible to receive benefits.0 l Thus, 
cosr-savmg claims may be constderablv overstated. 
Reducmg Length Of Stay. As with the goal of 
reduc mg caseloads, it seems very unlikely that the 
approach taken in the Initiative will increase the rate 
at which parents now leave the welfare system or 
enable those who now remain m the system for many 
years to become self-sufficient, as desirable as this goal 
may be. Once again, this is recognized in the 
Governor's budget estimates, which forecast only a 4% 
reduction in long-terrn participants if the Initiative is 
passed. The research indicates that this is the most that 
might be expected. A number of studies have examined 
the relationship between benefit levels and duration of 
partiCipation m AFOC. While most studies find that 
higher benefits are associatt:d with longer duration, 
these studies also find that the tmpact of grant amounts 
is verv sma!l.64 In fact, California has exactly the same 
percentage of current recipients who have been on 
welfare for two or more years, 4 7%, as the nation as a 
whole.6' Moreover, as shown in Table 14, the states 
with the greatest percentage of long-terrn recipients do 
not have especially high benefits. 
Ill 
Table 14 
Benefit levels in States with Highest Percent 
Population Receiving AFDC More Than Two 
Years (1989-90) 
Cash More Than 
State Rank Benefit 2 Years 
llinois I $343 57.7% 
Michigan 2 465 57.3 
Pennsylvania 3 374 55.5 
Ohio 4 325 55.3 
Mississippi 5 121 55.0 
Kentucky 6 225 53.2 
Connecticut 7 570 52.2 
California 8 637 51.9 
Rhode Island 9 498 51.6 
New jersey 10 263 50.9 
Source: Characteristics and Financ1al Circumstances of 
AFDC Recipients, FY 1990, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services. 
It must be remembered that the majority ot all new 
AFDC recipients already leave rhe system w1rhin a 
year, although many need more than six months the 
point at which the Initiatiw would reduce benefits for 
most recipients- before they are able to find, or take. 
a job. Another group of recipients, many of whom are 
participating in education or JOb training programs, 
need support for longer, but they generally remam in 
the system for only 1 to 3 years. (Some of these are 
teenagers who will be excluded from the cuts if they are 
in school.) While some of these recipients mtght 
abandon their education or training and take a low-
paying job because of the impact of the cuts - which 
may not be desirable from anyone's perspective th{'V 
often will remain eligible for support because the 
they can get pay so lmle. 
For those recipients who now require longer 
periods of support, cuts in benefits will not push them 
out of the system for the simple reason that most long-
term recipients do not have the skills or job prospects 
that would enable them to earn enough to leave the 
system. A very different approach is needed to deal 
with this fact -one that emphasizes education and 
job-skill training- so that partictpants acquire the 
skills necessary to earn more than poverty wages. And. 
for a proportion of recipients, especially women with 
young children, only programs that both increase the 
income from work, such as increasing the Earned 
Income Tax Credit, and provide childcare, will allow 
them to be independent of welfare and still have 
enough income to live at a decent level.66 
The fact that many recipients cannot work their 
way off AFOC was spelled out by Robert Moffitt in his 
rev1ew of welfare participation studies. He states that 
"9 5 percent of those on the AFOC rolls would, if off 
the program, retain eligibility for benefits .... Thus the 
problem of welfare 'dependency' cannot be ascribed to· 
the work disincentives of the program."67 Put differ· 
ently, Moffitt is saying that for the vast majority of 
current long-term recipients any employment they 
might find would not pay enough to make them 
ineligible for AFOC. 
The end of this report provides a brief discussion of 
some policies that can help reduce, and perhaps even 
end, long-term welfare use- policies that do not 
jeopardize the well-being of children in the process. 
But they require investments not only in job-training 
and education programs, but i:.1. increased health 
coverage, increased child-support enforcement, and 
perhaps government-provided jobs. Not only are such 
programs altogether absent from the Initiative, many 
existing programs are being cut, increasing the likeli-
hood that the Initiative will have many unintended 
consequences. Without such policies, there is little 
hope of reducing the proportion of long-term recipi-
ents. 
Increasing Work By Recipients. Perhaps the central 
argument of the Initiative's supporters is that, at a 
minimum, recipients can make up the lost income with 
just a small number of hours of work per week- the 
Governor claims that 6 to 10 hours will be needed. 
While the number of recipients wouldn't be reduced, 
the amount of state payments would be, thereby freeing 
funds to reduce the deficit or fund other programs. 
Proponents believe that the cuts will push non· 
working parents into rhe job-market. Along with this 
stick, recipients also will be provided a carrot to induce 
more work. As previously mentioned, benefits currently 
are reduced one dollar for every dollar earned, after 
certain exemptions are counted. One of those exemp-
tions allows the first $30, plus one-third of the remain-
ing earnings, to be disregarded for the first four months 
of work. After that, only the $30 exemption is allowed. 
As a result, many recipients have little incentive to 
combine work and AFOC support. 
In compliance with legislation passed last year, the 
stare has received permission from the federal govern-
ment, which sets the requirements, to apply the full 
$30 and a third disregard for as long as the recipient 
has earnings, if the Initiative passes. Since working 
recipients will be able to retain more of their earnings, 
they will have more incentive to work. 
There are five issues raised by the claim that 
recipients can work to make up the lost income: ( 1) Is 
the claim correct? How much incentive for additional 
work does the proposal create? (2) Will those who find 
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work be able to replace the lost income? (3) Can 
current recipients actually find employment? Are the 
jobs available? Is childcare? ( 4) What percentage of 
recipients who can find work are likely to do so? This is 
critical from a child's perspective. If a parent does not 
choose to work, assuming she or he can, it is the child 
who gets penalized for the parent's behavior. Is this 
sensible? (5) Finally, is it a sound idea to try to make all 
parents work more? In particular, do we want to force 
mothers of newborns or of children under two to place 
their children in childcare? If yes, should this be 
contingent on the availability of high-qualiry 
childcare? Are there other people who should not be 
forced to work- those, for example, whose children 
have disabilities? 
This section focuses on the first four issues (the last 
will be discussed later). To summarize our conclusions, 
about half of all recipients who require support for 
more than 6 months will not find further employment. 
Perhaps a third to a half of current recipients will be 
able to find regular part-time work and the childcare 
that will enable them to take jobs. Most of these 
families will not be better off economically as a result; 
they will break-even or will not net enough to replace 
the lost income. The great majority of families, 
therefore, will be worse off economically. 
The start of any analysis begins with the current 
work efforts of recipients. At any point in time, 
approximately 7 to 8% of California's recipients report 
earnings, mostly from part-time work.68 This is slightly 
above the national average. Since recipients move in 
and out of the labor force while receiving support, 
between 20 and 30% report earned income at some 
point; some recipients have unreported earnings. 
Taking this last group into account, it seems likely that 
between 40% and 50% of all recipients work at some 
point.69 Many of these parents are undoubtedly among 
those recipients who exit AFOC relatively quickly. 
Most of those who now work do not work regu-
larly. To get a sense of why this is so, it is useful to 
think about the situation of many recipients. As noted 
earlier, women generally earn considerably less than 
men, regardless of the women's level of education. 
Women on AFOC are even more restricted with 
respect to the types of jobs for which they are qualified. 
Childcare responsibilities further limit the types of 
jobs single mothers can take. Unless they have help 
from family members or friends, they face both the 
necessity of finding affordable childcare and the need 
to work relatively close to be available in emergencies. 
If they do find work, it usually is at the low end of the 
employment structure. This makes them particularly 
vulnerable to changes in unemployment levels. In 
addition, family crises, health problems and other 
factors can force many of these mothers in and out of 
the labor market. Some parents need to stay home to 
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care for a child with disabilities. Finally, a portion of 
AFDC mothers suffer from physical or emotional 
problems that impair their ability to work, let alone 
earn enough to exit the welfare system. The children of 
this last group will be especially harmed by cuts in 
family income. 
While families receiving AFOC-U, which have 
two parents available, do not face the childcare 
problems confronting single mothers, most of these 
parents have less than high school education and a 
large percentage do not speak English. When these 
parents work, it usually is in the secondary labor 
market, where the wages remain low. 
Will the carrots and sticks in the Initiative change 
this pattern? Determining whether these parents can or 
will stay in the labor force and predicting whether 
those with no work history will begin working, or work 
enough to replace the lost income, is very difficult. 
Some inferences can be drawn from evidence regarding 
the impact of previous changes in the 30 and a third 
rule. Prior to 1982. the disregard applied to all recipi-
ents, nationally, for one year. At that time, the rule was 
changed to the present four months. Before 1982, an 
average of 14% of recipients reported earned income 
each year. Following the change, that figure dropped to 
the current 8%. Judging by that shift, just changing the 
disregard will influence only a small percentage of 
recipients. 
If the Initiative passes, both the benefit level and 
the disregard will change, so evidence from changes in 
the disregard alone provides only partial insight. 
Directly relevant, however, are the findings of econo-
mist Gary Burtless. After reviewing the research 
examining the relationship between grant levels, the 
amount of earnings recipients may retain, and work by 
AFOC recip1ents he concluded: "A reform that reduced 
tax rates and reduced support levels simultaneously 
would undoubtedly raise work effort among the poor, at 
least slightly, but it also would harm the living stan-
dards of families already at the margin of American 
life.''70 This is precisely the reform being proposed in 
California (tax rates is a term for the disregard rule and 
support levels a term for the cash grant). According to 
Burtless, somewhat more work can be expected, but on 
average poor children and parents will have less money 
as a result of the changes. 
Why will recipients be worse off economically on 
average? To begin with, while the change in the 30 and 
a third rule will enable some currently working 
recipients to retain enough of their earnings so that 
they are hetter off even with the reduced grant, most 
currently working recipients will find themselves worse 
off unless increase their hours of work. Otherwise, 
the reductton in the grant level will exceed the extra 
amount they can keep from their earnings. 
For those not currently working, who comprise 
over 90% of recipients, there is a question whether 
there are jobs available for workers with their job 
qualifications, especially during this time of recession. 
Experts offer different conclusions. 71 Research is onlv 
partially helpful; most studies do not match the 
available jobs with the places where recipients live, 
either with regard to counties or, in larger counties, 
location within the county. Even if jobs were avatlable, 
many mothers will be unable to find childcare, espe-
cially mothers with infants. The lack of "off-hour" care 
may also prevent recipients from taking some existing 
jobs. 
Finally, many recipients who find work will not be 
able to replace the income lost due to the cuts. The 
Governor's claim that a recipient would onlv need to 
work 10 hours per week to hreak-even assumes no 
childcare costs. A rectpienr with childcare needs would 
have to work at least 20 hours a week at $5 an hour JUSt 
to come out even. And w1th this combination of w,;rk 
and welfare they would soli be livmg below the poverrv 
line. 
A small percentage of parents may not work due rn 
personal problems, such as depression or substance 
abuse, or because thev prefer not wnrkmg to rhe extn 
income, or because thev have so lost touch with the 
labor market that they cannot imagme working. The 
Initiative, however, is not a targeted approach to 
dealing with this group. Cutting benefits to "pumsh" 
them for nor working is w deprive their children 11t 
resources, as well as the children of all those who want 
to work but cannot find jobs. It is like blowing up an 
entire city to destroy a few buildings; unfortunately, all 
of the buildings are occupted. 
Summary. In sum, the Initiative will not do much 
to prevent initial entry onto AFOC, nor willtt result m 
any real increase in the numbers of parents leavmg the 
system in less than six months. If our estimates are 
correct, and they are consistent wtth the Governor's, 
30 to 60% of new recipients will continue to need 
support for somewhere between six months and two 
years and an additional 20 to 40% wtll be on longer, 
even after the changes in benefits and the other 
programs. 
There may be some increase in the percentage of 
recipients who work part-time, but even so most 
children will experience a decline in income. While an 
unknown proportion of families will replace the lost 
income, few families will be better off. That few parents 
will be better off economically, even if they work, raises 
two concerns. First, as discussed later. requiring parents 
of infants and toddlers to work may he quite harmful to 
these children. For rhe~e children the Initiative offers 
no chance of increased well-being, only the risk of 
substantial detriment. Second, except for teenagers, 
recipients who want to get more education in order to 
improve their long-tern economic prospects will be 
unable to do so, unless they are willing to absorb the 
entire cut. As a result, many more children will 
continue living in poverty, albeit with a working 
parent. As we discuss later, it is parental poverty, not 
receipt of AFOC, that harms most children. 
Cal-Learn and Other Provisions Relating to 
Teenagers 
For the reasons noted earlier, as well as because 
adolescents seem to be less capable as parents, it clearly 
is desirable to encourage young women to delay 
parenthood. The Initiative seeks to address the issue of 
teen parenthood in two ways: first, by provisions that 
require younger teens to live with their own parents; 
and, second, by provisions designed to encourage teens 
who have a child to remain in school. While the goals 
are indisputably good, the means chosen in the 
Initiative may well do more harm than good. In terms 
of improving the life choices of both the teen mother 
and her child, other approaches appear to be far 
preferable. 
The Co-ResU:lence Requirements. Under the Initia-
tive, teenage mothers younger than 18 would be 
eligible for benefits only if they live with a parent or 
other relative. Exceptions would be made if the parent 
or legal guardian refuses to have the teenager, the 
physical or emotional well-being of the teenager would 
be threatened by living with her parent, or the teenager 
has been living away from the parent for a year. As 
previously mentioned, the justification for this provi-
sion is that it will discourage some teenagers from 
having children and encourage family unity. 
Evaluating this provision is difficult. Since no state 
has ever mandated co-residence, it is impossible to say 
whether the proposal will have any effect on the 
number of births by those under 18. It must be recog-
nized, however, that this provision is applicable to a 
very small number of cases. There are fewer than 9,000 
teen mothers under 18 who receive AFOC; 70% of 
these are 1 7 years old and 20% are 16 years old. 73 We 
did n< >t find estimates of how many of these teens live 
independently. 
Several anthropological studies suggest that some 
teenagers become mothers in order to be treated as 
adults and to escape from their families.; 4 Even for 
those teenagers the co-residence rule may have little 
effect. Young teenage girls would have to be aware of 
the provision and take it into account when deciding 
whether to have sexual relations or to terminate a 
pregnancy. lf one wants to assume that 16- and 17-
year-olds plan ahead to this extent, then one also 
should assume that 17 -year-olds who want to become 
independent can wait a short reriod and have the child 
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when they tum 18. More realistically, it seems unlikely 
that many 16- and 17 -year-olds are this calculating, so 
that the proposal probably will have a minuscule 
impact on birthrates. 
It is possible, however, that some young mothers 
who have a child and want to set up their own house-
hold will decide or be required to remain at home as a 
result of the proposal. This may have both good and 
bad consequences. There is a small body of research 
comparing teenagers who live with their parents and 
those who live on their own according to a variety of 
criteria. These studies suggest that teen mothers who 
live with their parents are much more likely to con-
tinue their schooling and slightly less likely to have 
repeat pregnancies. 75 
All the studies, however, compare teen mothers 
who chose to remain in the parental home with those 
who chose to leave. The findings from these studies, 
therefore, tell us little with respect to teen mothers 
required to live in the parental home by the state, 
which might yield very different results. There are 
several reasons for concluding that negative outcomes 
will predominate when teens are forced to live with 
their families. 
A teen mother's place of residence influences the 
mother's emotional well-being, her parenting behaviors 
and the development of her child. As we shall see more 
fully later, the evidence regarding the impact of 
residence on parenting behaviors, and on the children 
of teen mothers, is inconsistent. But there is reason to 
worry that coerced co-residence will be harmful to 
many teen mothers themselves. While the teen's 
parents may be able to provide needed support, being a 
teen mother does not end the normal conflict between 
adolescents and their parents.76 To the contrary, the 
presence of a new baby can be a source of constant 
conflict, generating hostility about differences m child-
rearing philosophy, the teen mother's behavior, and 
the role and responsibilities of the grandparent. The 
teenager may be regularly blamed for having the child. 
There may be additional disputes focusing on social 
relations. Those teens who chose to stay with their 
families may believe that these problems are out-
weighed by the benefits of parental support. But teens 
who wish to be on their own may have concluded that 
the added stress will harm them, as well as their child. 
Most importantly, some teen mothers come from 
abusive or otherwise dysfunctional homes. While the 
proposal allows teens to request exemption from the 
co-residence requirement, it is questionable whether 
this will be a very effective remedy. Some teens may be 
reluctant to ask. It is unknown whether social workers, 
many of whom have minimal training, are capable of 
making these judgments. An adequate home evalua-
tion would be time-consuming and costly; what's more, 
it is doubtful that such evaluations will take place. 
In sum, there may be both gains and losses from 
this provision. The impact on teen births will undoubt-
edly be negligible. For those who have children, the 
benefits to some mothers emanating from parental 
support will be balanced by the harms to others 
resulting from increased conflict. The administrative 
costs will be substantial, or else the exemption provi-
sions will be rendered meaningless. At a minimum, this 
provision cannot not be seen as much of a reason to 
vote for the Initiative. 
Cal-Learn. Under this program, parents 19 and 
younger receiving AFOC (including the "parents of 
unborn children") will have their AFOC grants 
increased or decreased based upon school attendance. 
Many people consider this provision to be an especially 
desirable feature of the Initiative. Helping teens 
complete high school is highly desirable. Because of the 
imporrance of this goal, the means selected demand 
careful scrutiny. The evidence indicates that the 
provision probably will do more harm than good. 
As noted. about half of all teen mothers do not 
finish hi15h school. The drop-out rate for Hispanic 
females is especially high, as is the drop-out rate for all 
Hispanics male and female. In contrast, more than 
60% of young black mothers now obtain a degree. As 
these differences indicate, dropping out of school is 
influenced by a variety of factors. 
Not surprisingly, those leaving school tend to be 
the students who were doing most poorly to begin with. 
Recent findings indicate that as many as 60% of 
Hispanics, 52% of whites and 26% of blacks dropped 
out before becoming pregnant. 77 Plagued by poor 
grades, often behind by a year or more, these adoles-
cents see little to be gained by remaining in school. 
Other teens drop out upon becoming pregnant, often 
because thev do not want to attend during their 
pregnancies. Finally, some leave school after the child 
is born. The added responsibilities of childcare, along 
with any other disincentives they may have, make 
school attendance too difficult. 
Many different approaches are being tried within 
California and throughout the country to deal with this 
problem. The evidence indicates that compared with 
other approaches the use of financial rewards and 
punishments is noi: very in inducing dropouts 
to return to school or in improving attendance among 
those who have not completely dropped out. Two 
states have recently implemented programs similar to 
the Initiative's, Leamfare it) Wisconsin and LEAP in 
Ohio. Preliminary studies of these programs - prima-
rily Learnfare - find that: 1) Learnfare does not <.ppear 
to improve school attendance; 2) Many teen parents 
have been sanctioned (had their grants reduced) under 
these programs; and 3) The programs are difficult to 
administer economically and fairly. 
Wisconsin's Learnfare program has been heavdv 
evaluated. In January 1992, the University of 
Wisconsin's Employment and Training Institute 
released results from a formal, multi-year evaluation of 
the Learnfare program. :R They found an extremely 
mixed picture regarding attendance. While approxi-
mately one-third of the teens to Learnfare had 
improved their school attendance, more than half had 
actually attended less after one year of the program. 
Moreover, in statistical analyses data from six 
school districts, researchers found that even the 
improvement in attendance could not actually be 
attributed to Learnfare. Another review of Wisconsm 
data, by the Center for Law and Social Policy 
(CLASP), found that the number of Learnfare teens 
who dropped out of school actually increased during a 
two-year period under the Leamfare program. 
The failure of Leamfare to increase attendance ts 
not the result of an absence of sanctions. During the 
first year of the program, hetween 'i.Z% and l0.6'Ytl ()t 
all Leamfare teens were sanctioned each month. 
Twenty percent of those sancnoned were sancnnned 
for dropping out of school. SO'XJ fqr tailing to complv 
with monthly attendance n.:quirements, and the 
remaining students were 'ianctioned for <lther reason-, 
( e.g. failure to verifv statu:,). Simdar results were iound 
in a preliminary review of LEAP. In four of ftve Ohiu 
counties for which data were ;lVadahle, sancnons were 
requested for 20% of teen rarenrs subject to LEAP. 
Roughly two-thirds of those were sanc-
tioned for their failure to he enrolled in school. 
The research in Ohio and Wisconsin also makes it 
clear that implementing a sanction program is costly 
both in dollars and administrative time. The acttvitie~ 
of state and county soc tal services agencies, public 
schools, private schools and independent service 
agencies all must be coordinated. Establishing umform 
procedures throughout the state has proven especially 
difficult, raising issues of fairness for Learnfare teens. 
Perhaps most importantly, the Umversity of Wisconsm 
study found more than 16,000 errors in Learnfare 
records (including inaccurate ages, faulty attendance 
records, etc.). A state audit in Milwaukee Counrv 
alone found improper reductions of welfare benefits for 
more than 1,100 families, reductions families 
could ill afford. Developing procedures to carefully 
monitor school attendance will be qutte costly for 
California's school districts, which already have 
funding problems. 
These programs result in the imposition 
of financial penalties on teen parents, many of whom 
have already dropped out uf :ichool. Yet the pt>nalties 
often do not generate the desired behavior. The net 
effect is to punish mothers and their children without 
achieving many positive outcomes. In light of the 
LJUestionable value of these penalnes, and the 
harm that can be done to children, it would seem that 
more positive approaches should be utilized. A major 
barrier for many teens is the absence of chtldcare and 
traf1SPOrtation. The Initiative makes no provision for 
childcare; the Governor's budget proposals do request 
additional funds. While this certainly is desirable, extra 
funds are already needed for the many teens who now 
want to return to school but lack childcare. Such 
expenditures need not tum on passage of the Initiative. 
Given the educational difficulties confronting 
these teens, moreover, just getting them to school is 
not enough. Many need special programs to help them 
overcome academic deficiencies, and to become better 
parents. A number of California school districts have 
special programs that already have long waiting lists.80 
Other teen mothers receive special attention in GAIN 
programs. If the Initiative passes, its focus on financial 
rewards and penalties may supplant these more 
promising approaches. 
In sum, the harms from the proposed approach 
seem to clearly outweigh any potential gains. There is 
little reason to believe that financial incentive will 
influence the behavior of many teens. The administra-
tive costs may be substantial. Most importantly, the 
money spent trying to implement this approach could 
be utilized for programs that already have demonstrated 
their effectiveness. 
Denial of Benefits for Additional Children 
Under current law, the total grant amount is 
linked to family size. Upon the birth of another child, a 
family receiving support gets an additional $97 to $128 
per month, depending upon the number of recipients 
already in the family. The Initiative would discontinue 
these increases for families in which the new child is 
conceived while the family is receiving AFDC. 
We have not found data regarding the percentage 
of families receiving support that actually have addi-
tional children; the state has not previously gathered 
this information on a systematic basis. Some recent 
surveys in California and other states indicate that 
perhaps 20 to 30% of recipients who remain in the 
system longer than two years will give birth to another 
child."i 
While opinions differ about whether it is irrespon-
sible or inappropriate for poor families to have addi-
tional children, value judgments of this kind are not 
the tocus of this report. From the perspective of 
children already in AFOC families, discouraging 
additional births might be beneficial in some ways. 
Thev would receive more parental attention; more 
importantly, the birth of another child lowers the 
probability that the parent wtll be able to able earn a 
reasonable income. If the penalties for additional births 
served as a total deterrent the proposal might be 
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desirable, viewed solely from the perspective of 
children. 
The critical question is how much of a deterrent a 
denial of benefits will be. If additional births still occur, 
all family members will be poorer. For this provision to 
be effective, the threat of lower benefits would have to 
induce a large number of women to cease having sexual 
relations or to use contraceptives or to have abortions. 
During the early 1980's, a number of commenta-
tors argued that the availability of welfare benefits 
served as an inducement for poor women to have 
children. In order to test these claims, researchers 
began to examine the relationship between benefit 
levels and family size. As even the critics of the current 
welfare system recognized, these studies showed that 
the possibility of obtaining additional benefits did not 
motivate parents to have additional children.ti2 Fertility 
rates of recipients appear to be lower than those in the 
general population and, as previously pointed out, most 
families on welfare are small, with an average of less 
than two children. 
Possibly, the absence of additional support will 
serve as a deterrent, even if grant increases do not 
create incentives. But the data do not seem to support 
this hypothesis. Throughout the country, the number 
of children in families receiving welfare is unrelated to 
benefit levels. In very low-benefit states, where the 
birth of an additional child leads to virtually no 
increase in benefits, recipients have as many children 
as those in higher-benefit states.83 
It seems extremely unlikely that passage of the 
proposal will cause recipients to stop all sexual activity. 
The provision applies to married couples, as well as 
single women. Conceivably contraceptive use will 
increase, although there is no evidence to this effect. 
Moreover, failure rates for the most reliable forms of 
contraceptives- the pill, condoms, and diaphragms 
-range from 6 to 16% a year. If the provision has any 
impact, it probably will be through pushing women 
into unwanted abortions. 
We cannot reliably estimate the number of 
prevented births versus the number of families that will 
loose benefits as a result of this provision. Certainly 
some families will have additional children; the degree 
of deterrence is speculative. It is with this framework in 
mind that voters should weigh the likely impact of this 
provision on children. 
Eliminating Benefits to Pregnant Women 
The provision to eliminate AFDC grants to 
pregnant women has received little attention. This 
provision applies only to first- time mothers, since 
pregnant recipients already receiving support are not 
currently eligible for increased benefits until the child 
is born, except for a $70 per month supplement during 
the pregnancy, which also is eliminated by the Initia-
tive. Approximately 14,000 women without children 
receive benefits under this provision at any point in 
time; a greater number receive benefits during the 
course of a year. 
The underlying assumption behind this proposal 
appears to be that most pregnant women who receive 
benefits are in the labor force when they become 
pregnant that availability of benefits encour-
ages them to stop working. If these benefits are 
eliminated, the Governor's budget proposals estimate 
savings of $38 million in state funds. Unfortunately, 
there are no data available that would enable us to 
assess the probable impact of the proposal and the 
likelihood that it will achieve its stated goals. It is not 
known how many current recipients were in fact 
working prior to applying for benefits, how much they 
were earning and in what type of jobs, or why they left 
work, if they did. Their need for this support therefore 
cannot be determined. 
There are some possible consequences that should 
be of concern, however, although their magnitude 
cannot yet be determined. First, as pointed out by the 
Leg1slative Analyst, many of these women could apply 
for General Assistance (GA). This basically transfers 
responsibility from the state to the counties, although 
there will be modest savings because GA grants are 
lower than AFOC grants. More trnportantly, from the 
pregnant women may fail to 
take of other programs, such as Medi-Cal or 
the federal Women, Infant and Children program 
(WIC), which provides food to pregnant women. Some 
mothers may be made aware of these programs by 
AFOC workers. 
As we discuss later, if mothers fail to get medical 
care, to eat nutritiously, and to avoid behaviors that 
can a fetus, the harm to children from this 
proposal could be very substantial indeed. And the 
public would be hurt as well, since lack of medical care 
etc. is correlated with having a low-birth weight 
infant. Medical care for such infants can cost as much 
as $ per child. Such costs could tum out to be 
an unintended consequence of the Initiative. 
f..esidency Requirements 
According to polls, one of the most popular 
provisions of the Initiative is the restriction on the 
amount of benefits available to new applicants who 
have not lived in California for 12 months. Such 
applicants will receive only the amount they could 
have received in the state where they last resided, but 
no more than the maximum California benefit. For 
those from Texas, for example, the maximum 
benefit would be $184. 
The is based on t!:te assumption that some 
people from other states move to California because of 
California's comparatively high cash grants. Presum-
ably, these families either were receiving AFOC in 
another state and wanted higher benefits or were 
willing to quit a and seek better work 
that if they did not find work 
for AFOC. 
The California of Social Services 
estimates that 7% of those who received benefits last 
year lived in another state within the previous 12 
rnonths.84 Estimating how many of them fall into either 
of the categories just mentioned is not possible. It 
seems likely that at least some portion of new recipi-
ents from out-of-state carne to California to take a job, 
to find a job, or to join relatives without any thought 
that they might have to apply for welfare. 
The question of whether welfare benefit levels 
serve to attract potential reopients to a state has been 
the subject of a fair amount of research during the past 
10 years. Because there are enormously difficult barriers 
to studying the question in a methodologically ad-
equate way, debate continues. The general conclusion 
from this research, however. is that benefit levels 
appear to have little, if any, tmpact on decisions to 
move from state to state. although two experts take 
somewhat different view, claiming that benefit levels 
have a small but consequential impact. 
All of these studies fincl that families move for a 
variety of reasons. The minor importance of benefit 
levels is evidenced, in part, the fact that 
numbers people move from high-benefit to low-benefit 
states and then end up needing to apply for AFDC. In 
fact, a recent study in the state of Washington found 
that 20% of new recipients from out of state had come 
to Washington from California.t'i\ In addition, when 
studies have asked new moved to 
state, the most common answer was to be near familv. 
This is hardly surprising; a poor family is to 
move a great distance without the support system 
provided by family or a job. 
While politicians and researchers seem to be 
concerned with the question of whether 
states are welfare " lookin~ at the issue from 
the of children different ._.u,.Juut 
For children, the relevant is not how many 
people are attracted to California because of high 
benefits, but how many will not be deterred from moving 
to California even though they may receive very small 
grants. 
To the extent that families are 'i"''"'"r"fi 
will have no on 
although some non-California 
children- for example, those whose parents 
the opportunity to move to California to better 
jobs or to join extended family may be harmed. On 
the other hand, to the extent families continue to 
move to California and end up having to apply for 
.Af[)C, the impact on children could be extremely 
negative. All of the research indicates that there will 
be little reduction in the number of new applicants 
from other states. Those families who cannot find work 
will either have to live on very low incomes here or 
move to other states. As we shall see shortly, either 
alternative would be bad for children. 
Summary 
From the previous discussion it is apparent that 
little reform of the welfare system can be expected as a 
result of the Initiative's proposals. The evidence from 
all prior research demonstrates that the goals of 
reducing entry into the system, ending long-term 
reliance on support, preventing births to teens, and 
improving the prospects of teen mothers cannot be 
achieved through policies that rely exclusively on 
economic penalties and rewards. Rather than reducing 
the number of children and parents living in poverty, 
the Initiative will push many families into deeper 
poverty. 
The review of the circumstances that cause parents 
and children to rely on AFOC tells why this is so. The 
families that must rely on AFOC have no other 
options. This is especially true with respect to long-
term recipients. The great majority of parents lack the 
education, job skills, or language ability that would 
enable them to earn enough to provide basic support to 
their children; in hard economic times many cannot 
find any employment. Single mothers, who comprise 
.. 
more than three-quarters of the adult recipients, face 
the additional barrier of needing care for their children 
in order to work. This care must be affordable, acces-
sible, and of sufficient quality to protect and promote 
children's well-being. At least for mothers of very 
young children, and there are approximately 200,000 
mothers with children less than a year old currently 
receiving support, adequate care is not available. 
Most of these parents cannot change their situa-
tion in response to financial penalties or even rewards. 
They need help in acquiring job skills and provision for 
their children's care. Among single mothers, the half 
who become single parents as a result of divorce, 
separation, or death of a spouse often need time to 
adjust to their new economic and personal situation. 
Finally, the data ftom the programs in Wisconsin 
and Ohio aimed at teen mothers indicate that financial 
penalties and rewards, at least at the levels being 
proposed, are not sufficient to make school a viable or 
attractive option. The decisions of young women, 
including those in their early 20's, with regard to 
childbearing, school and work obviously are influenced 
by a complex set of factors. Reform efforts that seek to 
change these behaviors must be based on an under-
standing of these factors and be tailored to respond to 
them in ways meaningful to these women. 
Because recipients will receive less support the 
Initiative will have the effect of reducing the budget, at 
least in the short-run. Since the majority of recipients 
will be unable to replace the lost income, many 
children will be poorer. We tum next to examining the 
likely effects on children . 
THE EFFECTS ON CHII...OREN ~ 
We now tum to our major concern, the effects of 
the proposal in its entirety on the well-being of 
children. In order to understand the potential effects, it 
is necessary to understand the aspects of a child's 
environment to successful development. With 
those in mind, we can then examine how these aspects 
of children's environments are likely to be altered by 
the Initiative. 
Among child development experts there is a 
considerable degree of consensus regarding the basic 
elements needed to insure children's well-being. These 
elements were identified by the National Commission 
on Children: 
The essential ingredients for developing 
competence and character cut across culture, 
nationality, and class. All children need 
loving parents who provide safe, secure homes 
and encourage their development. They must 
be sheltered and protected from harm. 
Their basic health and nutritional needs must 
be met, as must their mothers during preg-
nancy. early, children must learn to trust 
others. They must possess a secure and 
positive sense of their own identity and their 
place in the world .... 87 
The Commission identified two factors as espe-
cially critical to a child receives these ingredi-
ents- the quality of care provided by parents and by 
the child's other and family income. 
Moreover, that the two factors are 
interrelated, since inadequate income often signifi-
candv the quality of care a parent can and 
does 
Inadequate income alters a parent's ability to 
provide adequate care in a variety of ways. To begin 
with, there are direct consequences of having too little 
money. Parents with very low income often cannot 
provide children sufficient nutrition; they may be 
forced to live in or overcrowded housing; even 
with Medt·Cal may not have access to regular 
who are often must 
rely on poor childcare. 
Secondly, living in poverty a parent's 
ability ro the support, monitoring, and stimula-
tion children need. This is especially true for single 
parents without support systems. It is extraordinarily 
difficult to manage all of the tasks a single parent must 
perform; these problems can become overwhelming in 
the face of very limited income, poor housing, danger-
ous neighborhoods, and a parent's personal problems. 
So great is ti11S stress that approximately 30% of AFOC 
mothers suffer tmm depression.o,q 
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In addition, poor children often are served 
inferior-quality institutions. For 
ally attend schools have fewer resources 
schools of non-poor and their often 
start with low that students will be 
activities.YO f-',.,,,.,,..,.;,.,,., 
mental dangers requires heroic efforts on the part of 
parents; poor parents must do more than other parents 
just to protect their children from harm. In the face of 
rhe stresses of poverty, manv poor parents are not able 
to make such efforts~ 
The cumulative impact of all these factors severelv 
compromises a poor child's opportumties for normal 
development. They help accoum for fact that 
children living in poverty considerably 
higher rates of infant mortalitv, accidents and in Junes, 
academic delays and school and emotional 
problems. Any estimates of the of the lninattve 
must start with the that the children who 
will be most affected alreadv are harmed 
in poverty. 
The Reductions in Benefits 
A very large percentage of families recetve less 
financial support as a result of the Initiative. The effect 
of the Initiative will parents 
respond to income loss. discussion 
shows, there will be a group of children whose 
parent(s) will be able to lost income 
through work, but who will remain poor and on 
welfare, even with part or full-time work. There also 
will be some families who will be induced to work 
the incentives or penalties and wtll able to raise 
their income above the poverty leveL Finally, there 
will be families unable to some or all of the lost 
income. Although 
what percentage of 
groups, this last group 
Our task then is to from child's perspec-
tive, the probable impacts on each of these groups of 
children. Obviously, is concern the 
of families thar fall 
situations parents are 
work efforts also must be 
some of these children will 
family income is increased or 
parent is working rather than relying on welfare. On 
the other hand, in order to most parents 
must find childcare. The impact of the parents' work 
on their children is more likely to be determined by the 
quality of care these children receive while their parent 
is working, than on any increase in income. The effects 
of work conditions on the parents' emotional status 
also will have an impact on their children. 
The Impact on Children Whose Parents Do 
Not Replace the Lost Income 
We begin by examining the likely impacts on 
those children whose parents are unable to replace the 
lost income - those parents who cannot or do not find 
employment and those who will not net enough to 
replace the lost income, even though they are working. 
For some children, the reduction will be relatively 
short term, from a few months to a year. Others will be 
poor for several years. However, perhaps as many as 
20% of those children currently receiving support will 
live further in poverty for many years. 
As a result of the income loss, parents will have to 
cut back on the quality of food, housing, or other goods 
necessary to their children's welfare. Some will be 
forced to move to more dangerous housing or neighbor-
hoods. They will be under more stress, which will lower 
the care they can provide. 
To what degree will these changes worsen the 
condition of poor children? As just indicated, studies 
of children show that poor children fare worse than 
non-poor children, in terms of academic performance, 
school completion, emotional health, and some aspects 
of physical health.91 Knowing that poor children do 
worse than non-poor children does not reveal the 
impact of the Initiative, however. All of the families on 
AFDC already are poor. Their children already are 
suffering from the consequences of poverty. The issue is 
how much worse off they will be as a result of being 
even poorer. In addition, some of the deficits mani-
fested by poor children may not be the direct result of 
poverty. Poor parents often differ from non-poor 
parents in some important respects; for example, they 
generally have less education and more often began 
parenthood as teenagers. We need to know how much 
income, in and of itself, matters. Finally, it would be 
helpful to know whether there are differences in the 
development between poor children in families 
receiving AFDC and in poor families with a parent 
working, since it often is claimed that, even if it is bad 
to be poor, it is worse to be poor in a family receiving 
welfare. 
There are a limited number of studies that directly 
address these issues; we rely primarily on these studies. 
In particular, there is a very recent and comprehensive 
study of children's well-being conducted by researchers 
at Child Trends, one of the ~.:ountry's leading research 
groups on children's well-being. The study, which we 
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refer to by the name of its principal author, Nicholas 
Zill, compared three groups of children - poor 
children in AFOC families, poor children in non-
welfare families, and non-poor children. The study also 
examined the effect of poverty itself, separating out by 
statistical means differences that might be accounted 
for by other factors, such as AFDC receipt, parental 
education or family structure. Because it is the most 
comprehensive examination of these issues, we present 
its findings in some detail. 
Physical Health. Fortunately, due to the availability 
of Medi-Cal and other public-health services, the 
general physical health of most poor children is 
reasonably good. But they still are considerably more 
likely than non-poor children to suffer from serious 
medical conditions. If the Initiative passes, this 
situation will worsen. 
First, the reduction in benefits is likely to affect 
the medical care received by children, particularly with 
respect to dental care. Perhaps because dental coverage 
under Medicaid and Medi-Cal has a low reimburse-
ment level and does not encourage preventative care, 
AFDC children already receive less dental care than 
non-poor children.92 In addition, if parents are forced 
to move frequently, their ties to their current medical 
providers will be disrupted, making it more likely that 
they will rely primarily on emergency care rather than 
on preventive check-ups. 
The health of children will be at further nsk 
because, as already mentioned, many parents will be 
forced to reduce food purchases as a result of lower 
income. Inadequate nutrition and hunger, already 
prevalent among poor children, cause dizziness, fatigue, 
headaches, ear infections and other persistent medical 
problems. Those would only be likely to become more 
common under the Initiative. 
One of the worst threats to children's health wtll 
come from the fact that cuts in income will force 
families to find cheaper housing, which generally 
means lower-quality housing in less desirable living 
areas. This will increase the number of children 
harmed by lead poisoning and accidental injuries. For 
children younger than five years old, the child's blood 
lead concentration increases as his or her poverty level 
increases.93 Even low levels of lead poisoning harm a 
child's central nervous system, impairing mental and 
physical developmtnt. 
As mentioned earlier, many low-income families 
already live in housing containing safety hazards. Their 
surrounding environment is also more hazardous. Zill 
found that, on average, for children ages three to five 
years, 17% of the play environments of AFDC children 
appeared unsafe compared with 7% of those of non-
poor children.94 Injuries cause almost half the deaths of 
children one to four years of age and more than half 
the deaths of those five to 14. Studies have found that 
poor children are five times as likely to die as a result of 
fire than non-poor children. Both deaths and injuries 
will increase tf families become poorer. 
At the extreme, the cuts will push some families 
into homelessness, which dearly impairs children's 
physical, mental and educational health.95 While 
precise estimates cannot be made, a study by the Santa 
Clara Countv Department of Social Services found 
that 3000 current AFOC families in that county will 
have their grants reduced to an amount below what 
they now pay for rent. 96 While some of these families 
may increase their work income, find cheaper housing 
or both, it seems certain that some will wind up 
homeless. 
As noted earlier, the elimination of AFOC support 
to pregnant women from the time of conception could 
have extremely detrimental effects on the children 
born to these women, if the lack of support results in 
pregnant women obtaining less medical care or causes 
them to eat less nutritiously or denies them the support 
they need to refrain from behaviors that might harm 
the fetus, such as drug use. Stress, inadequate medical 
care, poor nutrition and health behavior all increase 
the likelihood of having a low-birth- weight baby or of 
injury to the fetus. Low-birth-weight babies in low-
income families are more likely to die, to have frequent 
illnesses, to suffer developmental delays and to have 
cognitive deficits, to academic problems. The 
lack of medical care may be particularly detrimental for 
pregnant teenagers, who often do not get medical care 
and have a high proportion of problem pregnancies and 
births. 
Unfortunately, poor children suffer health hazards 
from their family environments as well as their physical 
environments. Parents under substantial stress are less 
attentive caretakers, contributing to the high rate of 
accidental injuries. In addition, although the majority 
of poor children are free from abuse and neglect, 
children from poor families are subject to significantly 
more maltreatment than children from non-poor 
families. In general, the rates of physical and sexual 
abuse and senous neglect are from four to six times 
greater in families below the poverty line.97 Moreover, 
some studies find that the deeper the poverty the 
higher the rate of abuse.98 Particularly in those families 
that undergo the 25% income cut, we can expect an 
increase in abuse and neglect. 
On the positive side, the provision requiring 
teenage mothers to continue living with relatives also 
might lead to improved health-care for new babies. 
The harms associated with the reduction would far 
outweigh any benefits. While poverty does not always 
pose a health hazard for children, the risk of a poor 
child's being unhealthy significantly exceeds the risk 
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for a non-poor child. This is true despite the fact that 
poor children whose families receive AFOC have 
better access to health care than do other poor chil-
dren. Given these children's current exposure to 
inadequate nutrition and care, !ow-quality housing and 
violent neighborhoods, any increased deprivation 
would make that care even more inadequate and widen 
the existing health gap between poor and non-poor 
children. 
Academic Perfarmance. The relationship between 
family income and academic performance and school 
attainment is one of the most highly researched issues 
in studies of poverty. A substantial body of evidence 
shows that lower income significantly decreases a 
child's probability of achieving educational success, 
regardless of other characteristics in her or his family. 
The evidence further demonstrates that the lower the 
family income, the greater the likelihood that a child 
will fall behind in school. The basic picture is ret1ecteJ 
in Zill's findings. He found that 26% of AFOC children 
have repeated a grade, compared with 17% of non-poor 
children, and that among children four to seven years 
of age, 52% of AFOC children scored below the 30th 
percentile on a national vocabulary test compared with 
30% of non-poor children. These differences were not 
the result of differences in parental education, family 
structure, ethnicity or geographicallocatton. 
Two other studies show that the degree of povertv 
seems to matter.99 A national study conducted for the 
U.S. Department of Education found that the chance 
of a child falling behind in school decreases by 4% for 
every $1,000 of additional family income. The second 
study found that higher AFOC benefits were associated 
with small increases in years of schooling completed. 
Why does income matter? There are a number of 
possible explanations. First. as mentioned above, poor 
children suffer more headaches, dental problems, ear 
infections and other conditions that cause them to mtss 
school or to function badly in schooL 
School performance is also influenced by continu-
ity of involvement. Poor children may experience 
academic difficulties because they change schools more 
frequently. To the degree that families to move 
more frequently to obtain affordable housing children 
will loose continuity. When families move into 
crowded living situations, perhaps doubling up with 
friends or relatives, children will be deprived of space 
to study and do homework; in fact, such living condi-
tions may make it impossible for some children to focw· 
on schooL 
Increased poverty is likely to affect some parents' 
ability to help or encourage their children's academic 
development. Zill found that young poor children are 
less likely to be read to by their parents and own fewer 
books. They are more likely than non-poor children to 
live in homes where the television is kept on seven or 
more hours per day. While these differences may in 
part reflect educational or intellectual differences 
between poor and middle-class parents, there also is 
reason to believe that, in some poor households, the 
parent is too stressed to read to her or his children. 
For example, in the year following a divorce, many 
mothers dramatically decrease the time they spend 
reading and talking with their young children.100 The 
stress of the divorce and the accompanying depression, 
in part caused by substantial declines in income 
following a divorce, deplete many mothers' energy. 
Since many mothers tum to AFDC for support in the 
wake of a divorce, it seems likely that the cuts will 
further interfere with their ability to remain responsive 
to their children. 
Finally, as we will see in more detail, poor children 
have more behavioral problems, including aggressive 
actmg-out and hyperactivity. These behavioral 
problems are inextricably linked to academic problems. 
Zill found that poor children ages seven to 17 are twice 
as hkely as non-poor children to have been suspended 
or expelled. Fourteen percent of AFOC children have 
been suspended or expelled, compared with 7% of non-
poor children. 
As far as academic performance is concerned, the 
greatest impact of the cuts will be on the children of 
longer-term recipients. Not only does long-term 
welfare recetpt expose the child to the negative 
conditions longer, but most studies also find that 
school problems are cumulative. Zill found that the 
longer that families have been on AFOC the more 
likely children are to score below the 30th percentile 
on national vocabulary exams: 69% in families that 
recetved AFOC in more than three ot the previous five 
years, 50'% in those that recetved AFOC for three years 
or le~s in the previous tive years, 39% in poor families 
with no AFDC history and 299\J in families that were 
not poor and had no AFOC history. 
There are several ways that the Initiative might 
lead to tmproved school performance for some chil-
dren. If more teen mothers participate in special school 
programs that focus on parenting, as well as academics, 
this should help their children. Similarly, if more teens 
graduate high school and thereby increase their long-
term economic prospects, the increased income will 
benefit their children's education. It is possible that if 
the additional child provision discourages some births 
the school performance of other children in these 
families will be enhanced, since presumably they would 
benefit from more parental rime and more available 
resources. These gains would he offset, of course, by the 
harm to children in families where the mother does 
have another child. 
Emotional Development. As just pointed out, poor 
children tend to have more emotional and behavioral 
problems than other children, although the differences 
may not be substantial. Zill found that 25% ot AFDC 
children were reported to have developmental prob-
lems, compared with 19% of non-poor children, and 
that on a standardized behavioral test for children ages 
four to seven years, poor children were almost twiCe as 
likely as non-poor children to score above the 90th 
percentile in severity of behavioral problems. ( 36 
versus 19%). 
For all the same reasons that the proposed cuts 
threaten children's physical health and academic 
performance, they also are likely to worsen the prob-
lems of children already evidencing behavioral prob-
lems, as well as to increase the number of children with 
these problems. 
With regard to all the harms identified above, the 
children of long-term rectpients will be most seriouslv 
affected, since their parents are least able to replace the 
lost income and the impact of living in poverty is 
greatest for those who are poor the longest. During 
childhood deficits tend to be cumulative. Moreover, 
these may be the parents least able to help their 
children initially. Less obvious, perhaps, is the poten-
tial impact of the Initiative on children of parents who 
move to California in hopes of finding a job or reunit-
ing with relatives, but who end up needing to apply for 
welfare. Many of these families will be entitled to 
extremely small amounts: A family from Texas, for 
example, would get $184 a month. While some of these 
families may leave California as a resurt, others wtll 
inevitably become homeless, be forced to move in wtth 
friends or relatives or attempt to survive on extremelv 
minimal income, either from work or welfare. As 
discussed above, all of these responses entail threats to 
children's development. 
The Impact on Children Whose Parents Work 
to Replace the Lost Support 
While the percentage of parents who will be able 
to replace the lost support through increased work is 
debatable, this certainly will occur in some cases. In 
fact, a substantial proportion of recipients will increase 
their hours of work regardless of whether or not the 
Initiative passes; this is one of the main routes off 
welfare. Still, some parents who might not otherwise 
have done so will seek work as a direct result of the 
Initiative. Included in this group will be mothers who 
believe that their children are too young to he left in 
childcare or who feel that the available childcare is 
inadequate. 
The impact on children of the additional work by 
parents will depend primarily on three factors: the 
quality of care that children receive while their parents 
are working; the effect working has on parents func-
tionmg when they are with their children; and whether 
entering the workforce leads to a significant increase in 
the families long-term economic status. Assessing the 
impact of the Initiative on children, therefore, requires 
examining three issues: 
I. Is it good for children to force mothers of infants 
and very young children to place their children 
into childcare? 
2. What will be the quality of childcare most chil-
dren receive? Will some children be left without 
care? 
3. Will some children benefit as a result of their 
parents entering the labor force? 
Since the answers to these questions may depend 
on the age of the child, we examine separately the 
likely effects on children under and over two years of 
age. 
Requmng Work From Mothers Of Children Under 
Two. Proposttion 165 is unique among welfare reform 
proposals because it does not exclude mothers of very 
young children from the work requirement. Reforms in 
other states, federal laws, and the GAIN program all 
exempt mothers of children under three trom work 
mandates. t The 1988 federal Family Support Act does 
allow states to require work of rectpients with children 
over 1 year old.) In contrast, if the Initiative passes the 
mother of a newborn would have to begin work 
immediately to compensate for the initial cut. She 
could wait only until the child was six months old to 
avoid the larger reduction. Currently, more than 
200,000 children younger than one (nearly 20%) 
receive AFDC support; another 15% are two or three. 
These provisions consequentlv will affect large numbers 
of children. 
The proposal is a 180-degree move from the 
origmal purpose of AFDC, which was to allow mothers 
to remain at home with their young children. A policy 
that effectively requires work when children are 
younger than two, and especially younger than one, is 
certainly questionable. Although an increasing 
percentage of non-AFDC mothers of very young 
children now work at least part-time, most experts-
and most parents- believe it 1s highly desirable for a 
child ro receive full-time care in the first year 
of life. At a minimum, parents should be given this 
option. This is the rationale for the widespread support 
for adopting a parental leave policy; all other industri-
alized countries have adopted such leaves. 
The first year of life is a crittcal period for parent-
child bonding. It is now widely accepted that, in the 
absence of sound bonding, children are at much greater 
risk for emotional, academic, and social problems. As 
the National Commission on Children reports: 
In the first few months of life, infants 
begin to develop strong attachments to 
important caregivers. particularlv their 
parents. These attachments ... prov1de children 
a fundamental sense of mternal security .... 
Secure attachments do not mstanta-
neouslv. Thev reqmre the conststem avadabd-
of one or more adult~ who are affecttonate 
and resronsive to a child's and 
emotiOnal needs. ln the absence of strong 
attachments, many of these children will 
experience later intellectual defiCiencies, 
social problems, and emotional difficulties.:.'t 
Manv child-development experts believe that, 
ideally, all children would have a parent avadable full-
time Juring their first year, smce this is the surest wav 
of rrovidim; consistent care and emottonal im·olve-
ment. ''Lonng attachments develop graduallv out ot 
the many moments of engagement that occur between 
infant and rarent durmg dadv feedtnl!, barhinl!, 
diapering, and playmg. Learn tnt! t• 1 >\nchrom:e 
interactions also takes ttme 'Pent tcll;ether. 
low-income parents to care tor rhetr \'t:fV vount.; 
children mav be especiallv JestraHe. The amcltmr <>t 
-stress suffered by a parent h , 1ne ut r he ma m 
of poor att<Khment. Fc1r AFt K~ lllclther' tu ht: torct:d r. · 
cope with !tlh prnhlt:m'i .md rhe nn·cl w find ch1Lk.Irc· 
m additiun w the srress Clu,ed h J, '\' mu;mc :md tht: 
difficulties rhey mav han: m gettmc: medicalc.m·, 
certainly makes more ditfictdr for thnc 
mothers. If the child has or was born 
low-birth-wetght, condittons far more 
poor children, extra attenuun neeJed. 
through breast feeding poor mothers can help ensure 
adequate nutrition, facilitate 
Breast-feeding is more difficult for 
Of course, not all parents of newhoms can or 
choose to provide full-time care. Under the 
conditions, children can do well with alternative 
childcare. But, especially for infants and very young 
children, this care must be of the highest it 
requires no more than one adult for three children m 
order to attention, CLmtact and 
responsiveness. And the caretakers must be 
committed and well-trained. children (lJ 
is 
Few low-income mothers will be able to find 
childcare that meets these standards. 
High quality infant care can cost a 
year per child, far the means of poor 
Even less-than-high-qualny care ts AFDC 
will need subsidies to obtam care. 
There is not subsidi:ed care fnr a!l the low-
income families that now request it. A recent study h 
the California Department of Educanon found that 
there are twice as many AFDC 
in the GAIN program desiring placement of their 
infants in subsidized care as there are slots. 104 If the 
Initwt1ve passes that demand will certainly increase. 
ChilJcare also will have to be provided for the children 
uf teenagers who attend school; the Initiative makes no 
rroviSIOn for these needs. 
Many parents will tum to relatives and neighbors 
to fill in. This care will range from good to inadequate; 
there 1s substantial reason for concern that relative care 
will not provide the majority of infants or toddlers with 
the types of continuous and intimate interactions they 
require. In the course of their first year of life, many 
infants will be exposed to multiple caretakers, the worst 
poss1ble situation. It must be recognized that parents 
will need to find more than just a few hours of care a 
week. Just to replace the income lost after 6 months, 
recipients paying $2 an hour for childcare will need to 
work at least 20 hours a week, assuming that they earn 
around $5 per hour, the average earnings of recipients 
now working. 105 The children will be in care longer 
than the 20 hours, since the mothers must get to and 
from work. It is not possible that adequate care by a 
single caretaker can be provided to the more than 
200,000 infants affected by the cuts. 
There also is reason for concern that working will 
impa1r, not improve, the quality of attention that single 
mothers of very young children can provide to their 
children. Infants need a great deal of attention from 
their parents. With the added stress of work, often 
under poor working conditions, many mothers simply 
will not be able to provide this type of attention to 
their newborns. Attention to older children in the 
famt!v also w1ll decline. Childcare problems may 
negauvely affect the mothers job performance, as welL 
Whtle there 1s evidence that the emotional well-being 
of mothers sometimes is enhanced by work, the 
research mdicates this is true for mothers of older 
children who like their work and believe that their 
children are receiving good careY16 
Finally, there may well be other unintended 
consequences of the proposals. California now provides 
higher childcare subsidies for recipients participating in 
GAIN education and training programs than for 
working recipients. As discussed earlier, the Initiative 
would push parents out of such programs and into low-
paymg jobs. AFOC recipients may actually lose 
benettts. It also is possible that if more slots are made 
avadable, places will be denied to the children of low-
income workers who do not receive AFDC, but are 
now eligible for subsidi:ed care. The overall impact on 
childcare rates created by the increased demand also 
needs consideration. 
Child Older Than Two. In contrast to infant care, 
moM experts believe that, in general, children aged two 
to ftve are not harmed, and often are benefited if they 
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spend time in good childcare. In any case, if, as a result 
of the Initiative, more parents require childcare, thetr 
children will find themselves in no worse a situatton 
than the millions of children whose working parents 
currently place them in vanous forms of childcare. 
The key issue is whether mothers forced to go to 
work can find good quality care. ln the study by the 
California Department of Education, discussed above, 
the lack of available care was not limited to families 
with very young children; most of the GAIN families 
had children older than three, and 60% of the children 
on waiting lists were school-aged. Moreover, there were 
nearly 200,000 non-welfare children on the waitmg 
lists, many with priority status. 
Recent studies indicate that many employed 
AFOC recipients are dissatisfied with their child care 
arrangements. 107 The majority of recipients rely on 
relatives and do so to a greater degree than other 
working parents. While some do so by preference, 
many rely on relatives for reasons of cost or because 
they cannot find group care at the times they work, 
before 6:00a.m., after 6:00p.m. and on weekends. One 
recent survey of AFDC mothers in Boston, Charlotte, 
and Denver found that more than two-thirds of the 
recipients relying on relatives would have preferred 
some other type of care. 10~ The unreliability of rela-
tives, with respect to both availability and quality of 
care, is a frequently expressed problem. 
There is good reason, therefore, for concern that 
even older children will not necessarily receive 
adequate care. Just recently, the Panel on Child Care 
Policy of the National Academy of Sciences concluded 
that: 
Poor quality care ... threatens children's 
development, especially children from poor 
and minority families .... Arranging quality 
child care can be difficult, stressful, and time 
consuming for all famtlies. However, the 
problems are inevitably compounded for low-
income families who lack time, information, 
and economic resources. For these families, 
the choices are often more limited, and the 
consequences of inadequate care are likely to 
be more severe. 109 
If children receive adequate care, the picture 
would be quite different, at least with respect to 
children 3 and older. Children may benefit just from 
the fact that the parent is working; if the parent is able 
to increase family income there would be further 
benefit. Working often ratses mothers' self-esteem and 
broadens their social networks, both of which may 
enhance their parenting abilities.ll° Furthermore, if 
moving into the workforce becomes the first step in a 
process ultimately leading to substantial increases in 
income, this would clearly benefit children, as long as 
they recetve reasonable quality childcare. The poten-
tial effects on children may depend upon the 
of the parents job, however. If the Job is 
or overly stressful, this could impair the care 
they provide to their children. 
final 
Parents Versus Non-working Parents. One 
is whether children will be better-off 
solely because their parents have entered the 
workforce, even if the family remains poor? This 
question is by Zill's research. His findings 
indicate that in almost aU aspects of development 
children of poor working parents are as damaged by 
living in poverty as children whose parents rely on 
AFDC. These findings indicate that the risks from poor 
childcare are not balanced by any advantages that 
might come from having a "working poor" parent. 
Although living in a "working poor" family may 
not help children in the short-run, perhaps this will 
redound to their long-term benefit. A primaty concern 
of the Initiative's proponents is the fact that some 
children who grow up in families that receive AFDC 
become recipients themselves as adults (or as teen 
mothers). The Initiative specifically mentions the 
problem of "intergenerational dependency." 
it would be desirable to protect children 
from factors that increase the likelihood that they will 
need to rely on AFDC as adults. Research indicates 
that one-third of all children who live 
AFOC become recipients them-
two-thirds do not. 111 This research also 
finds that the length of time parents receive AFDC 
not the likelihood that their 
wdl ever support, although it is related 
of time they may need support. 
The fact that in some families several generations 
receive support does not mean, however, that the 
reliance on AFOC caused the child's later 
AFOC use. Other factors, most notably the fact that 
families AFOC are poor, may account for the 
child's future use of AFOC. Before "blaming" AFDC 
use, it is necessary to know whether children from poor 
families receive AFDC are more likely to require 
AFOC adults children from poor families that 
do not receive AFDC. 
This has studied by a number of 
researchers. 111 To simplify a complicated matter, the 
studies indicate that children who live in poor families 
are far more likely to receive AFDC as adults than 
children who never experience poverty. Among those 
children who do experience poverty, however, welfare 
receipt itself does not substantially increase the 
chances that a child will end up requiring support. 
Poverty, not AFOC receipt, largely accounts for 
"intergenerational dependency." These findings 
indicate that to help all families avoid poverty, 
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and programs that enable poor parents to earn more 
than poverty wages, will reduce the of 
children needing support m the future. In contrast, JUSt 
moving parents into poor wtl! have. at 
most, only a vety small effect on children's 
welfare use. 
Children of Teen Mothers 
teenage mothers 
are designed births to teens. and 
to minimize the that teens who do have 
children will become dependent on welfare for 
periods of time, both the and 
provisions could affect the children of teenage mothers. 
It is not possible to estimate the overall of 
the co-residence Although many re-
searchers have documented the faced 
children born to teen mothers, few have examined 
whether the teen mother's of residence has an 
impact on her children. Those who have have reached 
different conclusions. 11 3 A 1982 study of 60 teen 
mothers found that those who lived with thetr parents 
were likely to be restnctive and punitive in rhe1r 
parenting than teen mothers who thetr , 1wn 
households and a mid-1970s study of first-grade 
children found that those living in mother-alone 
households were at greater risk for soctal 
than those who lived in mother-grandmother famtl!es. 
In contrast, one recent study found that co-restdence 
was related to and 
grandmothering and a second recent of 
mothers, many of them found that 
mothers 
verbal responsiveness and greater involvement with 
their infants than mothers who remained in the 
parental home. At this it appears that the 
residence will have both and 
negative children that mav cancel 
each other out. 
Many more teen mothers will 
Cal-Learn than the 
ment. Unfortunately, no studies 
compare the parenting and 
of teen mothers who have 
those who remain in 
studies comparing the 




lead to better 
pregnant students and for 
may lead mothers to get 
care during the pregnancy, thus improving chances 
that children will be born healthy; may also 
u''""u'""' better parents. extent the 
Initiative facilitates attendance in such classes, both 
the mothers and their children are likely to benefit. 
There 1s another side to the picture, however. For 
a young mother, school is one more task to cope with. 
Especially if she is not a good student, the added 
pressure may impinge on her psychological readiness to 
focus on her child's needs. 114 lt may be very hard for 
these mothers to attend school every day; yet, if they 
do not, they will lose critical income. And if the 
mother does not have adequate childcare, the require-
ment of school attendance may result in an extremely 
bad environment for the child. 
In light of the fact that the majority of teen 
mothers already attend school, it is uncertain whether 
the potential benefits to children outweigh the 
potential harms that could result from forcing teen 
mothers into bad living situations, unwelcome school 
environments or greater poverty. As noted earlier, 
other approaches probably would be far more effective, 
albeit more expensive in the short-run. 
Children in Families from Other States 
As we have shown, even if the Initiative passes 
many families still will move to California and wind-up 
havmg no job and income. These families will face 
three choices. They can move elsewhere in hopes of 
finding a job; they can move in with family or friends, 
if any are available, and depend on them for support; or 
they can apply for AFOC, receiving the amount they 
would have received in their previous state of resi-
dence. Whatever the choice, the well-being of many 
children w1ll suffer. 
If parents remain in California and need AFOC 
support, the families will be extremely poor. Many will 
be t(1fced to live in cars or vans or the worst quality 
housing. Some famtlies will become homeless, some 
chddren may be placed into foster care, voluntarily or 
involuntarily. Others will move in with family or 
friends under highly crowded conditions. There is no 
way to determine how many children will experience 
these various outcomes; as many as 50,000 children are 
potentially affected. Their situation must be included 
in any calculations. 
Summary 
The approach taken in the Initiative will harm 
chtlJren m three ways. First, many children will live 
deeper in poverty, since it is certain that a substantial 
proportion of the families will not be able to replace 
the lost income. This will impair children's physical 
health, academic performance, and emotional well-
bemg. The loss of family income will affect children 
directly hy depriving them of access to needed services. 
Even more importantly, the quality of parental care 
will decline, due to the added stress on parents. 
Second, because the Initiative fails to assure that 
adequate childcare will be made available to working 
parents, many children will be left in inadequate homes 
or daycare centers. As the National Academy of 
Sciences has pointed out, low quality childcare poses a 
major threat to the health and development of the 
nation's children. Finally, applying the cuts ro mothers 
of children under a year of age creates especially great 
risks for these children. If these mothers are forced to 
work parent-child bonding may be impaired; it any case 
most of these children will receive inadequate 
childcare. This picture may sound overly bleak, but the 
data detailing the developmental deficits among poor 
children allow for little optimism. 
In assessing the overall consequences of the 
proposals, it must be considered that these children 
already face numerous obstacles to normal develop-
ment. First, the children currently live in poverty, wtth 
its attendant consequences; negative events have their 
greatest impact on those already vulnerable. Second, 
almost half of the children are five and under, 200,00 
are under 1; young children are the most vulnerable to 
inadequate care by their parents or by other caregivers. 
Third, the vast majority of these children live with a 
single parent, who often is quite young as well; without 
the back-up of another parent or adult, many smgle 
parents have a difficult time meeting all of the1r 
children's needs, especially when the parent is under 
stress. Fourth, many of the families enter the welfare 
system following a divorce or separation, an event 
which itself jeopardizes children's well-being, at least 
for a period of time. Finally, many of the families live 
in neighborhoods that lack the kinds of serviCes -
such as high quality childcare and medical services -
that can enable parents to help their children cope 
with all these other problems. Research on chtld 
development has shown that, in general, it 1s the 
cumulative impact of several factors, not the existence 
of any particular problem, that causes developmental 
delays and harmful behaviors among children. And 
when multiple adverse conditions are present, the 
harms children experience increase exponenttally. 
These are not inevitable consequences of all 
welfare reforms. ln fact, if older children were provided 
with good childcare and teen parents were assured 
places in high quality school programs designed to meet 
their special needs, a policy that encouraged and 
helped parents find jobs and brought teen mothers back 
to school would benefit both children and parents. 
The ends of the Initiative are good for children, it is 
the means that are deficient. 
CAN SERVICES SUBSTITUTE? , 
In numerous speeches and in the ballot arguments, 
Governor Wilson has expressed the view that the 
money now spent on AFDC would be better spent on 
other children's services, such as education. One 
interpretation of this statement is that the proponents 
of the Initiative believe that the money now being 
spent on AFOC cash grants would be better spent on 
other servtces for poor children, such as Head Start. 
This raises two empirical issues: ( 1) Do poor children 
benefit more from direct services than from income 
support? and ( 2) Can the impact of the grant reduc-
tions be neutralized by providing poor children with 
other services, including better access to medical care, 
preschool, and special educational programs? The 
answer to both these questions is no. 
We note, to begin with, that poor children clearly 
need and benefit from the types of services the Gover-
nor supporrs. As a supplement to an adequate income 
program they are invaluable. They accomplish things 
that income alone cannot guarantee. However, while 
these programs are a critical supplement to income 
supporr, are not a substitute. Programs like Head . 
Start, Healthy Start, and school reform work best when 
parents are heavily involved in the program. For many 
children, none of these programs are effective if 
parents are functioning badly. This has been well-
documented in Head Start and school reform 
efforts.ll5 
Since placing parents under enormous financial 
strains generates inadequate parenting and prevents 
parental involvement in activities with their children, 
the cuts will undermine the effectiveness of other 
programs. It therefore would be a mistake to treat this 
as an either or choice. It makes little sense to 
more money on services to poor children while at the 
same time undercuttmg the effectiveness of 
services. As the National Commission on Children 
stated: "If our society is committed to supporting 
families as the basic institutton for children, 
and if all children are to have an to 
develop to their full then it is necessary for 
families to be more economtcally secure." 116 
ARE THERE ALTERNATIVES? 
The analysis in this report focuses on the likely 
impacts of the specific provisions in the Initiative. Our 
review indicates that these provisions will accomplish 
little welfare "reform", yet they will result in substantial 
harm to children. As noted throughout the report, 
however, the goals of the Initiative' proponents 
command widespread support, among recipients as well 
as within the general public and those who have 
studied the welfare system. While the approach 
adopted in the Initiative will harm children, this does 
not mean that welfare reform is impossible. 
There are many alternatives approaches to welfare 
reform, proposed by groups and individuals whose views 
span the entire political spectrum. Some envision 
changes much more extensive than those found in the 
Initiative; the California Legislative Analyst also has 
suggested less extensive legislative changes that could 
increase work incentives without reducing benefits. 117 
All of these proposals recognize that whatever ap-
proach is taken avoiding harm to children must be a 
central goal. While a full description of these proposals 
is beyond the scope of this report, the core of virtually 
all other suggested programs is a system that combines 
job training, high quality childcare, and some means of 
ensuring that parents who work earn enough from that 
work to support their families at an adequate level. The 
proposals also focus on the need to hold fathers 
responsible for child support. 
In fact, California already has a program that 
incorporates many of these features, the GAIN 
program. As noted earlier, California was the first state 
to establish a mandatory work-job training program for 
AFDC recipients. In order to help recipients become 
truly self-sufficient the GAIN legislation requires state 
and local welfare agencies to provide a wide array of 
employment and support services for all AFOC 
Ill 
applicants and recipients. In addition to education 
and \or job training GAIN recipients may be eligible 
for the provision of money for transportation, b(x)ks, 
tuition, uniforms and other costs associated with 
training and education programs. Although the GAIN 
activities have never been fully funded, preliminary 
findings from research on the program indicate that it 
has increased the hours of work and the income of 
recipients. 118 
In order to protect the needs of children, GAIN 
provides a childcare entitlement. In addition, the 
statute authorizes three months of transitional 
childcare and four to nine months of Medi-Cal to 
participants who become employed through GAIN and 
lose their AFOC benefits. Finally, single mothers with 
children under 3 are exempted from the mandatory 
requirements. 
We cannot examine here the merits of GAIN 
versus other possible approaches to welfare ret()rm. And 
our criticism of the Initiative is not necessarily meant 
to be an endorsement of GAIN; a great deal wtll be 
learned from the evaluations. We do, however, endorse 
its goal of trying to protect the needs of children at the 
same time as trying to help recipients obtain jobs. As 
stated at the outset, we believe that Californians 
should, and do, want to make children's well-being a 
top priority. It was this premise that motivated our 
efforts to determine how the Initiative would affect 
children. 
It seems clear that the Initiative does not meet this 
test. Children will be hurt and the welfare system will 
continue to function much as it has in the past. The 
negative effects will be greatest for the youngest 
children and parents with the least job readiness. These 
will be the real, if unintended, consequences of thts 
proposal. 
1 QH ( JLJ 
'I. Appendix A ' ' 
Data Sources 
The used in this paper were drawn from the 
following five primary sources. 
I. Data and Materials Related to Welfare Programs for 
Families with Children, Prepared by the Staff for the 
Use of Committee on Finance, United States 
Senate: Also known as "The Green Book," this 
source compiles information on characteristics of 
AFDC recipients across all fifty states and U.S. 
territories. The information on the states is used to 
construct estimates of averages and medians for the 
entire U.S. population. The Green Book also 
provides information about program benefits for 
AFDC, Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax 
Credit at the federal level. 
These data are compiled from the National 
Integrated Quality Control System (QC). The QC 
provides data on roughly 75,000 AFDC cases. This 
represents a sample drawn from all fifty states and 
U.S. territories. Information for each household 
member includes age, race, sex, employment 
status, income (if any) and relationship to the 
household head. For each AFDC unit, the date on 
which the unit last began to receive AFDC 
benefits -providing information on the 
length of welfare spells. Program 
eligibiliry and benefit levels can be calculated on 
the basis of income, assets, and work-related and 
child care expenses. 
These data are probably the best source of informa-
tion about the characteristics of current AFDC 
families nationally, both because the sample is 
because information relating to program 
rules IS reported. At the same time, because only 
households getting AFDC are included, the QC 
cannot be used to compare recipients with non-
l. Characteristics and Financial Circumstances of AFOC 
·An annual publication of the U.S. 
Health and Human Services, this 
manual compiles about AFDC 
recipients across states and U.S. territo-
ries. The source of the data is the QC, described 
above. While some of the information overlaps 
with the Green Book, this publication provides 
detailed information about individual recipients of 
AFDC and therefore permits comparison of the 
children, male recipients, and female recipients of 
AFDC across the fifty states. 
3. California Statistical Abstract, 1991: A publication 
of the California Department of Finance, Financial 
and Economic Research Unit, this volume is a 




The authors relied on this source for information 
about unemployment and the county 
level in California. The source of the 
population data is the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
primary source of the 
California Employment 
Labor Market Information Division. Other sources 
included United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the California of 
Industrial Relations. 
Public Welfare in California and AFDC Charactem-
tics Surveys: A monthly publication of the Data 
Processing and Stattsttcal Services Bureau, 
Department of Social Public Welfare 
an up-to-date report of the size of the AFDC-FG 
and AFDC-U rolls bv county. This publication 
also provides information on benefit levels and size 
of food stamp and AFDC grants. The authors 
relied on this source for county level information 
on participation in the AFDC program. 
The AFDC Charactenstics 
from special surveys taken 
of AFDC recipients. surveys obtain data not 
regularly reported in Public Welfare in Califomu. 
The most recent survevs were in January 1991 and 
April 1990. Because are relativelv 
random . 
entire population. In 
centages be four percentage 
lower than the percentage. 
These surveys are to examine 
special interest regardmg welfare 
data in them are not in 
that enables one to use them directly in 
or 
the various provisions of the Initiative; the survevs 
were not designed for purpose. However. up~n 
request the State Social Services 
does special runs for with research intere'itS 
regarding AFDC svstem. 
tion was ~..vttcLLcu 
AFDC 
Appendix B 
State-by-State Comparison of AFDC, Food Stamps & Housing Subsidies 
Monthly Fair Rank of 
Combined Market Rents State re: 
AFDC& for 2-bedr. Combined Combined 
Food Stamps apartment benefits benefits 
( 1992) (1991) less FMR less FMR 
Alabama $441 $390 51 38 
Alaska 184 550 634 I 
Arizona 620 570 so 39 
Arkansas 496 10 86 32 
California 850 750 100 30 
Colorado 636 480 156 22 
Connecticut 862 680 82 19 
Delaware 673 730 -57 51 
DC 623 590 33 44 
Florida 595 520 75 33 
Georgia 572 500 72 34 
Hawaii 1077 700 377 2 
Idaho 607 540 67 35 
Illinois 649 610 39 42 
Indiana 580 450 130 24 
Iowa 685 470 215 13 
Kansas 697 460 237 7 
Kentucky 520 410 110 27 
Lousisana 482 470 12 46 
Maine 703 590 113 26 
Maryland 668 610 58 37 
Massachusetts 764 780 -16 49 
Michigan 708 490 218 II 
Minnesota 759 530 229 9 
Mississippi 412 430 -18 50 
Missouri 584 450 134 23 
Montana 659 480 179 20 
Nebraska 564 440 124 25 
Nevada 667 680 -13 48 
New Hampshire 748 660 88 I 
New jersey 691 650 41 41 
New Mexico 613 510 103 28 
New York 806 610 196 16 
North Carolina 641 420 221 10 
North Dakota 647 440 207 14 
Ohio 334 440 184 8 
Oklahoma 625 440 185 17 
Oregon 744 510 234 8 
Pennsyvania 681 510 71 21 
Rhode Island 812 610 202 15 
South Carolina 502 400 102 29 
South Dakota 670 430 240 6 
Tennessee 477 430 7 40 
Texas 476 460 6 45 
Utah 668 410 258 5 
Vermont 857 640 217 12 
Virginia 634 570 64 36 
Washington 541 530 II 47 
West Virginia 784 450 334 3 
Wisconsin 748 470 278 4 
Wyoming 638 600 38 43 
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rhe Initiative on both participation rates and work 
by recipients. For a full dtscussion of these points 
seeM. Wiseman, "The New State Welfare 
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